I haven't responded to these topics at length for a couple of reasons, chief of which is that it's hard to write coherently when you're watching a human nightmare unfold in close to real time and it feels like you need a close to daily Johnny Walker nightcap to help sleep at night, as I have friends and acquaintances from Ukraine who have thankfully managed to flee to Poland or Moldova (for those interested, here's where I go for my doomscrolling).
-To start I can't help but observe just how astoundingly prescient former Russian GenStab member Mikhail Khodarenok was at the beginning of February on outcome of the "Special Operation". Translation provided by the excellent <<Russian Defense Policy>> blog and excerpts provided for emphasis:
"To assert that no one in Ukraine will defend the regime signifies practically a complete lack of knowledge about the military-political situation and moods of the broad masses in the neighboring state. And the degree of hatred (which, as is well-known, is the most effective fuel for armed conflict) in the neighboring republic toward Moscow is plainly underestimated. No one in Ukraine will meet the Russian army with bread, salt and flowers.
It seems events in south-east Ukraine in 2014 didn’t teach anyone anything. Then they also figured that the entire left-bank Ukraine in one fell swoop and ticked-off seconds would turn into Novorossiya. They already drew the maps, thought out the personnel contingent for the future city and regional administrations, worked out state flags.
But even the Russian-speaking population of this part of Ukraine (including also cities like Kharkov, Zaporozhe, Dnepropetrovsk, Mariupol) didn’t support similar thoughts by a huge majority. The “Novorossiya” project somehow imperceptibly deflated and quietly died.
In a word, a liberation crusade in 2022 in the form and likeness of 1939 won’t work in any way. In this instance the words of Soviet literature classic Arkadiy Gaydar are true as never before: “It’s obvious that now we won’t have an easy battle, but a hard campaign.”
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To this it’s certainly necessary to add that supplies of prospective and highly-accurate weapons in the VS RF don’t bear any kind of unlimited character. “Tsirkon” hypersonic missiles still aren’t in the armory. And the quantity of “Kalibrs” (sea-based cruise missiles), “Kinzhals,” Kh-101 (air-launched cruise missiles) and missiles for “Iskanders” in the very best case number in the hundreds (dozens in the case of “Kinzhals”). This arsenal is completely insufficient to wipe a state on the scale of France with a population of more than 40 million from the face of the earth. And Ukraine is characterized by exactly these parameters."
-Ever since the lines seemingly ossified in at the end of 2014 I had deep suspicions that the Russian armed forces were going to have a substantially harder time moving beyond the Donbass due to the potential morale problems we are seeing now; the Russian armed forces would be invading a fellow Slavic country with a shared cultural and religious background and most Ukrainians are able to speak Russian, fluently in fact. In spite of a painful history between Ukraine and Russia a conflict was as unthinkable for most westerners as the state of Iowa invading Minnesota (I'm reminded of this poignant exchange between Simon Ostrovsky and Ukrainian Naval Infantry from back in 2014). What's more I had believed the addition of the FGM-148 Javelin to the Ukrainian arsenal (which in retrospect should have happened in the direct aftermath of the MH-17 shootdown, not in 2018 when Ukraine had long since ramped up production of domestic ATGMs, which made up for their lack of sophistication in comparison to the Javelin with sheer numbers) was going to be something that would give Russian armour pause due to how devious the thermal imaging mode of the CLU and its launch-and-leave features were going to be on top of the fact that current hard-kill APS measure cannot account for top attack projectiles.
-The seemingly derelict Russian Air Force can in part be attributed to the fact that the Russian armed forces tend to treat air power more as "extended range artillery" which drops ordinance no more than 100-150km behind enemy lines, and not as a means of conducting deep battlefield interdiction as western Allied air forces pioneered in Europe in 1943-1945 and the US codified into doctrine with AirLand Battle in the 1980s. For this the Russian Armed Forces would have left the task to breakthrough exploitation force (not happening now, for obvious reasons) or to their missile artillery and cruise missile bombers (both only effective against stationary targets). What has not helped is the severe lack of PGMs and advanced imaging infrared targeting pods in the Russian inventory (the most advanced targeting system in use is the Su-34's targeting system which only has an LLTV mode, which doesn't compare favourably to western IIR-capable offerings like Sniper XR or the ATFLIR) which has limited their ability to engage pop-up targets from a safe enough altitude (most Russian aircraft losses were from MANPADS, as they had to fly low in order to hit targets with any meaningful accuracy, which was fine in Syria, where the MANPADS inventory of rebels quickly dwindled to nothing).
-All these factors lead to what is seemingly the only viable strategy left in the minds of the Kremlin, which is to follow the formula they used in Syria, which is to savage Eastern Ukraine and bomb all the civilian infrastructure that makes it possible for the remaining population to make the call that they're better off sitting tight. After all no population left = no partisans or potential troublemakers for the now evidently woefully-inadequate invasion force to deal with (some folks who like living inside their tanks insist that the Russians are making real progress in terms of territory, to which I say: "So, what? They haven't even gotten to what was supposed to be the actual _hard part_ yet, which is installing their Quisling and rebuilding a country while everyone is shooting at them). The message is this: "You want liberal democracy? A small/Mittelstand business climate that isn't (as) racked by corruption and cronyism? Go move to the EU for that, because here it's 'Putin or we burn the country.'"
Will add more tomorrow night.