The All Things Political Topic - Nothing strengthens authority so much as silence

[Zoraptor]

It's largely a matter of US attitude. While not explicitly a peace treaty Obama negotiated the JCPOA with Iran fine ten years ago, and it largely worked; even after Trump pulled the US out of it Iran remained in compliance for most (all?) of the agreed restrictions. The subsequent two Presidents failed miserably whether it be with Iran or Palestine because they gave unqualified support to one side. That, fundamentally, is not really negotiating as the mediator isn't actually a mediator but a cheerleader, and it's no surprise that it doesn't work. It's no accident that Obama actually got an agreement against a backdrop of strident Israeli criticism.

The original Camp David worked because Israel was willing to give something up and Carter was willing to negotiate in (broadly) good faith. Let's be honest, if they were being negotiated, now, the US would probably be demanding Israel get half the transit fees from the Suez Canal and keep the Sinai. The other half goes to... a US slush fund for investments in Egypt, maybe? Cue unbiased mediators and Hasbara saying how nice Israel is being for not demanding the Pyramids too since the Israelites built them.

(To be fair to Trump, he too had a successful negotiation- with the Taleban. While the end result was somewhat embarrassing it was always coming, and was always going to be an embarrassment; it was just a question of how much more sunk cost was going to be added to the tally. Bush and Obama had 15 years of not talking to the Taleban to get Afghanistan in a fit state, an extra 8 years of Hillary was not likely to result in anything other what happened in 2021 happening in 2029 instead)

[rjshae]

In case we forget what the first amendment does for us:

Saudi Arabia executes a journalist after 7 years behind bars. Activists say it was over his tweets

[ShadySands]

I doubt anything will come of this but I found it interesting considering everything that is going on with El Salvador and USAID

https://www.propublica.org/article/bukele-trump-el-salvador-ms13-gang-vulcan-corruption-investigation

Quote

Investigation Impeded: Despite Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele’s crime fighter reputation, his top aides blocked extraditions of MS-13 leaders to the U.S., officials say.
Money Laundering Inquiry: U.S. agents drew up a request to examine whether Bukele and senior officials had diverted USAID funds to help out MS-13 gang members.
Salvadoran Allies Threatened: Law enforcement officials had to flee El Salvador after facing harassment and threats from the country’s government.

 

[Malcador]

So I guess Iran will submit by the end of the week

[pmp10]

There is no reliable way for us to judge that.
Iran wasn't offered any face-savers yet, but then the operation was planned for weeks.

[Malcador]

12 minutes ago, pmp10 said:

There is no reliable way for us to judge that.
Iran wasn't offered any face-savers yet, but then the operation was planned for weeks.

Just judging on Israeli acting with impunity so far, Iranian missile salvos seem fewer but maybe they're saving up some.  Never know, could have something amusing like an F-35 crashing due to malfunction in Iran.

[Gfted1]

5 minutes ago, Malcador said:

...could have something amusing like an F-35 crashing due to malfunction in Iran.

Then we simply activate the kill switch.  

[Malcador]

29 minutes ago, Gfted1 said:

Then we simply activate the kill switch.  

Well was more thinking if they nab an IAF pilot. 

[Sarex]

29 minutes ago, Malcador said:

Well was more thinking if they nab an IAF pilot. 

They claim they captured 2 and killed one so far.

Doesn't seem conclusive from the video:

 

Edited Monday at 11:43 PM by Sarex

[Malcador]

https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-attack-strikes-news-06-16-25-intl-hnk#cmbzpjbe2000s3b6xvad2fl3l

 

Trump said people should evacuate Tehran, quit the G7 meeting too. I guess the US jumping in.

[Gromnir]

4 hours ago, Malcador said:

So I guess Iran will submit by the end of the week

dunno, but after israel went after hezbollah, this were the increasing likely outcome... but am still not sure what israel sees in the fog of war for this new front to make sense.

for decades, israel were doing the mow the grass approach in gaza, kneecapping hamas but recognizing that genuine weeding 'em out were too much effort and pointless as whichever group came after hamas would likely be ideological as bad.  worse, hamas 2.0 might be more capable; hamas were incompetent at providing basic government services and israel seemed to think they were a limited threat insofar as their terrorist ambitions. hamas popularity were always low, save for immediate after terrorist or mass rocket attacks. get rid o' hamas seemed pointless when any alternative were likely to be worse. 

personally we couldn't figure out the gaza campaign beyond the initial retributive stages... until israel attacked hezbollah. the carnage in gaza made little sense to us as the idf were going so far to gain so little. the next hamas would be just as bad, and there would be legit reason for the palestinians to be more supportive o' river to the sea goals. the post october 7 gaza campaign were creating a generational wound. again, hamas were only ever popular with the people of gaza after they killed israelis. whenever hamas popularity got dangerous low, they committed some kinda "atrocity" against israel, and that seemed to mollify the people of gaza for a time. the vulgar levels o' violence done by israel in gaza were only gonna make hamas, or the next hamas, more sympathetic when that group carried out bloodshed against israelis. however, going after hezbollah made sense o' gaza 'cause it revealed israel were not interested in just getting rid of hamas; israel had larger goals.

again, destroying hamas were gonna be bloody and pointless, 'cause whoever came next would be just as bad if not worse. the real danger was that the next hamas would be more competent. the thing is, israel recognized that october 7 happened 'cause o' iranian support o' hamas. once israel attacked hezbollah, it looked to us like their ambitions for a post october 7 were much more comprehensive than regime change in gaza. iran were likely always the ultimate ideal goal after october 7.

is doubtful the israeli plan has gone exact according to the post oct 7 script, but am suspecting they always wanted to level gaza, decapitate hezbollah and the US were s'posed to neuter the houthis-- can't trust the americans to do anything right these days, eh?  iran were always the ultimate goal, but could israel pull that off w/o facing the initial hamas quandary? what does regime change in iran really get israel... 'cause is obvious to us this ain't really about the iranian nuke program. 

israel intelligence shocking blundered in a big way regarding october 7 and am thinking that since that time, israel has been incremental building up to the iran attacks we see today, but am admitted not fully comprehending what is the final goal. even if regime change were somehow successful, how would that make the situation for israel better? the next iran is gonna be more huggable and less competent? serious? am giving israel credit for accurate predicting that the rest o' the arab world would sit idle and watch gaza burn. so far, israel also appears to have guessed right about the level o' outrage from the arab states following attacks on lebanon and iran. 

the US joining in to take down iran? if there is one thing which might encourage other arab states to come to iran's aid, the great satan aiding israel more direct might do it... but we got no real insights about what the arabs would or wouldn't do save to observe that israel has been more prescient than we gave 'em credit.

still, none o' this actually makes sense to us save as a way to temporarily save netanyahu's political bacon, no pun intended. bloody regime change in iran poses similar issues as does regime change in gaza-- is worse 'cause the scale is so much larger in iran, and iran does have the know-how and basic resources to construct nukes. israel avoided regime change in gaza for many years and following innumerable rocket attacks precise 'cause the outcomes didn't justify the costs. why would israel believe the situation with iran is better? am admitted baffled by the reason and logic, but this might not be about reason and logic.

HA! Good Fun!

[uuuhhii]

35 year after cold war people are really overestimating the resilience of human civilization

if that one guy didn't refuse to launch nuke during cuban crisis not much would be left

[rjshae]

Apparently no strikes in eastern Iran. Range limit perhaps?

[Zoraptor]

We've had months of the US and various Israelis saying the plan is to depopulate Gaza, months of a completely illegal blockade of essential goods and more than year of indiscriminate large scale bombing, shootings and artillery. We've had systematic targeting of journalists, the specific and targeted murder and torture of medical workers, those counting the dead and aid workers, imposition of concentration camps ("islands of peace" or whatever bollocks Hagani came up with) those seeking food aid and the deaths of women/ children/ men are in near perfect ratio to the population's. It's pretty bloody obvious what is happening and the endgame is unless you really, really, really want to ignore the truth.

Or to put it another way, just imagine the reaction and terms that would be used if it were China or Russia* doing it, instead of Israel.

We've had Israel break the truce in Gaza, we've had Israel invade Syria, we've had Israel continue bombing its neighbours and all the rest. We've had Israel launch an attack on Iran with no proximal** reason. Definition of a rogue state and everything is perfectly well explained by the pattern of sociopathic narcissism that has so very clearly been exhibited by its leadership, and enabled by the unrestricted support of a bunch of gross hypocrites and moral cowards in western leadership. 

*Strangely, the same people who burble on about 377 Ukrainian children being 'kidnapped' as a clear cut case of 'genocide' suddenly develop blindness when it's 20k Palestinian children being killed by Israel and hundreds of thousands more being starved, and the same reporters reporting that outrage and describing Putin as an indicted war criminal decide the Palestinian children all just died, who knows what of? and still describe Netanyahu as just Israel's PM.

**First occurrence I could find of "Iran imminently going to have nuclear bomb" from Bibi is from... 1998. The first estimate I could find from US intelligence was that they could have one by 2000.

Iran nukes and cold fusion, perpetually just a little longer away.

[Malcador]

And of all days, two tankers collide in the Gulf

[Gromnir]

logic failure. the fact iran hasn't developed nukes does not in anyway diminish the possibility that they have been one year away from developing a nuke for over a decade. iran no doubt made the calculation that they have more advantage being on the cusp o' producing a nuclear weapon than the costs o' actual possessing nuclear weapons would entail. iran has possessed the know how for a long time and they got most o' the infrastructure necessary to build a nuclear weapon. all they needed were time and will. iran has chosen nay as 'posed to yay... thus far. 

our neighbor has a phd in chemistry from brown. perhaps we once gave her sh!t about going to brown, 

in spite o' our joking, she has a legit degree and +30 years of experience working both at jpl and then teaching at major universities. she knows chemistry.

if our neighbor wanted to, could she build a device similar (considerable more efficacious) than the one used by timothy mcveigh? of course she could. the fact she hasn't gone ahead and built such a monstrosity is hardly proof she is incapable of doing so. 

duh.

curiously, our neighbor is a middling cook, though we suspect she could do baking w/o much difficulty. is not as if she is a terrible cook like in bad anime, but am having seen her make omelets, roast chicken and have watched her attempt to grill foods and am feeling a bit embarrassed for her even if we pretend to enjoy what she serves. honest, we don't know why it would be so hard for a world class chemist to follow a recipe, but...

in any event, october 7 and hamas keeping hostages, some o' whom were abused and/or sexually assaulted, gave israel's initial retributive efforts legitimacy in many corners o' the globe that other chronic war crimers don't have.  israel, in spite o' their october 7 blunder, correctly predicted that the outrage over palasteninas suffering in gaza would amount to sound and fury. am genuine surprised israel calculations proved accurate, given the ugly humanitarian crisis israel indulged in beyond any seeming reasonable efforts to remove/punish hamas and get hostages returned. we woulda' thought there were a limit to how much palestinian suffering arab nations and the US would accept before making serious efforts to intervene, but am admitting we were wrong. 

the thing is, am suspecting too many arab nations is even less sympathetic about iranian suffering than they were 'bout palestinian. but again, the potential downsides o' a conflict 'tween israel and iran is so not similar to the worst-case scenarios for israel v. hamas. we woulda' expected a bit more pushback after the initial israeli preventative attacks. shows we don't know enough to provide meaningful analysis, but we don't pretend to neither.

HA! Good Fun!

ps (edit) am not sure about everybody else, but pete hegseth taking time to go on jessie waters to reassure the world that a US attack on tehran was not imminent was very comforting. (<--sarcasm) 

Edited Tuesday at 05:24 AM by Gromnir

[pmp10]

4 hours ago, Zoraptor said:

We've had Israel break the truce in Gaza, we've had Israel invade Syria, we've had Israel continue bombing its neighbours and all the rest. We've had Israel launch an attack on Iran with no proximal** reason. Definition of a rogue state and everything is perfectly well explained by the pattern of sociopathic narcissism that has so very clearly been exhibited by its leadership, and enabled by the unrestricted support of a bunch of gross hypocrites and moral cowards in western leadership. 

There is always (admittedly a little conspiratorial) possibility that far from being rogue, Israel is doing exactly what it was asked to do.
The wider west could have already made the decision to start bombing but hopes Israel can win by itself or at least goad Iran into escalation serving as an excuse.

Granted, it does seems a little too clever for Trump.

[Zoraptor]

There's no chance. This whole thing has been an utter disaster for western credibility including the US. Every single country that actually cares about Ukraine has watched Israel crap all over their talking points and had people outright laughing at them for the hypocrisy about war crimes and aggressive war. They've proved every single accusation about their inconsistency and bias to be correct. They've even managed to invalidate the old canard "at least our side didn't invade its neighbours".

Trump may feel he has to jump on board now to preserve his credibility, but only because this has been an unqualified embarrassment for him- the deal maker who pledged to stop all the wars.

3 hours ago, Gromnir said:

if our neighbor wanted to, could she build a device similar (considerable more efficacious) than the one used by timothy mcveigh? of course she could. the fact she hasn't gone ahead and built such a monstrosity is hardly proof she is incapable of doing so.

You could build an ANFO bomb. Anyone can. It takes no specialist training or education at all. You had illiterate Afghans who'd barely seen electricity in their lives building them. Leave out the FO and people can and regularly have made one accidentally so much so there's a wikipedia page dedicated to listing them.

But you need very, very specific ingredients to build a nuke. Without those ingredients it simply won't work, as a matter of basic physical reality.

Dirty bomb, sure. That however would be extraordinarily disingenuous since New Zealand could build one of those, and we don't even have a reactor. So could Fiji.

Quote

the fact iran hasn't developed nukes does not in anyway diminish the possibility that they have been one year away from developing a nuke for over a decade.

We've been told by Netanyahu for 27 years that Iran was going to imminently have the capability to build them, and that they would. Thing is, it doesn't even matter when debunking that if they've been a year away since then. For very, very obvious reasons.

Which, I suspect, I will have to state anyway: if they've actually been a year away for a decade but not got there then the only logical conclusion is that they don't actually want to have nukes, which makes the second part of Bibi's accusation untrue. Unless, maybe, they feel forced to by an existential threat. Either way, Netanyahu has been wrong for at least 26 years. He may be right, now, and if he wants someone to blame he can always look in the mirror.

 

Edited Tuesday at 06:37 AM by Zoraptor

[Gromnir]

1 hour ago, Zoraptor said:

But you need very, very specific ingredients to build a nuke. Without those ingredients it simply won't work, as a matter of basic physical reality.

well yes, which is why for over a decade iran has been deemed capable of developing nuclear weapons within a year. they got the know how and near all the required resources. 

again, duh. is the same silliness as we heard from zor in 2015 btw. the fact iran doesn't have a nuclear weapon in no way diminishes the possibility that they could achieve such in a realtive short period o' time.

yeah, since 2003, iran had not been active working on developing a nuclear weapon, but rand, iaea, isis (institute for science and international security as 'posed to the terror group... or the egyptian goddess) and others were in agreement iran had progressed very close to the threshold stage. iran had virtual all the ingredients and the infrastructure, and at one point estimates were that iran were within one month of breakout, IF iran put forth the effort to achieve such... which they did not and had not... although am gonna admit the one month estimate were kinda an outlier.

converse, from rand

"In any case, this evidence raises substantial concerns about Iran’s
nuclear activities prior to 2004 and supports the 2007 NIE’s finding
that Iran had a weapon program in place until that time. It also raises
substantial concerns about Iran’s behavior and intentions after 2003,
and undercuts Iran’s claims that its nuclear program is entirely peaceful in nature. The available evidence suggests that by 2003, Iran may
not have had perfected its ability to produce a weapon, but had made
significant progress with virtually every element of weaponization. It is
unclear what, if any, progress Iran has been able to make in its weaponization efforts since its formal program was halted in 2003."

"Even though Iran may already have developed the necessary
technical components to produce a bomb, as of January 2012, Iran
would likely need over a year to do so. This correlates well with the
conclusions of the U.S. Intelligence Community, which has estimated
that it would require Iran at least a year to produce a single nuclear
weapon even if all available resources were swiftly dedicated to the
task.107 Other credible sources, however, arrive at estimates as short as
6 months, or as long as 19 months.108 These estimates vary according
to the assumptions they make about a number of uncertain variables.
They also vary according to whether the intent is to identify likely or
merely plausible—but unlikely—outcomes. Both worst-case and likely
estimates will be provided in this section where appropriate."

feel free to once again read or ignore the relevant sources, but back in 2011 and 2012, iran were estimated to be six to nineteen months away from developing a weapon, if they chose to do so. they had the infrastructure and resources to at minimum enrich enough U-235 to a purity o' 90% back in 2012, which were always the only real hurdle other than time and will. once enough fissionable material were produced, it could be removed to more secure locations safe from israeli bombing for instance, and then the iranians conversion o' heuf6 to metal, and machining of implosion devices could go through the predictable trial and error stages. 

back in 2011 and 2012 there were little disagreement that iran had the capacity and the basic materials to achieve breakout in a relative short timeline IF they chose to make the effort. the fact they didn't actual go through with such efforts is not proof that iran lacked capacity as 'posed to will.

again, iran not developing nukes as proof they couldn't breakout within six to nineteen months is bad logic, and ignores the observations and conclusions o' reputable sources far more reliable than zor and al jazeera. HOWEVER, that is kinda our point. iran coulda moved forward at anytime since 2003, but they had made only incremental efforts in that direction and virtual no progress since 2015.  hadn't done before the iran deal. hadn't done so after the iran deal... and hadn't appeared to make any efforts to do so even when the iran deal were ended. so israel pretending as if there were some kinda need for preemption ignores the past +ten years o' iran sitting on their hands. 

HA! Good Fun!

ps (edit) in the spirit o' full disclosure, am admitting we were wrong about the original iran deal, and have pointed out our error multiple times.

we believed the iran deal were foolish naive as it lacked any real enforcement and relied on iran to voluntarily comply with inspections and performance. and yeah, is not as if iran sudden became a good faith actor on thew world stage as evidenced by october 7, but by all accounts, iran were sticking to their commitments to not develop their nuclear weapons program even after the US broke the deal. 

yes, 2025 iran were likely even closer to breakout than were the case in 2015, if only 'cause iran were technical more advanced. so less than six to nineteen months? even so,  israel's excuse for attacking iran appears little more valid today than at any other point in the past decade... or more.

Edited Tuesday at 08:06 AM by Gromnir

[Zoraptor]

Sigh. That's completely pointless word salad.

Again, Netanyahu's accusations of imminent nukes for Iran are 27 years old. His ridiculous bomb graphic at the UN is 13 years old. 

He has always maintained Iran are developing the capacity and always has said they have the will to build them. 27 years is not by any reasonable definition imminent, neither is 12. You cannot be one year, months, weeks away from something you want to do imminently and as a matter of policy for 27 years. Or if you prefer 324 months/ 1404 weeks. The accusation is so old Leo DiCaprio wouldn't consider dating it.

There are two options: Netanyahu was lying about the timeframe. Or he was lying about the will to make. Those are the only options.

Edited Tuesday at 10:38 AM by Zoraptor

[BruceVC]

1 hour ago, Zoraptor said:

Sigh. That's completely pointless word salad.

Again, Netanyahu's accusations of imminent nukes for Iran are 27 years old. His ridiculous bomb graphic at the UN is 13 years old. 

He has always maintained Iran are developing the capacity and always has said they have the will to build them. 27 years is not by any reasonable definition imminent, neither is 12. You cannot be one year, months, weeks away from something you want to do imminently and as a matter of policy for 27 years. Or if you prefer 324 months/ 1404 weeks. The accusation is so old Leo DiCaprio wouldn't consider dating it.

There are two options: Netanyahu was lying about the timeframe. Or he was lying about the will to make. Those are the only options.

Its not about what Netanyahu says, of course he is exaggerating or sensationalizing the whole " Iran will have nukes in months "

Its the IAEA that you should  listen  to and they have been warning Iran is close to 90% Uranium enrichment or they cant confirm the exact stage because they have been prohibited from certain sites and they have provided numerous concerns over the last 12-24 months similar to this updated opinion. No country since the end of the Cold War needs nukes and no new country should be able to get nukes.  We cant change the reality of any country having nukes but we can definitely be opposed to any new attempt from anyone to get nukes 

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce3v6w2qr12o

 

" The global nuclear watchdog's board of governors has formally declared Iran in breach of its non-proliferation obligations for the first time in 20 years.

Nineteen of the 35 countries on the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) voted for the motion, which was backed by the US, UK, France and Germany.

It says Iran's "many failures" to provide the IAEA with full answers about its undeclared nuclear material and activities constitutes non-compliance. It also expresses concern about Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium, which can be used to make reactor fuel but also nuclear weapons. " 

https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-uranium-7f6c9962c1e4199e951559096bcf5cc0

" The IAEA report raised a stern warning, saying that Iran is now “the only non-nuclear-weapon state to produce such material” — something the agency said was of “serious concern.”

Approximately 42 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium is theoretically enough to produce one atomic bomb, if enriched further to 90%, according to the watchdog.

The IAEA report, a quarterly, also estimated that as of May 17, Iran’s overall stockpile of enriched uranium — which includes uranium enriched to lower levels — stood at 9,247.6 kilograms (20,387.4 pounds). That’s an increase of 953.2 kilograms (2,101.4 pounds) since February’s report." 

 

Edited Tuesday at 11:40 AM by BruceVC

[Gromnir]

2 hours ago, Zoraptor said:

Sigh. That's completely pointless word salad.

Again, Netanyahu's accusations of imminent nukes for Iran are 27 years old. His ridiculous bomb graphic at the UN is 13 years old. 

He has always maintained Iran are developing the capacity and always has said they have the will to build them. 27 years is not by any reasonable definition imminent, neither is 12. You cannot be one year, months, weeks away from something you want to do imminently and as a matter of policy for 27 years. Or if you prefer 324 months/ 1404 weeks. The accusation is so old Leo DiCaprio wouldn't consider dating it.

There are two options: Netanyahu was lying about the timeframe. Or he was lying about the will to make. Those are the only options.

you wouldn't recognize word salad any better than logic. same old fails.

again, from the linked rand report... highly recommended.

In 2010, Iran began enriching to 20% in the PFEP using two centrifuge cascades. One cascade enriches 3.5% LEUF6 to roughly 20%.
The other cascade is fed the tails assay from the first, which is around
2% U-235, and enriches it to 10%. The 10% product is then fed back
into the first cascade at an intermediate point in order to enrich it to
20%. This procedure greatly improves overall efficiency. This is important from a cost perspective in producing fuel for the TNRR, Iran’s
stated objective in enriching to 20%. However, it is also a useful way
for Iran to improve its breakout capability should it ever choose to 

attempt a “batch recycling” process to quickly enrich 3.5% LEUF6 to
90% (this process is discussed in more detail in the section on breakout
scenarios below). As of May 2012, Iran had produced 110.1 kg of 20%
LEUF6 at the PFEP.

iran had the know how and the resources at least as far back as 2012.

but...

It is unlikely that Iran will produce nuclear weapons within the
next year, and it could be years—if ever—before it does so. At present, although Iran likely possesses the technical ability to make at least
one deliverable nuclear weapon, it would be very difficult for it to do
so without accepting serious risk. If Iran were to use its declared facilities for a breakout dash, it would likely require at least one year, and
potentially more than two years, to build a bomb. Iran would find it
extremely difficult to carry out a breakout dash using these facilities
without alerting the United States and its allies, providing them with
several months to consider a response. A potentially more attractive
option for Iran would be to use a covert facility for HEU enrichment.
However, this route would require the clandestine construction and
operation of a facility, which would also carry significant risks. It is
likely that Iran instead intends to focus its efforts over the near term on
improving its breakout options, and to do so in ways that are unlikely
to trigger a serious response, such as air strikes. Such a goal would be
consistent with what has thus far been observed in Iran.

...

Negative Security Consequences of Weaponization for Iran

If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, the strategic results would not
be all positive. In fact, Iran faces a complex and uncertain strategic calculus over the question of weaponization. The way that this calculus is
approached, moreover, very likely varies across domestic political actors
in Iran, with many elites more willing to accept the risks and costs of
weaponization than others.
The development of nuclear weapons could invite a preventive
attack, and would likely trigger efforts on the part of other states to balance against Iran’s nuclear capabilities through arms buildups and possibly through the pursuit of nuclear weapons of their own. Iran would
not be able to count on a benign response from Israel, and could find
itself in a confrontation with a state that possesses far greater conventional and nuclear military capabilities. Weaponization could lead to a
greater and permanent U.S. military presence or, in the worst case, military conflict with the United States. It could also increase Iran’s diplomatic and economic isolation, particularly with the West. Although
some in Iran might believe that, eventually, they could go down the
path of India and achieve a level of international acceptance as a nuclear
power, they would not be able to count on such an outcome.
For Iran, the security implications of weaponization are uncertain. Not all Iranian elites will recognize these potential trade-offs,
however. The way in which Iran’s decisionmakers interpret the costs
and benefits of nuclear policy choices will have at least as much to do
with their particular views and assumptions as any objective calculation of rational regime interests.

in 2012, rand and others observed how there were compelling reasons why iran was not likely to further pursue breakout, but were rather focuse on improving breakout capacity. regardless, the ability to do a thing is in no way disproven by a failure to do the thing in question. if zor reflected for even five minutes he could identify dozens o' examples which disprove his utter ridiculous claim, but in classic and predictable fashion he doubles down... and when confronted by sources, such as rand, iaea and isis, he bleats something irrelevant and repetitive. how many times has we replayed this same tired song?

but, "Again," the whole point is that iran has been six to nineteen months away from breakout for at least 10 years and likely since 2003. nothing has fundamental changed in that time. is Gromnir who pointed out that the recent israeli attacks were preventative as opposed to preemptive, precisely 'cause there were nothing imminent about an iranian attack, especial with nukes. we observed earlier how if israel were most concerned about nukes, then their choice o' initial targets were perplexing... but less a mystery when viewed through the lens o' regime change. etc. in any event, what kinda l00n continues to fight with somebody, trying to prove a point their perceived adversary agrees with 'em 'bout? 

seriously dude.

nevertheless, you keep making an observation which is utter irrelevant-- the fact iran didn't create a nuclear weapon since 2003, 2011 or whatever date you wanna choose as the one where folks who know a heck of a lot more than zor all seem to agree that iran was potentially months to, at worst, a couple years away from creating a nuclear weapon, in no way disproves the premise that they lack capacity to do so. what stopped iran from developing a weapon weren't a lack of capacity but rather their recognition o' the very real consequences o' genuine pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. the fact iran had the good sense not to antagonize, israel, the US and the world by crossing a red line since 2003 is strong if not conclusive evidence that they woulda' continued to forgo developing a nuke.

converse, israel's calculus seems to be that they can claim self defense or some other kinda silliness and the other arab states as well as the US and the global community will at worst proclaim their indignation, but nobody will do anything meaningful to stop 'em. 

sheesh.

honest, am feeling dirty for pointing out that we made zor's point before he did. somebody is too myopic or reflexive indignant to recognize they is arguing pointless. whatever. not new.

HA! Good Fun!

ps for those genuine interested in iran's breakout capacity circa 2012

Spoiler

Possible Breakout Paths
An Iranian breakout could begin with different initial feedstocks. The
higher the enrichment level of the initial feedstock, the shorter the
breakout time. One breakout path Iran could take to a bomb would be
to enrich its existing stock of either 3.5% LEUF6 or NATUF6 to weapons grade. Both stocks are sufficient to produce at least one bomb.114
However, because both are under IAEA safeguards, it would be difficult for Iran to do this without relatively quick detection.115 Because
either would require months, given Iran’s capabilities as of January
2012, the United States would receive sufficient warning of a breakout
to organize a response months before Iran could produce enough HEU
for a bomb.116

(important footnotes:

114This assumes 1,030–2,900 kg to make the first bomb and 1,030–1,300 kg LEUF6 to make
each successive bomb (using the Pakistani four-stage enrichment process). As of May 2012,
Iran had already stockpiled more than 6,000 kg of 3.5% LEUF6. The IISS estimates that
roughly 11 metric tons of NATUF6 would be required to make a single bomb using a facility
with 5,832 IR-1 centrifuges with cascades arranged according to the Pakistani method. Iran’s
stockpile as of September 2011 was roughly 350 metric tons. IISS, 2011, pp. 70–75.
115 IISS, 2011, p. 71; Peter Crail, “Iran Raising Uranium-Enrichment Level,” Arms Control
Today, Vol. 40, No. 2, March 2010. Iran’s entire stock of 3.5% LEUF6 is contained in one
capsule, which is stored at the FEP. The IAEA conducts up to 24 inspections at Natanz
per year, up to 12 of which can be unannounced (minimum of two hours’ notice). Materials such as LEUF6 are under seal, and surveillance cameras are installed. See Ivanka Barzashka and Ivan Oelrich, “Increased Safeguards at Natanz: What Does It All Mean?” FAS
Strategic Security Blog, August 28, 2009, http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/08/increasedsafeguards-at-natanz-what-does-it-all-mean.php.)

Another option would be for Iran to initiate breakout using natural uranium ore or yellowcake. In principle, uranium could be taken
from Iran’s mines, which are not under safeguards, or yellowcake could
be illicitly imported from abroad. Such a move would avoid immediately triggering detection. However, Iran would still need to convert the
uranium to UF6, which would involve using the UCF at Isfahan (or at
a secret UCF, the construction and concealment of which would raise
its own complications). This, too, would likely be quickly detected.
In the near future, Iran could potentially be able to use uranium
enriched to 20% to initiate a breakout dash. In 2010, Iran began
enriching 3.5% LEUF6 to 20% using cascades in the PFEP at Natanz.
Enrichment from 3.5% to 20% brings Iran much of the way toward the
90% enrichment required for fueling a nuclear bomb. As of November
2011, Iran had produced 76.8 kg of 20% LEUF6, not nearly enough
uranium for a weapon. Using Iran’s 2011 rate of production of roughly
4 kg per month of 20% LEUF6, it would take Iran at least three years
to produce enough to fuel a single weapon.117 However, in January
2012 Iran began to increase its production of 20% LEUF6 when it
initiated an additional enrichment line at its Fordow facility. Iran also
has announced that it plans to further increase its rate of production by
adding additional centrifuges and replacing IR-1 centrifuges with more
advanced models. This could greatly shorten the time needed to stockpile enough 20% LEUF6 to fuel a bomb (if further enriched to 90%).
As of January 2012, Iran has not demonstrated the ability to dedicate
newer-model centrifuges to this task.
While Iran’s stock of 20% LEUF6 would be under IAEA safeguards, if Iran were to initiate a breakout using these stocks the required
time to produce sufficient HEU for a bomb would be much less than
if it started with 3.5% feedstock, giving the United States less time to

intervene. Given Iran’s current efforts and the advantages that would
accrue from stockpiling greater quantities of 20% LEUF6, Iran has
an incentive to wait until it has at least a single bomb’s worth of 20%
LEUF6 in its stockpile before attempting a breakout. The current production of 20% LEUF6 could, therefore, be the beginning of a “slowmotion” breakout. Additionally, because, as of November 2011, Iran
had installed only 412 IR-1 centrifuges at the FFEP for the purpose of
enriching uranium to 20%, it has an incentive either to greatly increase
the number of cascades at Fordow before trying a breakout or to use
the cascades installed at the FEP for this purpose.118

If Iran were to decide to use the FEP for a breakout dash, however, it would either have to reconfigure the cascades—which would
require the time-consuming and highly visible work of repiping the
machines—or attempt to use the untested, more inefficient process of
“batch recycling.” The likeliest path would be for Iran to use Pakistan’s
method, which involved a four-stage process of enrichment to 90%
HEU. The A.Q. Khan network is known to have sold the plans for this
method to other states on the black market, and likely gave it to Iran as
well.119 This process would require the reconfiguration of centrifuges at
Natanz, repiping, and the installation of new equipment. This would
be technically challenging to do, and nearly impossible to carry out
without alerting inspectors. The IISS estimates that such a reconfiguration at the FEP would take a minimum of three months.120
The alternative would be to use a process called “batch recycling”
or “batch enrichment,” which would not require reconfiguring centrifuges. In the batch-recycling process, 3.5% LEUF6 would be fed into
cascades at the FEP using their existing configuration to produce 16%
LEUF6 as an intermediate. The process would then be repeated to produce weapons-grade HEU. This would require far less time than the
Pakistani four-stage process. Assuming no wastage or technical problems, it could take as little as four months, as opposed to a minimum
of eight months, and would be less obvious to inspectors.121 It would,
however, be both risky and inefficient. Batch recycling is an untested
process, and Iran would be taking a significant risk in attempting it.
The four-stage process, on the other hand, is a proven method of HEU
enrichment. Also, because batch recycling is highly wasteful (it involves
a high tails content, and the tails are not further enriched, at least not
to make the first bomb), it requires about twice as much initial feedstock. Given Iran’s stockpile of LEU as of November 2011, Iran would
risk not being able to produce enough HEU for a weapon by using this
method.

(more footnotes: 117This assumes it would require at least 150 kg of 20% LEUF6 for a bomb. It should be
noted that this is an extremely conservative estimate, as 150 kg of 20% LEUF6 is mathematically equivalent to only 21.8 kg of 93% U-235 metal (i.e., with perfect efficiency and
no wastage at all, an impossibility to be sure, 150 kg of 20% LEUF6 would produce less than
the 25 kg of 90% U-235 metal used by the IAEA to represent a significant quantity of fissile
material). Between September 19, 2010, and August 20, 2011, Iran produced 45.7 kg of 20%
LEUF6 at the PFEP using two 164-centrifuge cascades. IAEA, GOV/2011/54, p. 4.)

etc.

this is a sober analysis from rand in 2012. iran already had the material and infrastructure required for at least a single weapon more than a decade past, and it it is reasonable to assume their technical capacity has improved in the interim, although, as am having identified in the past, the uranium conversion from gas to metal necessary for actual weapon creation, while based on decades old tech, still requires rather specialized engineering experience which iran is unlikely to possess. gas to metal is not a huge hurdle, but is likely to require time during which their efforts would possible be discovered.

regardless, the point is that iran, like our chemist neighbor, has chosen not to do something self destructive stoopid. for more than a decade, iran has had the material, infrastructure and know how to build at least one weapon, and perhaps more.  

but again, the iranian nuke weapon hobgoblin has been a potential threat for "more than a decade." for israel to use the possibility as an excuse now is kinda transparent. 

 

Edited Tuesday at 01:45 PM by Gromnir

[Malcador]

https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/17/politics/israel-iran-nuclear-bomb-us-intelligence-years-away

Of course the Mossad master race are definitely correct.

And just because the US administration are clowns, Trump is disagreeing with his agencies.

 

 

[Gromnir]

50 minutes ago, Malcador said:

https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/17/politics/israel-iran-nuclear-bomb-us-intelligence-years-away

Of course the Mossad master race are definitely correct.

And just because the US administration are clowns, Trump is disagreeing with his agencies.

 

 

our only quibble is with the following:

"The challenge, for Iran, is producing not merely a crude nuclear weapon – which experts say Iran could potentially do within the space of months if it decided to – but also producing a working delivery system, which could take much longer."

post 9/11, this kinda thinking strikes us as painful short o' imagination. once you got a working implosion device, then is any number o' creative if crude ways to deliver to a target, particular a port city such as tel aviv for example. 

beyond 9/11, consider the following: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/wartech/nature.html

ukranian spiderweb just happened for chrissakes. 

the inability o' too many in our military and intelligence communities to consider new possibilities and unconventional solutions is a persistent problem.

h.r. mcmaster observed more than once that you can fight the US asymmetrical or you can lose. most other nations is aware o' that problem, so 'course they is planning asymmetrical and unconventional. why the US continues to assume that every other nation is incapable o' ingenuity is perplexing.

to pretend as if iran is too stoopid to be creative strikes us as a serious mistake... and october 7 should make it abundant clear that the israeli intelligence is anything but omniscient. 

HA! Good Fun!

ps (edit) not directed @Malcador, but 'cause this point keeps getting missed, am feeling the need to repeat: since at least 2011, iran has had the capacity to build at least one nuclear weapon and the time frame anticipated by the big brains has been anywhere between a few months to a couple of years.  as such, the excuse israel is providing for their current preventative attacks has been equal valid/invalid every day for fourteen years... or more. iran coulda' built a nuke at least as far back as 2011, and probable closer to 2003. they haven't. for israel to attack now, and to not target at least a few o' the most important facilities in iran's potential weapons development infrastructure, serious undermines the excuse being provided. 

 

Edited Tuesday at 02:35 PM by Gromnir

[Gromnir]

on the lighter side:

warning: the following scene is very tarantino

Spoiler

 

HA! Good Fun!