That's good! I see your Sith analogy in full force, now that Rand's Objectivism is laid bare (no wonder she wanted to call it Existentialism!) I hadn't seen any reference to that, and the axioms placed emphasis on the individual creating their own value system. (So that's a Good Intentions lift straight to hell.)
Indeed, though, your conclusion is diametrically opposite to the spirit of the tenets (not having read her writing in total, I can only guess at her reasoning), in effect becoming exactly what it shouldn't: "selfishness without a self". (Note the quote about living on a sub-human level, vide infra):
pretty good assessment, meta. seems you pay attention to such things. i disagreed with pop's assessment that an objectivist cannot consider others. on the surface, this is how objectivism comes across, though there is a subtlety that you won't get simply from a little reading. concerns for others are very important to an objectivist, though his motives for said concern are based on self-interest.
i think ayn believed that _most_, if not all, people were actually sort of "closet objectivists" simply because their motivations are rooted in their own self-interests more often than not. the difference being that someone calling himself an objectivist openly admits his motivations (most of this my own opinion, btw). for example, people that do a lot of charity work often talk about how good it makes them feel to help others (not all, of course).
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Ayn Rand argues that as soon as a person accepts altruism, he becomes beneath contempt. "If a man accepts the ethics of altruism", she writes, "his first concern is not how to live but how to sacrifice it." Rand is focused on the individual, such that she demands that one not practice altruism.
Thus, a man must focus on himself, and never consider others. A man who denies a beggar coin because "they should pull themselves up" is concerning himself with others' welfare. Rand calls this "sacrificing one's life", in that one's life consists of goods earned and created. To Rand, when one even acts in a way that benefits others by not helping them, he has no longer concerned himself with the betterment of the being of ultimate value: himself. He has become an altruist, and is therefore a scumbag. A true egoist would not recognize the existence of the poor.
This is where Rand parts ways with other egoists like Hobbes. The claim that all people act out of their own self-interest is made by Hobbes, not Rand. Hobbes was making a descriptive claim, saying "this is the way things are". Rand's argument was "this is the way things should be". Hobbes is much more flexible, as he says that people can include others into their own self-interest. Let's say I have a family, and I'm an egoist. If I'm a Hobbesian, I can care for their well-being, because if I'm not a good husband and father, I won't value myself. This makes some sense, but it still runs into a problem that I won't get into in that there could be a point at which I'm willing to die for my family, at which point the principle of self-interest breaks. If I'm a Rand objectivist, I cannot love my family. Rand dictates that I cannot care for my family, as I am the only morally important being, and investing in their well-being is being altruistic, which I cannot be if I am a true individual. Rand disregards the is/ought fallacy in this way, and her philosophy is greatly weakened in the process (see my signature)
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cf.:
I agree totally that the extremist viewpoints (as usual), including the total disregard of altruistic motivations, even for people one might care for, is nonsensical. Just as August Comte isn't nonsensical, too: the total neglect of the self will not provide the maximum benefit to others, and so it is a self-defeating concept. Ignoring self-survival is as wrong as enslavement to it.
Ethical egoism does not necessitate that individuals disregard the well-being of others, nor does it require that an individual refrain from taking the well-being of others into consideration. It allows for the possibility of either as long as what is chosen is efficacious in satisfying self-interest. For some, it is the philosophical basis of their espousal of libertarianism or anarchism, which advocate that individuals do not coercively prevent others from exercising freedom of action.
I think a sensible social theory needs to include some sort of allowance for ethical egoism, with some sort of value being placed on the society: after all, it is far better to be an individual in a prosperous society than an individual outside society.