The All Things Political Topic - Those who do not move, do not notice their chains

[Elerond]

4 hours ago, Malcador said:

Russia should just say Ukraine has WMDs.

ironically one of reason why we are where we are is because Ukraine gave up of its WMDs, because Russia and USA (plus UK and France) promised to ensure its territorial integrity

[rjshae]

2 hours ago, pmp10 said:

That is only one way of looking at politics of it.
He also reveled EU to be hopelessly divided and US to be prone to hysterics.  

Historically, Western Europe demonstrated a willingness to abandon smaller nations in order to maintain the peace. (E.g. Austria, Czechoslovakia.) Russia had already demonstrated a willingness to invade its neighbors. *COUGH*Crimea*COUGH* Once they start doing that, where do you draw the line? If they're stopped at the Ukraine then you don't need to spend a ton of money to stop them at Poland. It's not hysterics; it's a powerful lesson from history.

[ComradeYellow]

On the domestic front:

https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/27/economy/us-fourth-quarter-2021-gdp/index.html?utm_source=twcnnbrk&utm_medium=social&utm_term=link&utm_content=2022-01-27T13%3A45%3A06

Impressive growth, even bigger than China's, but not impressive inflation, and also like China, problems arise in 2022.  Half the public is still obsessing over Omicron, the other half wants newfeeds about these things to just go away and pretend like it's not even happening, lol.

[Malcador]

32 minutes ago, rjshae said:

Historically, Western Europe demonstrated a willingness to abandon smaller nations in order to maintain the peace. (E.g. Austria, Czechoslovakia.) Russia had already demonstrated a willingness to invade its neighbors. *COUGH*Crimea*COUGH* Once they start doing that, where do you draw the line? If they're stopped at the Ukraine then you don't need to spend a ton of money to stop them at Poland. It's not hysterics; it's a powerful lesson from history.

Russia probably sees the same from NATO states creeping towards them.  Probably both are a bit overdramatic.

[Zoraptor]

11 hours ago, Gromnir said:

dear lord. not this again.

Exactly. Nice links, you can get the previous debunkment of the fp article from there, though you'd just not read/ understand it, again.

TL: obviouslyDR, Hokkaido was not defended by just 2 understrength divisions. Even if it were it would be irrelevant. The tiny and largely irrelevant Kurils were defended by two 'understrength' divisions too, the 89th and 91st. That was, hmm, 80,000 men. Because oddly enough not all units are divisions. Mostly though the soviets had extremely limited amphibious capacity which the Japanese knew, and is why they only developed a plan for an invasion after the Japanese had already surrendered and for a scenario where there was no resistance; and why they had to invade the miniscule Kurils over a roughly 2 week period, and why they never even took all the islands. Sakhalin is utterly irrelevant, as the soviets already held half the island. They also suffered the small matter of near 20% casualties despite most of their landings being literally unopposed.

The reasons for Japanese surrender were the nukes and the utter collapse of the Kwantung Army in a week, which completely compromised the supply for the 3 million Japanese soldiers in China. A soviet invasion of Hokkaido might be a problem, eventually, but they had multiple more pressing things that had not gone entirely to their advantage happening right then.

2 hours ago, rjshae said:

Frankly, it's better for NATO if the Ukraine stays neutral as that reduces the potential frontage of a war.

This isn't the Cold War. NATO has a massive advantage in terms of resources and troops, now. Indeed, it's one of the trademark signs of gaslighting that a force of 100k is being played up as if it's the ~10 million man Red Army of 1945 when it's literally 1% of the size.

The entire deployable Russian army is only about 300k. Ukraine would add that many troops to NATO, by itself.

1 hour ago, Elerond said:

ironically one of reason why we are where we are is because Ukraine gave up of its WMDs, because Russia and USA (plus UK and France) promised to ensure its territorial integrity

The nukes Ukraine (and Belarus/ Khazakstan) had were unusable though. They probably could have reverse engineered them eventually, but that would not have been popular with anyone and have cost money that they didn't have. There's essentially no plausible scenario in which Ukraine retains the nukes that were based there to this day. Consider how different the reaction to Ukraine selling North Korea rocket engines would be if they also had nuclear warheads; no way it would be swept under the carpet then no matter how pro western the government. At best they could have retained them until ~2001.

Kind of ironic though, the original reason why people think that nukes --> no invasion has nothing to do with Russia, but with the earlier western attacks on Libya and Iraq as opposed to the DPRK.

Edited January 27, 2022 by Zoraptor

[Gromnir]

2 hours ago, Zoraptor said:

Sakhalin is utterly irrelevant, as the soviets already held half the island. They also suffered the small matter of near 20% casualties despite most of their landings being literally unopposed.

kinda relevant if you are able to read a calendar. review the fp article we once again quoted... again.

"The Soviet 16th Army — 100,000 strong — launched an invasion of the southern half of Sakhalin Island. Their orders were to mop up Japanese resistance there, and then — within 10 to 14 days — be prepared to invade Hokkaido, the northernmost of Japan’s home islands. The Japanese force tasked with defending Hokkaido, the 5th Area Army, was under strength at two divisions and two brigades, and was in fortified positions on the east side of the island. The Soviet plan of attack called for an invasion of Hokkaido from the west."

so not only do you got established historians stating as fact that the soviets were gonna attack hokkaido, but the soviet plan to attack hokkaido were established as a follow-up to their sakhalin island attack, an attack which occurred when? will let low-effort zor look that one up but the soviet attacked sakhalin pre declaration o' surrender. 

as an aside, 'cause this is zor bait he finds impossible to resist and we need only link to past posts to get a chance to smite again...

It took a second Imperial Conference and second intervention of the emperor on
August 14 to accept the Byrnes Note. On August 15, 1945, the Emperor broadcast by
radio his decision to the Japanese people and the world (Butow 1954 , pp. 207–208,
248; Frank 1999 , pp. 314–315, 320; Hasegawa 2005 , pp. 238–240). But the war had
not ended. Soviet combat operations continued in Manchuria. Moreover, the Soviets
unleashed an amphibious assault on the Kuril Islands – which thanks to other new revelations we now know was in preparation for a landing by Soviet forces on Hokkaido,
the northernmost home island. Only fierce Japanese resistance on Sakhalin Island and
President Truman ’ s insistence on meticulous adherence to prior agreements saved
Hokkaido from Soviet invasion and probable occupation. Had this happened, almost
certainly the Soviets would have obtained some occupation zone in a divided Japan
(Frank 1999 , pp. 322–324; Glantz 2003 , pp. 280–307; Hasegawa 2005 , pp. 271–285).

and 

Alongside with these military plans, however, Imperial General Headquarters harbored wishful thinking that there was unlikely to be a Soviet attack. The Kwantung Army had little confidence in its ability to hold the last defense line. As for the Fifth Area Army, it expected that in the event of the anticipated American invasion of the homeland, Hokkaido would be left to defend itself against a possible combined attack by the United States and the Soviet Union. The problem with Hokkaido’s defense was its size, which was as big as the whole of Tohoku and Niigata prefectures combined. The Fifth Area Army had to disperse 114,000 troops to three possible points of attack: one division in the Shiribetsu-Nemuro area in the east, one division at Cape Soya in the north, and one brigade in the Tomakomai area in the west. The fortification of the Shibetsu area had not been completed, and the defense of the Nemuro area was considered hopeless because of the flat terrain. The defense of the north was concentrated at Cape Soya, but nothing was prepared for Rumoi, where the Soviet forces intended to land.[65] The inadequacies of these operational plans, both in the Kwantung Army and the Fifth Area Army, were exposed when the actual Soviet attack came. The military planners had no confidence in the army’s ability to repulse a Soviet invasion of Korea and Hokkaido. As Frank writes, “the Soviet Navy’s amphibious shipping resources were limited but sufficient to transport the three assault divisions in several echelon

. The Red Army intended to seize the northern half of Hokkaido. If resistance proved strong, reinforcements would be deployed to aid the capture the rest of Hokkaido. Given the size of Hokkaido, the Japanese would have been hard pressed to move units for a concerted confrontation of the Soviet invasion. The chances of Soviet success appeared to be very good.”[66] Soviet occupation of Hokkaido was thus within the realm of possibility.

and

In the wee hours of Aug. 24, 1945, Soviet long-range bombers would take off from their air base not far from the Far Eastern port of Vladivostok and fly east, across the Sea of Japan, dropping lethal payloads on the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. At 5 a.m. that morning, two Soviet regiments would storm their way onshore, followed, in two hours, by a larger force. Within days, two infantry divisions would sweep across northern Hokkaido, cutting the island in half.

That was the rough battle plan drawn up by the commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Adm. Ivan Yumashev, at the end of World War II for occupying Hokkaido. Troops were on standby. Submarines were ordered to the Hokkaido coast for reconnaissance in preparation for land invasion, and had even started sinking Japanese ships (tragically, just refugee boats fleeing Soviet operations on nearby Sakhalin Island). The Soviets had by then occupied southern Sakhalin and were mopping up the remnants of the Japanese along the Kuril island chain that stretched from Hokkaido to the Kamchatka Peninsula, in Russia’s far northeast. Although the Red Army was not as experienced as the Americans with landing operations, this Soviet “D-Day” in Hokkaido would’ve been a walkover — the Japanese army was in shambles, and Emperor Hirohito had recently proclaimed defeat.

so on the one side we got zor's military expertise 

OR

noteworthy historians who agree the soviets genuine were planning to invade hokkaido, and that the japanese were not only aware o' such plans but were very much concerned by the possibility. is not a contentious issue as to whether or not the soviet were planning an invasion o' hokkaido and it doesn't actual matter if the hokkaido invasion by the soviets would succeed. is kinda irrelevant as to when exact stalin finally decided an invasion o' hokkaido were viable. the important point is whether the japanese believed a soviet invasion were possible and that such an attack could succeed. it were the soviet invasion o' manchuria on august 8, after the first bomb were dropped by the US, which were the event changing the calculus for the japanese. what were previous seen as improbable (soviet invasion) became likely. and yeah, should be obvious to anybody by now that the soviets were indeed planning an invasion o' hokkaido. 'course this is all spam... again.

am gonna once again suggest zor watch the hasegawa video, particular from 20:00-30:00ish... maybe... has been more than three years since we initial linked and even we don't recall exact times span which is relevant. yeah, we don't have access to the russian archives, so one needs intelligent speculation and use historical reasoning to guess what is the end goal o' soviets sending large numbers o' troops east, the yalta promises, the russian letting the japanese would know the neutrality pact would not be extended but would continue to be honored through april 1946, and  on and on and on. etc. 

you are embracing and repeated offering your self as a target by defending a belief based on 1970s thinking and history. is well established at this point that the soviet declaration o' war was a pivotal aspect in the japanese surrender calculus.  in early 1945 the japanese understood the soviets were wanting what they were promised at yalta and that hokkaido were in danger.  japan thought they had until at least 1946 to worry 'bout stalin and the soviets, but with the declaration o' war january 8 and the invasion o' manchuria, all japanese hope to be fighting only the americans evaporated. 'ccording to japanese high command debate on the issue, the concern were that there were no longer a chance to create enough carnage with a US invasion to be resulting in better terms o' surrender, 'cause in a matter o' weeks the soviets would be attacking and the japanese were curiously not prepared for such. soviets most certainly were not a future problem, as should be obvious from linked historians who have real resumes and reputation and is speaking the current mainline historical pov. japanese were still debating fighting the americans after hiroshima, but the soviet declaration and invasions changed the situation.

"Hasegawa fails to sustain his main arguments with the necessary evidence. At best, he leaves the revisionist case as he found it, in ruins. Indeed, he makes the rubble bounce by convincingly demonstrating that the Soviet Union very much was racing to get into the Pacific War in order to facilitate its expansionist policies in the Far East. Those who seek the definitive analysis on the end of the Pacific War will have to look elsewhere. A good place to begin is Frank’s Downfall." --prof. michael kort

frank is one o' the folks quoted earlier, one o' the most frequent quoted individuals in point o' fact on these issues, and he is most assured one o' those historians believing the soviet declaration o' war were pivotal in the japanese surrender decision.

am not sure why you continue to wanna bullseye your self on this. 

HA! Good Fun!
ps am not sure why we got strikethru for half the post
 

Edited January 27, 2022 by Gromnir

[Malcador]

Uh huh

[ComradeYellow]

Might explain why American cops like to shoot first and ask questions later (Other than the fact that they're having manpower shortages and will hire virtually anyone at this point).  With professionals like these running government institutions...

Edited January 27, 2022 by ComradeYellow

[majestic]

Are Russian merceneries ripping babies from incubators yet?

[PK htiw klaw eriF]

1 hour ago, majestic said:

Are Russian merceneries ripping babies from incubators yet?

Yes, with WMDs.

[Zoraptor]

I saw someone say that the Russians could invade with 45 minutes notice, and I wasn't sure if they were being facetious or not.

1 hour ago, Malcador said:

Uh huh

Multiple sources are carrying various interpretations of that Biden/ Zelensky exchange. The most baffling part of it by far is 'once the ground is frozen'. It's already frozen and has been for weeks, and in contrast every day gets closer to the Rasputitsa. Could be a Bidenism of "while the ground is frozen" but even that doesn't make much sense in context.

For the more full version, [with apologies for the shonky embed, I think twitter hates me for having high privacy settings and the original tweet got got...]

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FKJDVv9XsAoYd-c?format=jpg&name=900x900

If it's an accurate representation- and there are multiple, similar takes from other sources- it's pretty damning.

50 minutes ago, Gromnir said:

you are embracing and repeated offering your self as a target by defending a belief based on 1970s thinking and history.

Well in that case you're repeatedly offering yourself as a target by defending belief based on revisionist history.

They handwave 2 understrength divisions, presumably without being aware that the same organisational size force in the far less important Kurils was actually 80,000 men. They handwave the logistics. They handwave the soviets lack of amphibious troops, and lack of specialist ships, and the lack of non specialist ships, and the lack of airbasing options. They've got a hard on for Sakhalin, which is an awful analogue for an invasion of Hokkaido as the soviets already held the north of that island and had a near 5:1 advantage in numbers- including a lot of tanks, which could not be used in amphibious operations- instead of a likely 1:5 disadvantage for an amphibious invasion. They ignore the far more relevant Kurils where the soviets could only ever invade with a few thousand men at a time because that was their logistical limit, and they still had ~3000 casualties despite almost none of the Japanese there actually fighting. Any imminent invasion of Hokkaido would have been a disaster. The only reason an actual plan was developed at all was on the assumption it would not be opposed, and the Kurils disabused them of that. The vast preponderance of historical analysis is on my side, not yours.

Sure, the soviets planned an attack on Hokkaido in the rhetorical/ theoretical sense. That was a threat for 1946 though, and realistically at least March at the earliest of that year. All the other stuff that made them surrender was happening right then.

[Gromnir]

*chuckle*

you saying preponderance is on your side is hardly convincing in light o' fact only person showing historian support is Gromnir, and potential soviet losses were likely not a huge concern for stalin anyway as the point were to get soviet troops to hokkaido before the US could force a surrender and 1946 would be far too late for that.

https://journals.openedition.org/monderusse/9333

68On August 20, however, after Stalin received Truman’s August 18 telegram, Antonov sent Vasilevskii an order, telling him to instruct the commander of the First Far Eastern Front to prepare the operation for Hokkaido and the southern Kurils, but to initiate this operation only by special order of the Stavka and “prepare for an operation either for Hokkaido or for the southern Kuril islands.”78

69On August 21, Vasilevskii issued two directives to begin “immediately and no later than August 21” the embarkation of the 87th Rifle Corps from the Sakhalin ports of Maoka, Otomari, and Toyohira for the capture of Hokkaido and the southern Kurils. The commanders of the First and Second Far Eastern Fronts, the Pacific Fleet, and the air force were ordered to be ready for airborne operations over Rumoi and to make the air base available by August 23 for the occupation of the northern part of Hokkaido. In addition, Iumashev was to send two marine divisions in two or three echelons to Hokkaido. Finally, Vasilevskii reminded all commanders that he would personally give the order to begin the landing operations for Hokkaido, and that preparations for this operation should be completed by August 23.79 The Soviet war machine was about to claw its way on to Hokkaido.

...

is mostly deflection by zor to focus on his belief regarding the potential success o' a hokkaido invasion. success or failure is speculative. regardless, is no longer controversial that the soviet were indeed planning and committed to such an invasion. furthermore, the soviet threat o' invasion, a very real threat, were a significant contributor to the japanese surrender at the end o' ww2 and is virtual no current support for the discarded position you are spouting. again, your position is now referred to as the "revisionist" position.

gonna keep repeating,

"Hasegawa fails to sustain his main arguments with the necessary evidence. At best, he leaves the revisionist case as he found it, in ruins. Indeed, he makes the rubble bounce by convincingly demonstrating that the Soviet Union very much was racing to get into the Pacific War in order to facilitate its expansionist policies in the Far East. Those who seek the definitive analysis on the end of the Pacific War will have to look elsewhere. A good place to begin is Frank’s Downfall." --prof. michael kort

https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/How-the-Soviets-helped-Allies-defeat-Japan-3177012.php

Despite the death toll from the atomic bombings - 140,000 in Hiroshima, 80,000 in Nagasaki- the Imperial Military Command believed it could hold out against an Allied invasion if it retained control of Manchuria and Korea, which provided Japan with the resources for war, according to Hasegawa and Terry Charman, a historian of World War II at London's Imperial War Museum.

"The Soviet attack changed all that," Charman said. "The leadership in Tokyo realized they had no hope now, and in that sense August Storm did have a greater effect on the Japanese decision to surrender than the dropping of the A-bombs."

is becoming spam... again. in three years, when we no doubt feel inclined to mention japan capitulation at the end o' ww2 we will no doubt need go through this all again and we will have to link same posts quoting same articles written by same reputable historians while zor repeats self into a corner... again.

in any event, we should thank you for once again doing your tethered goat impersonation. does get old fast but every few years you cannot help self but give us another opportunity.

HA! Good Fun!

 

 

[Gromnir]

different topic, so am indulging the dreaded double-post

Many Trump Electors Facing Criminal Referrals Were Just Following Precedent

Which is why the practice has evolved in a contested election of having both slates of electors cast their ballots on the day Congress chooses. In Hawaii in 1960, Richard Nixon had seemingly won in a very close vote. Hawaii’s acting governor so certified. A recount then determined that John F. Kennedy had in fact won. That recount was not completed until after the Electoral College had voted. Yet some smart lawyer advised the Hawaii Democratic Party to have their electors vote on the day set by Congress too. They did. Their ballots, certified by the governor, were then flown on a private plane, arriving in D.C. on the morning of Jan. 6, 1961.

What the Trump electors did in 2020 was, in every case, close to this, though in critical cases, something much worse. Two states were quite clear about the contingency of their votes —New Mexico and Pennsylvania. But five states prepared documents that made it seem like Trump had in fact prevailed in their state. Those claims were obviously false. Filing false claims with the government can be a crime. So yes, what those electors did should be criticized, and perhaps prosecuted. They should have done as their fellow electors in New Mexico and Pennsylvania had done — and certified a slate of votes contingent upon their candidate being declared the winner in their state. That certification, then, would have to wait—either for some state authority to declare its candidate the winner or for Congress to determine that that slate actually represents the candidate whose votes should be counted.

...

have seen confusion regarding the alternative electors part o' the trump campaign's green bay sweep efforts. were not necessarily illegal for republicans in "contested states" to create a second slate o' electors, but to be knowing part o' a plan to submit fraudulent slates indeed makes many electors subject to conspiracy charges, and 'course those who planned and coordinated the scheme to submit fraudulent slates should also be criminal liable. 

HA! Good Fun!

[Malcador]

1 hour ago, Zoraptor said:

Multiple sources are carrying various interpretations of that Biden/ Zelensky exchange. The most baffling part of it by far is 'once the ground is frozen'. It's already frozen and has been for weeks, and in contrast every day gets closer to the Rasputitsa. Could be a Bidenism of "while the ground is frozen" but even that doesn't make much sense in context.

For the more full version, [with apologies for the shonky embed, I think twitter hates me for having high privacy settings and the original tweet got got...]

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FKJDVv9XsAoYd-c?format=jpg&name=900x900

If it's an accurate representation- and there are multiple, similar takes from other sources- it's pretty damning.

Pretty funny the Ukrainians are trying to tamp down rhetoric.  Well the government at least, on social media it's all holy war against Russia.

[Gorth]

13 minutes ago, Malcador said:

Pretty funny the Ukrainians are trying to tamp down rhetoric.  Well the government at least, on social media it's all holy war against Russia.

Two years of lockdowns and restrictions. People are getting restless and need tangible enemies...

[ComradeYellow]

And notice how it's all liberals leading the charge here.  Liberals absolutely HATE Rooysha for some reason, which is strange because FDR and JKF were also liberals and they never took such a fanatical stance.

Edited January 28, 2022 by ComradeYellow

[Agiel]

18 hours ago, Zoraptor said:

 

Uh, really? Russia's western border is almost entirely land, and thus unsuitable for carriers. China's east coast however is rather more suited to them. The options that the US has for land basing in Europe are practically infinite. The options that the US has for land basing off China's coast have a massive gap between Japan and the Phils, and The Phils and Singapore- and IIRC there are no land based US planes in Singapore either, only helis. The only added deterence from a carrier in the Med might, at a stretch, be an attack on Tartus or Hmeimem. Which can probably be discounted as being somewhat too much of an escalation. You cannot tell anything about priorities from that, at all.

 

You're scarcely scratching the surface of what it is that makes a Carrier Strike Group such a useful asset. Take the 2015 deployment of the Russian Air Force to Hmeimim. For several weeks the US DoD announced the ever increasing amount of aircraft and materiel flowing into the air base before the Russian Air Force finally commenced air operations in earnest out of Hmeimim. A carrier air group by contrast has essentially everything it needs to start operations as soon as it's on station (available aircraft for all roles such as AEW and refueling, support personnel, armaments, fuel, lodging and food for aircrew, etc. capability I'm sure the Kuznetsov crew thought was eye-watering as their deployment was ostensibly a very expensive and roundabout way of ferrying some MiG-29Ks and obsolescent Su-33s to Hmeimim). Hence Clinton saying the first question a President asks when a crisis erupts is "Where's the nearest carrier?". Even absent the carriers the "gap" you mentioned is plugged in by aircraft out of Kadena using aerial refueling

This need for rapid flexibility instead of permanent presence is also underscored by the fact that the US Army and Air Force in Europe have since been consolidated with their Africa commands. In terms of ground forces there's only one ABCT in Europe on rotational basis, with the only major combat unit permanently garrisoned being 2nd Cavalry Regiment (raise your hand if you can picture a _Stryker_ Brigade on a road to Moscow). The effort to get a permanent Army presence in Poland during the Trump administration (mind you, an idea put forward by the Polish themselves and attempted to entice Trump to go ahead with it by proposing it be named "Fort Trump") was all but stillborn when the US and Poland failed to resolve the issue of cost-sharing. A more politically expedient solution has been found in the form of simply selling the Polish armed forces M1A2 tanks, and will likely be carried out even if Trump or a Trump-like candidate gets elected in 2024 (more jobs for General Dynamics, after all). 

You speak of NATO needing a boogey-man to stay relevant. That argument cuts both ways. Russia ranks dead last in trust in institutions, and thus in the middle of a deadly pandemic (excess deaths, considered by epidemiologists to be a far better indicator of the impact of COVID-19 than official death counts, put death rates in Russia at a phenomenally higher rate than the rest of the developed world) Putin needs a big political win on the level of his annexation of Crimea, else normal Russians no longer consent to serfdom to the oligarchs.

Edited January 28, 2022 by Agiel

[Zoraptor]

1 hour ago, Gromnir said:

69On August 21, Vasilevskii issued two directives to begin “immediately and no later than August 21” the embarkation of the 87th Rifle Corps from the Sakhalin ports of Maoka, Otomari, and Toyohira for the capture of Hokkaido and the southern Kurils. The commanders of the First and Second Far Eastern Fronts, the Pacific Fleet, and the air force were ordered to be ready for airborne operations over Rumoi and to make the air base available by August 23 for the occupation of the northern part of Hokkaido. In addition, Iumashev was to send two marine divisions in two or three echelons to Hokkaido. Finally, Vasilevskii reminded all commanders that he would personally give the order to begin the landing operations for Hokkaido, and that preparations for this operation should be completed by August 23.79 The Soviet war machine was about to claw its way on to Hokkaido.
 

Again, that was all to be carried out after the Japanese surrender and in the context of there being literally zero resistance; and the plan was completely conjectural even then. There's absolute conclusive proof of that in your own source as well to whit:

"On August 21, Vasilevskii issued two directives to begin “immediately and no later than August 21” the embarkation of the 87^th Rifle Corps from the Sakhalin ports of Maoka, Otomari, and Toyohira[sic]"

is preceded by

"The landing units encountered a violent storm on the way from Maoka to Otomari, and it was not until August 26, four days later than Vasilevskii’s plan [to take Sakhalin], that the Soviet troops captured the port." Indeed, they didn't capture Toyohara either until the 26th. So even according to your source the plan called for embarkation of troops that weren't there, from ports they didn't hold and didn't even plan to capture- in a best case scenario- until August 22 one day after the supposed invasion of Hokkaido was meant to take place. That problem with not noticing the implication of dates has been persistent too.

So, frankly I can't be bothered citing actual sources because (1) you don't read them anyway and (2) you don't actually provide reliable sources, and I'm a bit tired of critiquing them for free. The Japanese were going to oppose any landing; a speculative plan developed specifically in the assumption that they wouldn't and launched from bases they didn't hold with troops that weren't there is... dunno.

[Zoraptor]

16 minutes ago, Agiel said:

You're scarcely scratching the surface of what it is that makes a Carrier Strike Group such a useful asset...

Well sure in general, just not in the Med. They're not close to anything Russian except the forces in Syria, and transit of the Bosporus by carriers is literally proscribed by treaty. Guess the US could just abrogate Montreux as well, but that wouldn't even be popular in Turkey.

Comparison to a Russian deployment to Hmeimem is pretty irrelevant. The US and its allies has contiguous airspace and supply capability all over western and central europe and over the entire Med (and Baltic for that matter). They can easily redeploy assets if needed. The Russians had to avoid Turkish and NATO airspace which meant a massive detour was required over the Caspian and approval from Iran and Iraq if they wanted to take an air route. Indeed, some of the planes refueled in Iran. Different nowadays, but that was 2015 and only a few months away from Turkey shooting down the slowest Su-24 ever built.

Edited January 28, 2022 by Zoraptor

[Gromnir]

4 minutes ago, Zoraptor said:

Again, that was all to be carried out after the Japanese surrender and in the context of there being literally zero resistance; and the plan was completely conjectural even then. There's absolute conclusive proof of that in your own source as well to whit:

 

"carried out" is deflection. again, the japanese surrendered in part 'cause o' the soviet declaration o' war, which you keep insisting were not a significant part o' the japanese decision to capitulate, your stance being an out-o' touch and ignorant o' fact position dismissed as revisionist as noted 'bove by actual historians.  after january 8, the japanese feared that if they did not surrender to the americans, the soviets would manage to acquire significant japanese territory. what the bombs failed to achieve alone, the soviet declaration o' war cemented. subsequent actions by the soviets, including their unrealized but not at all controversial hokkaido invasion plans were seen as validation o' japanese fears.

as citied in an earlier source, again, the plan to invade hokkaido were anticipated previous to the sakhalin island operation... which occurred on? august 11, previous to surrender... not that the day o' surrender matters, or the actual end o' war which were september 2 btw. fighting clear continued after the 15th and soviets had every intention o' grabbing as much territory as possible, which, again, is exact what the japanese feared.

freaking circles.

'course zor can't be bothered  to cite or craft a decent rebuttal or do anything but deflect.

*chuckle*

thanks again. see you in three years on this same issue.

HA! Good Fun!

[Gromnir]

52 minutes ago, Agiel said:

 

You speak of NATO needing a boogey-man to stay relevant. That argument cuts both ways. Russia ranks dead last in trust in institutions, and thus in the middle of a deadly pandemic (excess deaths, considered by epidemiologists to be a far better indicator of the impact of COVID-19 than official death counts, put death rates in Russia at a phenomenally higher rate than the rest of the developed world) Putin needs a big political win on the level of his annexation of Crimea, else normal Russians no longer consent to serfdom to the oligarchs.

am suspecting merkel stepping down played a part in putin's choice to instigate this situation now as 'posed to earlier. from our pov, germany has been the nato member most notable for their absence o' concern regarding russia insofar as the current ukraine situation. is hard to imagine merkel remaining taciturn. given covid mishandling, the world bank projections on diminished growth for 2022, and the recent protests, putin no doubt needed the win you were referencing. however, while is likely an overstatement, merkel stepping down in december is possible worth considering as an overlooked contributing factor.

HA! Good Fun!

 

[Zoraptor]

1 hour ago, Gromnir said:

"carried out" is deflection. again, the japanese surrendered in part 'cause o' the soviet declaration o' war, which you keep insisting were not a significant part o' the japanese decision to capitulate

Dude, that's complete and utter bollocks, then and now. Go back and read the initial threads you quoted earlier for the then.

For the now, and literally on this page.

8 hours ago, Zoraptor said:

The reasons for Japanese surrender were the nukes and the utter collapse of the Kwantung Army in a week, which completely compromised the supply for the 3 million Japanese soldiers in China. A soviet invasion of Hokkaido might be a problem, eventually, but they had multiple more pressing things that had not gone entirely to their advantage happening right then.
 

What's even the point of trying to gaslight when a complete counter is a mousescroll up?

[Darkpriest]

CNN making fools of themselves with the whole Ukraine situation and Biden-Zelensky talk...

 

[Gromnir]

talk 'bout gaslighting.

"the soviets declarations and their intent to invade Hokkaido ahead of a planned US invasion o' the Japanese mainland is considered by modern historians to be as much a cause o' japan surrender as were the dropping o' the bombs."

was the quote you responded to with your manchuria and hokkaido observations.  we keep referencing the soviet deceleration o' war as a 'cause and you did indeed reject saying were the collapse o' japanese forces in manchuria a week later... and that the hokkaido fears were never meaningful. is not a quibble. you focusing on timing o' hokkaido has always been deflection. 

can read our old posts.

we said bombs weren't enough and were soviet declaration o' war and fears o' lost japanese homeland territory which eventual resulted in capitulation o' japan.

you rejected this position, and you were very much focused on your curious hokkaido timing silliness, ignoring what is common held belief 'mongst credible historians (see the half dozen or so links we has made) that the soviets did indeed have designs on hokkaido. was soon as soviets declared war and invaded manchuria that the calculus changed dramatic for the japanese, though not enough to cause immediate surrender. regardless, fears o' a hokkaido invasion were anything but fanciful at this point. so selective quote all you want.

again, 'cause we need do again, again.

"no sooner had the marriage of convenience uniting right-wing Japan and the communist Soviet Union broken down than the Japanese ruling elite’s fear of communism sweeping away the emperor system was reawakened. to preserve the imperial house, it would be better to surrender before the USSR was able to dictate terms. on august 13, rejecting Anami’s request that the decision to accept U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes’s counteroffer (the “Byrnes note”), which rejected Japan’s conditional acceptance of the Potsdal terms, be postponed, Suzuki explained: “if we miss today, the Soviet Union would take not only Manchuria, Korea, [and] Karafuto [sakhalin Island], but also Hokkaido. this would destroy the foundation of Japan. we must end the war when we can deal with the United States.”[68] furthermore, when Shigemitsu had a crucial meeting with Kido on the afternoon of August 9 at Prince Konoe’s request, which eventually led to Kido’s meeting with Hirohito that persuaded the emperor to accept the “sacred decision” scenario, Shigemitsu stressed the negative effect of further Soviet expansion on the fate of the imperial household.[69]"

august nine were contemporaneous with the soviet invasion. the bombs, soviet declaration o' war, the very real threat o' a soviet invasion o' japanese islands all contributed, but as has been stated many times over, the japanese were very much aware o' soviet plans and desires to occupy hokkaido and by now anybody but zor would admit the soviets clear had designs on hokkaido. the loss o' soldiers on the mainland were not what were gonna give the soviets leverage to "dictate terms." fighting continued in manchuria until september 2 btw, the actual end o' the war. regardless, the japanese had previous believed they had 'til 1946 to need worry 'bout the soviets. declaration o' war and simultaneous invasion were a curious surprise and changed the game entire. the bombs weren't enough. 

and 'round we go with you deflecting and cherry picking.

so, say something new, 'cause by now just 'bout every historian mentioned in this thread has disagreed with you regarding japanese concerns regarding hokkaido and the soviet intentions to invade.

HA! Good Fun!

Edited January 28, 2022 by Gromnir

[pmp10]

12 hours ago, rjshae said:

Historically, Western Europe demonstrated a willingness to abandon smaller nations in order to maintain the peace. (E.g. Austria, Czechoslovakia.) Russia had already demonstrated a willingness to invade its neighbors. *COUGH*Crimea*COUGH* Once they start doing that, where do you draw the line? If they're stopped at the Ukraine then you don't need to spend a ton of money to stop them at Poland. It's not hysterics; it's a powerful lesson from history.

The objectives are pretty clearly understood, it's the US response to Russia that is baffling so far.

Parts of Ukrainian government have already gone conspiratorial on this.
Supposedly it's a US ploy to deliberately spread panic and force giving up on Crimea and Donbas to ease financial pressure.