pmp10
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Everything posted by pmp10
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According to Ukrainian intelligence the spring/early summer period will be decisive for the war. Makes sense as almost all major factors can now be predicted, except for the effectiveness of newly conscripted Russian troops. Sure, but that's the corners cut in pursuit of quantity. A lot of 'make-do' decisions have likely been made when industry was set on semi-war footing. Doesn't necessarily mean they will be far less effective with somewhat less advanced optics.
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Not new T90s or BMP3s certainly, but by now they have mobilized the industry and are refurbishing T62s and BMP2s. So the best guess is they are capable of these numbers and maybe more by raiding strategic stores and cannibalizing mothballed hardware. Chances are they can do this for a few years as well. Word is that US got really annoyed at making demand for Abrams delivery too public, so this might be making amends. Or maybe they just underestimated the pressure this would produce. Either way we will see if that 'Leopard coalition' Poland kept talking about is actually real.
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So the summary of heavy weapon pledges at and shortly before Ramstein are about: ~170* soviet tanks 375 western and soviet IFVs 1000 western APCs 200 mostly western artillery pieces (half self-propelled) Not bad, but (artillery aside) this will cover roughly 3 months of serious fighting. Ironically this should also be about what Russia can produce in 3 months. * depending on what Poland has in mind and what the Czech delivery schedule is
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You know you cannot just drop a line like that and not provide some explanation. My simples answer is that he wants the war over sooner rather than later to salvage what he can from dealings with Russia. A movement for escalation was gaining momentum and had to be nipped in the bud. I'm sure he will still agree at some point, but only when there is no more chances of moving the west from 'Too Little / Too Late' aid trajectory. Also there are rumors of cut-throat negotiations between Berlin and Washington concerning much more than just tank delivery. Chances are this aid is seen as one more form of leverage.
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It's the precedent that is interesting. Until recently delivering a western-made IFV was sure to start a nuclear war. Now you can do 'light-tanks' and be fine. Chances are that Putin turned-down one carrot too many and so here comes the stick.
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Interestingly enough France is supposed to even provide 'light tanks'. I wonder what has changed recently.
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Some interesting predictions by Michael Kofman. That was a long wait for quite a standard response with some opt-outs. Seems both sides are being really cautious about the energy markets.
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Macron has been expanding on his idea for post-war order. His 'guarantees' are apparently to include the likes of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Armenia. I didn't think he wanted US gone so badly as to practically endorse a better CSTO.
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EU agrees to potential gas price cap. It's still very much theoretical (it's set far above the current market value) but after months of negotiations some agreement has been reached.
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With conscript forces there is no telling what they are capable of. Both on battlefield and off. But the initial 100k or so seems to have stabilized the lines and helped cover the retreat from Kherson. So chances are that next 200k would make some gains.
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Russia has not yet deployed majority of their conscripts to Ukraine. The questions are more of 'when will they start' and 'how far they will get'.
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Patriot missiles are in serious consideration for Ukraine. I admin I didn't see it coming. Delivery would likely take at least half a year which means US is resigning itself to a long slog.
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When you hear Macron or Scholtz speak on 'new security arrangements' I get the impression they are hinting something more. Ukraine has no reason to trust another version of Minsk accords, moreover (if the diplomatic leaks are trustworthy) no country would agree to guarantee their security during the talks in April. On the Russian side the demands were to push-back NATO to 1997 status and now claiming parts of Ukraine they don't even control. I have no idea how they want to square this particular circle but maybe the idea is just to start talking.
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Not really, in NATO there are members not under any serious threat and then there is the eastern Europe. If NATO is afraid of breaking a fingernail over Kiev then it will not be willing to bleed over Tallinn. Just over the last few months in Poland, people who would blindly trust in article 5 are now calling for panic-rearming and dreading future US pivot to Asia. And that's even before we even consider what European 'guarantees' for Russia could look like, because chances are they will demand some form of NATO roll-back.
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Putin sets expectations for a long war. So much for those diplomatic feelers that west was sending. He doesn't seem too concerned with any upcoming economic collapse either.
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Hungary blocks EU aid to Ukraine. Predictable hostage in dispute over rule of law and the EU recovery funds. But for once there is a deadline and someone will have to give-in before the year is out.
