World Wars

[walkerguy]

Seems like we need a World War thread! Yay, and heres all your information!

 

World War I

 

World War I, also known as the First World War, the Great War and the War To End All Wars, was a global military conflict which took place primarily in Europe from 1914 to 1918.

 

WWI Videos

WWI Details

WWI Era Timeline

 

 

World War II

 

It began in 1939 as a European conflict between Germany and an Anglo-French coalition, but eventually included most of the nations of the world. It ended in 1945 as the most destructive war in human history, leaving a new world order dominated by the U.S. and the USSR.

 

WWII Videos

WWII Timeline

WWII Details

 

 

Dum Tacet Clamat to all the dead heros...

[Morgoth]

A rather good documentary about WW1 with a lot of rare footage:

 

The First World War - To Arms part 1/6

The First World War - To Arms part 2/6

The First World War - To Arms part 3/6

The First World War - To Arms part 4/6

The First World War - To Arms part 5/6

The First World War - To Arms part 6/6

[Walsingham]

*chews pipe stem*

 

Yay! 'splosions!

[Tale]

I remember World War II. That was a real war. Not like this here Iraq war or this "war on terror." Why, when me and the boys stormed the beaches on D-Day, we knew real TERROR. We didn't declare war on it, we were too busy fighting real enemies, the Germans!

[Walsingham]

I sometimes wonder what Hollywood and the games industry woud do without the Germans.

[walkerguy]

Yeah, sure Tale fought in the War of 1812... Well, yes this war is just someone else's problem, a guerrilla war at that! Pain in the butt, its a waste of allied resources and lives.

Edited March 7, 2008 by walkerguy

[Fionavar]

Thread Pruned: Hopeful am I it will be constructive from here ...

[Hildegard]

Who's gonna be here to post about the third?

[Gorth]

Who's gonna be here to post about the third?

Skynet?

 

For WWI my favourite website: http://www.firstworldwar.com/ (warning, some disturbing images in the galleries).

 

As for WWII, I am mostly interested in things related to the two largest operations of the war, the german 'Operation Barbarossa' and the Soviet 'Manchuria Offensive'.

[BIOShazard]

in my Computers class, we watched this movie called WarGames where some kid hacks into the military thinking its a game company, and almosts starts World War 3, where a computer comes up with an answer to win the game 'Global Thermonuclear War' is to not play at all, and starts playing chess again.

I guess we need to talk about possibilities of a WW3. It could be the Soviets, or it could be the Germans again. Who knows. But when (and if) we enter WW3, what will be the trigger. In fact, if there is another incident similar to 9/11 (Hopefully the pres won't be reading to a class in Florida and ignore it until he's done), theres a chance we could go to Defcon 2. The trigger could be the Iraqi War, or Al Queda again. Then what would we do? Many people have Computer training, and someone who has hacker training can hack into a major CPU, crash many computers, and cause world wide panic.

I just confused myself.

[Walsingham]

I suppose you folks noticed that Skynet is the name of the British military command information system?

[Humodour]

I suppose you folks noticed that Skynet is the name of the British military command information system?

 

Their Skynet came first.

[Hildegard]

I suppose you folks noticed that Skynet is the name of the British military command information system?

 

 

In US military the 'Skynet' will be FCS.

[Walsingham]

Anyway, back on topic. WW2 generals? My favourites have to be Montgomery and Kesselring.

[Xard]

Pfft, Monty screwed with Market Garden big time

 

Rommel ftw

[theslug]

I killed a guy named skynet in cod 4 this morning...

[Nick_i_am]

Pfft, Monty screwed with Market Garden big time

 

It was more bad luck and bad intelligence than bad strategy.

[Gorth]

Anyway, back on topic. WW2 generals? My favourites have to be Montgomery and Kesselring.

Wals... some day, you are going to have to explain Montgomery to me

 

For me, as a non-brit, somebody like, say Harold Alexander looks like a better general. More concerned about winning the damn war than creating a cult of personality around himself.

 

Kesselring, well, that would be a toss up between him and Manstein. Manteufel gets the price for coolest name though

The russians have Конев and Жу́ков scrambling for the pole position.

As for the american, japanese, french, dutch, belgian, romanian, australian, croatian, hungarian, italian, greek, finnish etc. generals, I probably don't know as much about them as I should. Not enough to compare them to their national peers anyway

[Humodour]

Why don't we have a look at the hundreds of young "men" who were executed for shell shock? Many of them kids around the age of 15 and 16.

 

Those who experienced shell shock were considered weak, cowardly and to have no moral character. If they weren't executed they were sent back to the front lines within 48 hours. It's not called shellshock anymore, though. Now it is post-traumatic stress syndrome.

 

It didn't stop at WW1, either.

[Walsingham]

Pfft, Monty screwed with Market Garden big time

 

Rommel ftw

 

 

 

Montgomery did not 'screw' with MARKET GARDEN*. He took an eminently sensible gamble which didn't pay off. It failed to pay off for several reasons, but it may be wise to first quickly sum up for the unfamiliar.

 

Strategic Summary

 

Following the breakout from Normandy , and the capture of Paris, Axis forces were falling back as fast as possible into the low countries. Due to the nature of the terrain, and the short supply lines it was felt this would make good defensive ground. However, it also came at a risk, for behind this position, and across the Rhine lay the industrial heart of Germany. A breakthrough at this point would permit Allied forces to both seize crucial political ground, but more importantly to cut German supplies of war materiel. Without those supplies further German resistance would be futile, and therefore success of a breakthrough might end the war in Europe.

 

Operational Plan

Montgomery realised that the best hope of success lay not in a traditional offensive, but by striking at the entire depth of the Axis positions. I do not know if he was aware, but his plan echoed Soviet concepts of deep battle. The idea was to identify the key points necessary for success (the bridges at Eindhoven, Nijmegen, and Arnhem), and to assault these with airborne forces while simultaneously pushing conventional forces from point to point, linking up the airborne drop zones. The use of airborne forces was intended to prevent the Axis from destroying the bridges, but also to disrupt their defensive front line.

 

Typical criticism

 

Many historians criticise Montgomery's plan for two reasons:

1. The dropping of the paratroops into Arnhem, where they met two SS panzer divisions instead of the predicted poor quality infantry.

2. The axis of advance for the conventional force (XXX Corps) was along a single road.

 

The first point makes no sense, as Military Intelligence had not identified the panzers in the area. Their only reference to panzers came from the Dutch resistance (who had been thoroughly compromised by the Abwehr, and a handful of aerial photographs. In any event, the paratroops were equipped with light anti-tank weaponry and might be expected to hold their own. The British had, after all, possessed tanks in Crete, and it hadn't stopped the Germans.

 

The second point is fair to raise. However, in my opinion such criticism fails to take into account the fact that every single operation ever planned occurs in the context of glaring problems. It is the job of soldiers to overcome them. In this case it is entirely possible that the Allies would have come up with a technical fix, as they did in Burma, and during OVERLORD. But it was decided that moving quickly was better than more confidently on this occasion. Given the German capacity for constructing defences they were probably right to move before the opposition could dig in.

 

More Likely Causes of Failure

 

The crude reason the operation failed can be summed up as **** happens. All war is a gamble. However, to illustrate this, consider some examples.

 

1. Of only a handful of gliders, the first shot down contained jeeps of a reconnaissance squadron. These would have helped capture the bridge quicker, and come in handy later, with communications, ammunition supply, and carrying the wounded.

2. The radios didn't work. This was probably the single biggest problem. Without the radios, the paratroops couldn't communicate with each other (the jeeps might have come in handy here. But more importantly, the paratroops couldn't coordinate with Allied airpower and Allied resupply. It was the lack of effective air support, and lack of supplies which allowed the Germans to beat them in the end.

3. Bad weather in England held up reinforcement and resupply by the Polish paratroops, and regular drops. Again, had these been on time, and effective the paratroops coudl have held out longer.

 

These points are significant, because although XXX corps arrived late, they should have been able to punch through teh remaining distance and link up with the bridge at Arnhem, had it not been for Frost's paratroops finally being overrun. In other words but for some bad luck we'd remember MARKETR GARDEN, and Monty as the man who won the war. Indeed, had we been able to force a German surrender in 1944 it cwould have been considerably easier to prevent the Soviets from taking as much of Europe as they did.

 

 

*http://www.army.mod.uk/para/history/arnhem.htm**

**British operational codenames are traditionally all capitalised to distinguish them from normal text.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

 

Also

For me, as a non-brit, somebody like, say Harold Alexander looks like a better general. More concerned about winning the damn war than creating a cult of personality around himself.

 

Montgomery cultivated the cult of his personality for one simple reason: it helped win the war. He was in fact a very private man, whose every letter and lecture illustrates that he had only one desire, and that was to be a part of a war winning machine. His cult of personality helped because it gave the men confidence in him, and in the battles he organised. A fact my own relatives can attest to.

 

It is also worth pointing out that on the Allied side a great many generals tried to foster cults of personality. Alexander, as you say was not one of them. But place Monty near Patton, MacArthur, Clark, or de Gaulle and you may feel more relaxed.

[Xard]

Didn't read Walsh's post yet...

 

 

Pfft, Monty screwed with Market Garden big time

 

It was more bad luck and bad intelligence than bad strategy.

 

 

I'd say ignoring what intelligence had been telling out of pride or something is quite fatal flaw in plans. Monty chose not to believe in what he was told. That cost 7000 british captives, not to mention all the casualties.

 

Monty was good general, but such oversight over intelligence reports is amateurish.

 

Of course they had bad luck too with transmitting information...

 

But anyway, it was shoddily planned operation with many oversights and problems (geez, suddenly I feel like when I read Walsh's post I'll be pwned )

Edited March 9, 2008 by Xard

[Walsingham]

Xard, if Monty actually had ignored his intelligence reports you're right he would have been a fool. However, (and I know you said you hadn't read it yet) when you read my previous post you'll see that

 

1) The intelligence did not indicate the presence of the SS panzers in Arnhem. The intelligence sources indicating tanks were

- A handful of aerial photos

- Dutch resistance reports

 

As I said above, the Dutch resistance had been thoroughly compromised. So thoroughly that the Abwehr were sending jokes about it through double agents. In such circumstances, and assuming the Germans were weak, what would YOU send through captured agents? I reckon you'd want to make the Allies believe you had tanks aplenty!

 

Even if a handful of tanks had been present it would not have to alter events massively. Cancelling the operation on that basis would b crazy.

 

2) Sufficient combat power should have been delivered to avoid losing even in spite of the SS. But due to failed radios and bad weather, neither close tactical air support nor logistics got delivered properly.

[Guest The Architect]

So basically the unreliability of Dutch intelligence and a **** up in communications was what screwed up Market Garden. It was an overly optimistic but noble operation to begin with, and to go by intelligence a few days out of date that the occupation of German forces north of the Belgian border all the way to Arnhem was weak and meagrely armoured, so basically the bad underestimation of German morale and organisation, was stupid.

[Walsingham]

So basically the unreliability of Dutch intelligence and a **** up in communications was what screwed up Market Garden. It was an overly optimistic but noble operation to begin with, and to go by intelligence a few days out of date that the occupation of German forces north of the Belgian border all the way to Arnhem was weak and meagrely armoured, so basically the bad underestimation of German morale and organisation, was stupid.

 

What you call overly optimistic is in other circumstances is called daring. OVERLORD would be a good example. There were many intelligence surprises on D-Day, such as the moving of batteries, the dropping of thousands of paratroops into flooded areas, and the unexpected strength of the 352nd Panzergrenadier Division. But it came off OK. Hurrah. If it had not, what would we think of its architects?

 

If you think it is stupid to have underestimated the German morale, perhaps you have some suggestion as to how morale should be calculated from the air? But even if it were higher the plan would have succeeded with a swifter and more sustained buildup of combat power in the airheads.

[Guest The Architect]

They were expecting the German forces to be weak in Arnhem based on fudge all. That, is a silly underestimation of the German morale, or in war terms, it basically means the same thing as their organisation and preparation. Okay sure, it's admissible, no, habitual, for a commander to order forces that face probable forthcoming capitulation to undertake a risky operation, and this wasn't even the Allies initially believed case with Market Garden.

 

On the flip side though, the commander of an army doesn't gamble the lives of his troops in an operation with a small chance of success, even if the potential reward is great. And we know that appraisal of the risk involved in a planned operation depends primarily on intelligence, and the unreliability of Dutch intelligence was a significant factor counting against the op.

Edited March 10, 2008 by The Architect