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Gromnir

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Everything posted by Gromnir

  1. am not certain where the curious support for the discredited revisionist theories is spawned. already gave a nod to michael kort earlier, but... "Revisionism’s heyday lasted through the 1980s and into the early 1990s. Then the historiographical ground began to shift. During the 1990s a new body of scholarly work emerged, often based on hitherto unavailable documents, that countered many of the revisionist arguments, among them the characterization of the atomic bomb as a diplomatic weapon in 1945, the claim that Japan would have surrendered before the planned U.S. invasion had the bomb not been used, and allegations that projected casualty figures for the expected invasion and ultimate defeat of Japan were lower than those cited by supporters of the decision to use the bomb. The historians who produced these new books and journal articles provided powerful validation for America’s use of atomic bombs against Japan. In the process, they destroyed the pillars that had supported the various versions of the revisionist case. "The first of these works was MacArthur’s ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942-1945 (1992) by military historian Edward J. Drea, a scholar fluent in Japanese. Drea’s focus was not on the Hiroshima decision per se but on the U.S. Army’s codebreaking operation in the Pacific, called ULTRA, that beginning in 1944 provided General Douglas MacArthur invaluable information in his campaign against Japanese forces in the southwest Pacific theater. ULTRA reports––which were not declassified until the mid-1970s––were forwarded on a daily basis to top U.S. policy makers in Washington, including White House officials, along with diplomatic, or MAGIC, intercepts. What ULTRA showed during late June and throughout July was a massive Japanese buildup of unanticipated scale on the southernmost home island of Kyushu, precisely where the first stage of the two-stage invasion of Japan, called Olympic, was scheduled to take place on November 1. (The second stage, Coronet, was aimed at the Tokyo plain and scheduled for March 1946. The overall plan to invade Japan was designated Downfall.) Not only did the buildup testify to Japan’s determination to fight to the bitter end, but it invalidated any previous military estimates of the casualties such an invasion would cost. ULTRA showed that by early August the number of Japanese defenders on Kyushu was almost double what the U.S. had expected (ULTRA actually underestimated the number of Japanese troops by a third) and that Olympic would be “very costly indeed.” 11 Drea’s evidence thus undermined two key parts of the revisionist case: that Japan was seriously considering surrender in the summer of 1945 and that the lower casualty estimates cited by revisionists, all of which dated from before American military planners learned of the Japanese buildup on Kyushu, were the ones accepted by the top American decision makers in Washington. (as can be seen from our specific Shockley quote, he were basing numbers on predictable projected resistance rather than some kinda belief in particular intransigence o' the Japanese people. the high casualty totals were most direct attributed to US learning o' how extensive were Japanese preparations for a US invasion. regardless, is largely irrelevant as the question is what Truman believed would be casualty totals. after-the-fact debate as to what would be more accurate projections does not change information available to the ultimate decision makers. (a 1993 Smithsonian exhibit actual brief reinvigorated the revisionist debate, leading to revisionism's accepted demise by all save a few self-appointed pundits at the far corners o' the intra-web) … "Academic historians plunged into the fray on both sides. Revisionist scholars defending the exhibit insisted that the issue was scholarly research (their own) based on primary source documents versus the emotional reactions of their detractors, many of whom were elderly veterans. They complained that critics of NASM wanted to censor legitimate scholarship, a charge that ignored the existence of scholarship that contradicted what was in the NASM’s script. One academic who had served on NASM’s advisory group of scholars suggested the disagreement was between “memory and history,” the former flawed and faded as it emerged from the hearts and minds of aging, emotional veterans, and the latter reliable and reputable as it emerged from the research of unbiased, up-to-date scholars. Whatever its self-serving pretentiousness, the phrase caught on in revisionist circles. But the exhibit was mortally wounded. The Senate unanimously adopted a resolution critical of the exhibit and in January 1995 it was cancelled.12 Then, as if on cue, came a series of books and scholarly articles that demonstrated convincingly that those who had relied on “memory” during the NASM debate had not shown faulty recall after all. "The books included biographies of Truman by two leading scholars in the field, Robert H. Ferrell, whose Harry S. Truman: A Life appeared in 1994, and Alonzo L. Hamby, whose Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman was published in 1995. Each included a detailed chapter on the Hiroshima decision that refuted the revisionist claims, from Japan’s presumed readiness to surrender prior to August 6 to Truman’s alleged use of the atomic bomb as a diplomatic weapon against the Soviet Union. Stanley Weintraub’s The Last Great Victory: The End of World War II, July/August 1945 (1995), a day-by-day chronicle of the last month of the Pacific War, provided the grim context that ultimately dictated the use of the bomb.13 "These wide-ranging works were accompanied by works that focused exclusively on the Hiroshima decision, or more narrowly on certain aspects of it, which collectively shattered the revisionist case. In Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later (1995), Robert James Maddox convincingly dismantled the atomic diplomacy thesis, demonstrating how that thesis rested not on the documentary record but on unsupported allegations and distortions of the historical record. Maddox documented how Truman, far from using the atomic bomb as a diplomatic weapon against the Soviet Union, attempted to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union before and during the Potsdam Conference. Maddox further showed how MAGIC intercepts––in particular the cables between Japan’s foreign minister in Tokyo and its ambassador in Moscow––and the ULTRA intercepts made it clear to American leaders that Japan was unwilling to surrender on terms remotely consistent with minimum Allied war aims and was instead preparing vigorously for the expected American invasion. Maddox also cited solid documentary evidence that Truman and his advisors saw casualty estimates for the anticipated American invasion of Japan of 500,000 or more and that the president feared staggering losses should the invasion take place. "Robert P. Newman’s Truman and the Hiroshima Cult approached the Hiroshima decision topic by topic, with individual chapters defending policies such as demanding unconditional surrender and not providing Japan with a demonstration of a nuclear explosion. Most devastating to the revisionist case was Newman’s demolition of the USSBS assertion that Japan would have surrendered “certainly prior to December 31, 1945, and in all probability prior to November 1, 1945” absent the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Soviet entry into the war. By reviewing the testimony of the Japanese officials the USSBS had interrogated in 1945, he demonstrated that it is impossible to read that testimony objectively and not deduce that the USSBS reached its conclusion of a Japanese surrender during 1945 by ignoring its own evidence.14 "The claim that after the war Truman and some of his advisors exaggerated casualty projections of an invasion and final defeat of Japan––specifically that those projections reached 500,000 or more––for decades was one of the main pillars of the revisionist case.17 That pillar collapsed with the first thorough examination of the issue, “Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasions of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications” by military historian D. M. Giangreco. Writing in The Journal of Military History, Giangreco explained that in military hands these projections took three forms: medical estimates, manpower estimates, and strategic estimates. He then demonstrated that there was substantial documentation for high-end casualty projections–– which, to be sure, varied widely––from both military and civilian sources that reached upward of 500,000. Equally important, one estimate that reached Truman––from former president Herbert Hoover, who had high-level government contacts––led the president to convene an important meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and top civilian advisors on June 18, 1945, to discuss the projected invasion of Japan. In short, as Giangreco stressed in a later article in the Pacific Historical Review, Truman both saw and was concerned about high-end casualty estimates prior to the scheduled invasion. His claims to that effect were not postwar concoctions. "Nor did the thesis that unconditional surrender was responsible for extending the war fare well in the light of new scholarship. In “Japan’s Delayed Surrender” (1995), Herbert Bix concluded that “it was not so much the Allied policy of unconditional surrender that prolonged the Pacific war, as it was the unrealistic and incompetent actions of Japan’s leaders.”19 The intransigence of Japan’s leaders prior to Hiroshima was further documented by Lawrence Freedman and Saki Dockrill in “Hiroshima: A Strategy of Shock” (1994) and, most thoroughly and convincingly, by Japanese historian Sadao Asada in “The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender––A Reconsideration” (1998). Asada’s extensive use of Japanese-language sources convinced him the United States did not miss an opportunity to end the war before Hiroshima when it refused to modify its demand for unconditional surrender. Rather, if “any opportunity were missed, it may have been Japan’s failure to accept the Potsdam Declaration on July 26.”20" etc. revisionism only survives 'cause a few folks refuse to let it die in spite o' mountains o' scholarly work discrediting its dogma. HA! Good Fun!
  2. am fully supporting the boycott. am gonna encourage all our democrat acquaintances to join the boycott. if enough silly Californian democrats would boycott in-n-out, we might be able to get a double-double, fries and a coke w/o needing endure the dozen-car-deep drive thru gridlock which is a near constant at any area in-n-out location. in fact, we would consider starting a rumor 'bout lynsi snyder bathing in the blood of kittens and puppies if we thought doing so would discourage a few people from visiting in-n-out. HA! Good Fun!
  3. august 31 release https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5WnYi3T78Ag https://variety.com/2018/film/news/active-measures-review-donald-trump-vladimir-putin-1202915093/ is not our cup o' tea as it looks a bit more sensationalist than we prefer, but could be fun. HA! Good Fun! ps https://www.c-span.org/video/?450726-1/vice-president-biden-friends-eulogize-senator-john-mccain particular noteworthy: larry fitzgerald starts at approx. 54:00 joe bidden follows at 1:01:30
  4. dr. shockley casualty estimates from june 1945 "If the study shows that the behavior of nations in all historical cases comparable to Japan's has in fact been invariably consistent with the behavior of the troops in battle, then it means that the Japanese dead and ineffectives at the time of the defeat will exceed the corresponding number for the Germans. In other words, we shall probably have to kill at least 5 to 10 million Japanese. This might cost us between 1.7 and 4 million casualties including 400,000 and 800,000 killed.” the proposition that a-bomb use were first and foremost a warning to the soviets becomes dubious when one considers how, as o' summer o' 1945, the projections for US and japanese casualties resulting from an invasion o' japan were, w/o any hint o' hyperbole, nightmarish. as agiel linked clip notes, japan had no plans for "surrender" w/o an American invasion. at the time the bombs were dropped, the japanese were also killing approx 100,000 in mainland china every month. the total body count attached to continuing war in the pacific woulda' been soul crushing to consider, which is no doubt what the japanese were counting on at the time. am not certain what were truman's eventual calculus behind dropping the bombs, but am thinking there is a tendency to oversimplify motivations o' actors on both sides o' the pacific. with that said, it is difficult for us to personal imagine truman not using atomic weapons if he believed the casualty estimates he were getting. sure, soviet involvement may have been important to both US and japanese decision-making in august 1945, but faced with estimates o' japanese, chinese and american casualties, estimates crafted by guys such as shockley, it makes us wonder if truman coulda' decided on any other course o' action than use of atomic weapons. with the benefit o' hindsight, truman's choice takes on a much different look. am doubting truman and others could genuine recognize the magnitude o' their decision, regardless o' claims to the contrary. even so, for truman and others, am guessing the world looked a bit different in the spring o' 1945 than it did in the autumn... but such reflections is only our personal impressions. HA! Good Fun!
  5. No it isn't. The collapse of the Manchukuo Army and that cutting off supply to the literally millions of men in China and SE Asia was about as persuasive as the nukes since it meant there was nothing left for Japan to negotiate with or hope for. Invasion of Hokkaido by the Soviets though- well, maybe in winter when they could drive there. The plan to invade Hokkaido as cited in FP, if the Japanese even knew about it, was from 4 days after they'd already surrendered. Unsurprising as anything other than an unopposed naval landing would be extremely difficult for the soviets. Even an area as unimportant as the Kurils had 40k Japanese troops there, and the soviets weren't going to be sweeping through the steppe with IS3 and T34s like in Manchukuo. Indeed, when they did invade the Kurils after Japan's surrender and with most of the Japanese not fighting they still suffered 15% casualties (and about twice the absolute losses of the Japanese who had no navy or air support at all). hasegawa and others disagree with you. "no sooner had the marriage of convenience uniting right-wing Japan and the communist Soviet Union broken down than the Japanese ruling elite’s fear of communism sweeping away the emperor system was reawakened. to preserve the imperial house, it would be better to surrender before the USSR was able to dictate terms. on august 13, rejecting Anami’s request that the decision to accept U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes’s counteroffer (the “Byrnes note”), which rejected Japan’s conditional acceptance of the Potsdal terms, be postponed, Suzuki explained: “if we miss today, the Soviet Union would take not only Manchuria, Korea, [and] Karafuto [sakhalin Island], but also Hokkaido. this would destroy the foundation of Japan. we must end the war when we can deal with the United States.”[68] furthermore, when Shigemitsu had a crucial meeting with Kido on the afternoon of August 9 at Prince Konoe’s request, which eventually led to Kido’s meeting with Hirohito that persuaded the emperor to accept the “sacred decision” scenario, Shigemitsu stressed the negative effect of further Soviet expansion on the fate of the imperial household.[69]" soviet threat to hokkaido were considered a possibility for more than a year, and became increasing likely in 1945. soviet declaration of war against japan were august 8, before nagasaki and after hiroshima. sure, the attack on hokkaido were initial planned for late august, but assuming the japanese were complete ignorant of the soviet intent to invade seems a bit naive and flies in the face o' the weight o' modern scholarship. another fp article. "Viewed from the Japanese perspective, the most important day in that second week of August wasn’t Aug. 6 but Aug. 9. That was the day that the Supreme Council met — for the first time in the war — to discuss unconditional surrender. The Supreme Council was a group of six top members of the government — a sort of inner cabinet — that effectively ruled Japan in 1945. Japan’s leaders had not seriously considered surrendering prior to that day. Unconditional surrender (what the Allies were demanding) was a bitter pill to swallow. The United States and Great Britain were already convening war crimes trials in Europe. What if they decided to put the emperor — who was believed to be divine — on trial? What if they got rid of the emperor and changed the form of government entirely? Even though the situation was bad in the summer of 1945, the leaders of Japan were not willing to consider giving up their traditions, their beliefs, or their way of life. Until Aug. 9. What could have happened that caused them to so suddenly and decisively change their minds? What made them sit down to seriously discuss surrender for the first time after 14 years of war?" ... "If the Japanese were not concerned with city bombing in general or the atomic bombing of Hiroshima in particular, what were they concerned with? The answer is simple: the Soviet Union." "The impact of the Soviet declaration of war and invasion of Manchuria and Sakhalin Island was quite different, however. Once the Soviet Union had declared war, Stalin could no longer act as a mediator — he was now a belligerent. So the diplomatic option was wiped out by the Soviet move. The effect on the military situation was equally dramatic. Most of Japan’s best troops had been shifted to the southern part of the home islands. Japan’s military had correctly guessed that the likely first target of an American invasion would be the southernmost island of Kyushu. The once proud Kwangtung army in Manchuria, for example, was a shell of its former self because its best units had been shifted away to defend Japan itself. When the Russians invaded Manchuria, they sliced through what had once been an elite army and many Russian units only stopped when they ran out of gas. The Soviet 16th Army — 100,000 strong — launched an invasion of the southern half of Sakhalin Island. Their orders were to mop up Japanese resistance there, and then — within 10 to 14 days — be prepared to invade Hokkaido, the northernmost of Japan’s home islands. The Japanese force tasked with defending Hokkaido, the 5th Area Army, was under strength at two divisions and two brigades, and was in fortified positions on the east side of the island. The Soviet plan of attack called for an invasion of Hokkaido from the west. "It didn’t take a military genius to see that, while it might be possible to fight a decisive battle against one great power invading from one direction, it would not be possible to fight off two great powers attacking from two different directions. The Soviet invasion invalidated the military’s decisive battle strategy, just as it invalidated the diplomatic strategy. At a single stroke, all of Japan’s options evaporated. The Soviet invasion was strategically decisive — it foreclosed both of Japan’s options — while the bombing of Hiroshima (which foreclosed neither) was not." none o' this is at all controversial in this day and age. a small number o' traditionalists hold to the notion the bombs were decisive punctuation marks ending the war with japan, but hasegawa, richard b. frank the fp articles and others sources too numerous to mention agree, the soviet threat were a substantial factor in japan's ultimate decision to surrender, and a few historians suggest the soviet threat were the vital reason. the US were no less aware o' potential soviet threat. honest, is worth a view. HA! Good Fun!
  6. actually https://forums.obsidian.net/topic/66123-israel-vs-palestine/?p=1474304 https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/05/stalin_japan_hiroshima_occupation_hokkaido/ https://forums.obsidian.net/topic/66123-israel-vs-palestine/?p=1474576 highly recommend watching the prof hasegawa clip, but criticism o' hasegawa typically appears thus: "Hasegawa fails to sustain his main arguments with the necessary evidence. At best, he leaves the revisionist case as he found it, in ruins. Indeed, he makes the rubble bounce by convincingly demonstrating that the Soviet Union very much was racing to get into the Pacific War in order to facilitate its expansionist policies in the Far East. Those who seek the definitive analysis on the end of the Pacific War will have to look elsewhere. A good place to begin is Frank’s Downfall." --prof. michael kort the soviets declarations and their intent to invade Hokkaido ahead of a planned US invasion o' the Japanese mainland is considered by modern historians to be as much a cause o' japan surrender as were the dropping o' the bombs. as to whether or not bombs were meant as a threat to soviets fails to consider the possibility there could be more than one purpose. the Truman-warning-stalin reasoning no doubt played a part, but dr. Shockley analysis as well as many other factors contributed to the ultimate decision to drop bombs. regardless, one thing is certain: nobody wanted to surrender to the soviets. HA! Good Fun!
  7. To be fair, he probably wouldn't have been a pilot in the first place, so we are dealing with some big what-ifs. what-ifs which is red herrings. let's take as a given that nepotism is bad. is unfair. is wrong. Gromnir agrees nepotism is bad. for purpose o' the post, gonna assume nobody disagrees. so, is only 'cause o' nepotism mccain spent months flying dangerous combat missions from an undermanned carrier air group during vietnam conflict. if not for nepotism, mccain never woulda' been in life or death situations involving aa fire and soviet sams and migs. but for nepotism, mccain woulda' never been shot down and never captured and never tortured and never forced to consider whether to endure years o' extra confinement and torture or choose early release, a devil's bargain only in the offering 'cause o' nepotism. yeah, mccain really screwed the system. as to the question o' mccain's personal heroism, the nepotism and early pilot struggles is complete irrelevant. if mccain had benefited from nepotism to get into brown or princeton, we would criticize such. if mccain family name had landed mccain some kinda cushy job with a big paycheck in spite o' clear lack o' qualifications, we would criticize such. if nepotism had resulted in mccain receiving multiple deferments and a trumped up medical dq for bone spurs or some such to avoid military service, then we would be criticizing. it is a wrong for mccain to have benefited from nepotism, to have received so many additional chances to get into the ****pit o' military aircraft. such is irrelevant as to the question o' his heroism in combat or as a pow. don't let 'em distract you. as to trump crying wolf, am thinking this is the one single aspect which reveals animal cunning on the part o' the chief executive insofar as media manipulation is concerned. this is the razzle-dazzle we always reference. am not believing trump cares if the media and other sources do not take him serious. instead, it better suits him to be able to complain 'bout how he ain't being taken serious. this president has shown he doesn't understand complex issues. the president doesn't want his base to focus on his lack o' progress on platform issues and he doesn't want his base to read 'bout the guilty pleas and convictions o' multiple trump campaign personages. he doesn't wanna have base consider overwhelming scientific condemnation o' his climate change perspective. it doesn't benefit the president to have his base listen to even his own economic advisors extolling the virtues o' free trade. etc. the media responds predictable every time trump says something ridiculous. the media calls in experts to refute trump nonsense regarding google? doesn't matter, 'cause at least then the media is no longer 24/7 beating him up 'bout mccain or tariffs or mueller. but the media cannot resist oh, isn't that cute/funny? watch as the media spins and leaps and exhausts self every time trump says something ridiculous. add insult to injury, trump is then able to claim he is the victim. tells his base to see how he is being mistreated by the media. is mind boggling anybody is falling for this shtick, but it is working. is indeed crying wolf, but am suspecting it is with purpose. HA! Good Fun! ps per our quick search, pretty much every stoopid cat-chasing-laser video has music added. we would never have patience to record and upload such a video, but to edit and add music to a cat video disturbs us almost as much as does trump calculated crying wolf. who are these people?
  8. one suspects the recent criticism o' heroism would be significant muted if not for the thumbs down defeat o' obamacare repeal and mccain's animosity towards trump. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/24518450/ns/politics-decision_08/t/navy-releases-mccains-military-record/ have seen references to 23 bombing runs for mccain, but am having no idea where such numbers is coming from. take 23 with a grain o' salt as am having no way to check sources. regardless, particular after the forrestal fire, mccain were part o' an undermanned carrier air group facing conditions as described in the cs monitor article linked by us earlier in this thread, and did so for months. mccain were, 'ccording to the linked nbcnews article, awarded a bronze star and other commendations for his pilot efforts before the day he was shot down. am not certain why one would dismiss mccain courage while a pow, refusing release 'til others who had been in captivity longer were set free, but even before being shot down and captured, mccain had done enough to merit the label o' hero in Gromnir's book. nevertheless, to marginalize what mccain and others endured in combat and as pows is difficult for us to comprehend. HA! Good Fun! ps am having difficulty imagining what it would be like to refuse the keys to our own release. after years o' torture, to choose to extend the time o' our confinement 'cause o' a matter o' conscience and principle? am glad we need never have had to face such a choice, 'cause am suspecting we would have failed to show the same mettle as mccain.
  9. https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2015/0723/John-McCain-s-air-war-over-Vietnam.-And-mine https://www.c-span.org/video/?450491-9/senator-whitehouse-pays-tribute-senator-john-mccain and we knew whitehouse by name only, but of yesterday's tributes, am thinking whitehouse efforts stood out as particular noteworthy. alternative, sherrod brown o' ohio had his mic silenced-- wrong time.
  10. from the last paragraph of malcador's first linked article: "To be sure, Mr. Trump's tweet repeated the assertion from PJ Media's article, which didn't include an assessment of the amount of content created by different news organizations nor the size of their readership." is not difficult to imagine how searches for trump would typical provide negative stories if one assumes most media outlets do not care for trump. large media outlets such as washington post and ny times and cnn is indeed writing negative stuff 'bout trump and as such it ain't shocking such stories is being searched for and read. as stated many times 'fore, there is nothing unethical 'bout a journalist or media source having a demonstrably negative opinion 'bout a President. regardless, would be dubious 'bout results from a pajamas media (am not kidding) "study" or report... especially any such as relates to google, yahoo or microsoft. back in 2006, roger simon referred to the aforementioned as the "new axis of evil," and has advocated a number o' wingnut conspiracy theories dressed up as news which has been demonstrable proven false. heck, in an article lambasting wiki bias, pj media cited sources, sources which were actual from conservapedia. pj media is a trainwreck... but such doesn't make 'em necessarily wrong. even so, is cause to be dubious 'bout pj media claims. oh, and malcador suggestion 'bout 50/50 liberal conservative might not work for trump neither. kinda miss 2015 lindsey graham. am thinking if the chief executive doesn't wanna read mean stories 'bout himself, he should quit doing and saying stuff which predictable is gonna result in bad press. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-climatechange-trump-mit-idUSKBN18S6L0 https://www.vox.com/2016/7/30/12332922/donald-trump-khan-muslim etc. HA! Good Fun!
  11. one suspects your answer largely depends 'pon what for you are thinking and praying. HA! Good Fun!
  12. linda mccartney went horseback riding with her family and then died of complications due to cancer the same eve. it happens. when it doesn't happen, we hardly begrudge an individual and their family from choosing human intervention to alleviate the pain and indignity which so often accompanies deaths caused by cancer. most o' us recognize how agonizing such final choices must be and choose not to call attention to any peculiarities of timing or circumstance. john McCain wanted this statement read after his death perhaps more significant as a kinda final message is one of senator mccain's final speeches from the senate floor am saddened so many o' mccain's signature legislative efforts have been undone by subsequent legislative, executive and judicial actions. however, while it rare receives more than cursory recognition, mccain's efforts to normalize relations with vietnam may be the most enduring and meaningful aspect o' his legacy. mccain's ability to put aside differences and work on behalf o' the US and vietnam to the benefit o' both nations says a great deal 'bout the character o' mccain. he will be missed. he should be missed.
  13. HA! Good Fun!
  14. john mccain on snl. https://ew.com/tv/2018/08/25/john-mccain-best-saturday-night-live-moments/ am not certain how we missed the 2002 skit. oh, and the new true detective trailer HA! Good Fun!
  15. am driving in a car with a nice woman who is telling us 'bout music she likes and Gromnir is trying not to laugh as the following track from her playlist comes breezily through speakers as she explains how much she dislikes reggae. HA! Good Fun! ps one before bed from Gromnir playlist
  16. the 1960 Presidential Platform: In 1796, in America's first contested national election, our Party, under the leadership of Thomas Jefferson, campaigned on the principles of "The Rights of Man." Ever since, these four words have underscored our identity with the plain people of America and the world. In periods of national crisis, we Democrats have returned to these words for renewed strength. We return to them today. In 1960, "The Rights of Man" are still the issue. It is our continuing responsibility to provide an effective instrument of political action for every American who seeks to strengthen these rights-everywhere here in America, and everywhere in our 20th Century world. The common danger of mankind is war and the threat of war. Today, three billion human beings live in fear that some rash act or blunder may plunge us all into a nuclear holocaust which will leave only ruined cities, blasted homes, and a poisoned earth and sky. Our objective, however, is not the right to coexist in armed camps on the same planet with totalitarian ideologies; it is the creation of an enduring peace in which the universal values of human dignity, truth, and justice under law are finally secured for all men everywhere on earth. If America is to work effectively for such a peace, we must first restore our national strength-military, political, economic, and moral. National Defense The new Democratic Administration will recast our military capacity in order to provide forces and weapons of a diversity, balance, and mobility sufficient in quantity and quality to deter both limited and general aggressions. When the Democratic Administration left office in 1953, the United States was the pre-eminent power in the world. Most free nations had confidence in our will and our ability to carry out our commitments to the common defense. Even those who wished us ill respected our power and influence. The Republican Administration has lost that position of pre-eminence. Over the past 7 1/2 years, our military power has steadily declined relative to that of the Russians and the Chinese and their satellites. This is not a partisan election-year charge. It has been persistently made by high officials of the Republican Administration itself. Before Congressional committees they have testified that the Communists will have a dangerous lead in intercontinental missiles through 1963—and that the Republican Administration has no plans to catch up. They have admitted that the Soviet Union leads in the space race—and that they have no plans to catch up. They have also admitted that our conventional military forces, on which we depend for defense in any non-nuclear war, have been dangerously slashed for reasons of "economy"—and that they have no plans to reverse this trend. As a result, our military position today is measured in terms of gaps—missile gap, space gap, limited-war gap. To recover from the errors of the past 7 1/2 years will not be easy. This is the strength that must be erected: 1. Deterrent military power such that the Soviet and Chinese leaders will have no doubt that an attack on the United States would surely be followed by their own destruction. 2. Balanced conventional military forces which will permit a response graded to the intensity of any threats of aggressive force. 3. Continuous modernization of these forces through intensified research and development, including essential programs now slowed down, terminated, suspended, or neglected for lack of budgetary support. A first order of business of a Democratic Administration will be a complete re-examination of the organization of our armed forces. A military organization structure, conceived before the revolution in weapons technology, cannot be suitable for the strategic deterrent, continental defense, limited war, and military alliance requirements of the 1960s. We believe that our armed forces should be organized more nearly on the basis of function, not only to produce greater military strength, but also to eliminate duplication and save substantial sums. We pledge our will, energies, and resources to oppose Communist aggression. Since World War II, it has been clear that our own security must be pursued in concert with that of many other nations. The Democratic Administrations which, in World War II, led in forging a mighty and victorious alliance, took the initiative after the war in creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the greatest peacetime alliance in history. This alliance has made it possible to keep Western Europe and the Atlantic Community secure against Communist pressures. Our present system of alliances was begun in a time of an earlier weapons technology when our ability to retaliate against Communist attack required bases all around the periphery of the Soviet Union. Today, because of our continuing weakness in mobile weapons systems and intercontinental missiles, our defenses still depend in part on bases beyond our borders for planes and shorter-range missiles. If an alliance is to be maintained in vigor, its unity must be reflected in shared purposes. Some of our allies have contributed neither devotion to the cause of freedom nor any real military strength. The new Democratic Administration will review our system of pacts and alliances. We shall continue to adhere to our treaty obligations, including the commitment of the UN Charter to resist aggression. But we shall also seek to shift the emphasis of our cooperation from military aid to economic development, wherever this is possible. end sure, there were more to the kennedy platform, but we posted as it were presented, and responding to the growing threat o' china and the soviet union after perceived failure o' republicans to maintain adequate defense were the first and most important issue o' kennedy's presidential run. am not an eisenhower fan. his response to civil rights issues were shameful, and corruption were rampant during his administration. we were not a proponent o' MAD nor o' eisenhower's reliance on cia covert operations to influence foreign governments. however, whether you think MAD were ill-advised and possible suicidal (as does Gromnir) it not change fact that kennedy were responding to perceived eisenhower pacifism. following korean armistice, eisenhower never sent combat troops abroad, and defense spending relative to other potential US antagonists decreased while suffering from notable inefficiency and duplication. in eisenhower's farewell address, he took the opportunity to warn the nation o' the growing military industrial complex. this one ain't actual all too complex. kennedy's platform were first and foremost (literal the first heading) predicated 'pon rejection o' eisenhower to proper respond to the military threat o' the soviets and china. as to mccain. he were not always honorable as some would wish to (re)imagine. however, mccain were surprising honest 'bout his failures o' character and he were forthcoming 'bout his political blunders. he were a flawed man. mccain made mistakes, but am convinced mccain were as committed to service as any man who has served in the senate in the last five decades. while we didn't always agree with mccain, am believing he were a decent man. how rare is such in washington these days?
  17. Holy **** that is a good quote. world has gone topsy-turvy. whenever we explain how eisenhower-nixon were the doves and kennedy-lbj were the hawks, we get blank stares and disbelief. kennedy were elected in large part 'cause o' his rejection o' eisenhower era pacifism. robert mcnamara's adoption o' metrics for determining success o' a military campaign (body count) were transformative and seeming irreversible as those in the pentagon desirous o' promotion knew they needed show progress and achievement through metrics. https://www.c-span.org/video/?80828-1/dereliction-duty is worth reading mcmaster's book, but is perhaps just as interesting to see 1997 mcmaster, with hair, at a local bookstore speaking to mostly empty chairs about mistakes o' vietnam. video quality kinda sucks. HA! Good Fun!
  18. proof got a whole lot easier with pecker involvement. prove campaign entanglement will be easier when both cohen and presumably pecker will testify as to actual reasons for payments. is not much reason to grant pecker immunity unless he is able to offer evidence o' a crime. pay-off to cover-up an affair is not a crime. affairs is, as you note, embarrassing, but is guys such as pecker who is in the business o' revealing extramarital affairs and not the US Attorney. one expects that the manner in which payoff paper trail was handled, testimony from eye-witnesses and timing o' the payoffs is gonna make for more than simple embarrassment. HA! Good Fun!
  19. am not sure 'bout kanada, but in the US, plot is for cemeteries and lot is land on which your house sits. lot. for frame o' reference, Gromnir is on a .39 acre lot in a gated community, which works out to rough 16k sqft. a 6k sqft lot is nice if is more urban and less suburban, but US and kanada home and lot sizes tends to be larger compared to european counterparts. by comparison, we got 90' (diameter) circle lots in our community for smaller/smallish houses. for a one-story home, is tough to fit a 2000 sqft home on a 90' circle. HA! Good Fun! ps is not attempting to brag if it seemed such. in more than a few places in the US, Gromnir's lot and house size would be considered smallish.
  20. is a ny times linked article, so you are likely blocked. regardless, were enough evidence for an indictment o' russians. means there is legal evidence. may not be enough evidence to convict, but there is evidence or no indictment... and we sure as heck haven't abandoned reason such that we would adopt vol definition o' crimes as posed to us district court judges. and again, obstruction is different. did the administration illegal interfere with various investigations? doesn't matter if vol finds evidence compelling, but comey alone has offered relevant evidence regarding the possibility o' obstruction. would be up to a finder o' fact to decide if they believe comey, but such evidence regarding trump meetings and phone calls would be relevant evidence. edit: add for vol as an alternative to nyt link: http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/402902-muellers-speaking-indictments-offer-clues-to-strategy HA! Good Fun! ps funny aside, but am thinking the recent fox interview is increasing problematic for trump. claim by trump how he personal paid for hush payments not only doesn't get him outta unreported campaign contribution troubles, but such exposes him to tax problems. business legal/attorney fees is tax deductible. campaign contributions is not. if trump did payoff and then label as business legal/attorney fees, then there is possible tax issues for the president, and such a possibility is gonna require disclosure o' trump taxes.
  21. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/13/us/politics/mueller-indictment-russian-intelligence-hacking.html and the investigation were not only 'bout election interference, but also obstruction, and whether you is convinced by comey or not, there is evidence o' obstruction. regardless, investigations into criminal behavior frequent reveal additional charges for unrelated crimes. criminals rare limit themselves to a single criminal act. HA! Good Fun!
  22. well, take home before taxes is $71k, and in san francisco that is enough to pay for a nice cardboard box in an alley in the tenderloin district. am being hyperbolic, but not by much. HA! Good Fun!
  23. with the recent news regarding cohen, pecker and weaselberg, the situation is not looking good for the trump administration. in fact, recent leaked footage o' a senior wh staff meeting shows how tense the west wing has been in recent days. link. HA! Good Fun! ps am fully aware how to proper spell weisselberg, but mr. weaselberg has been considered the proverbial golden goose in any potential trump investigation, and the US Attorney's office has him. more than any single individual not named trump, mr. weaselberg has been aware o' the details o' trump business dealings for decades.
  24. am thinking you give trump too much credit. conspiracy theories exist in part 'cause o' the need to see coordinated human agency behind events. as a history guy, hurl no doubt recognizes how often events is simple the result o' mistake and misunderstanding. is no doubt some axiom which expresses how human involvement in any event increases unpredictability. hanlon's razor? *shrug* am not seeing a plan behind trump. as often as not he does things which hurt his efforts and he is utter surprised by the lack o' praise. stuff such as the putin meeting and charlottesville were not part o' some kinda trump plan. during the election, each mainstream republican candidate assumed that as their real rivals dropped out o' the race, they would gain additional supporters. fundamental misconception. exit polls showed how at the time o' the election, republicans were not enamored with trump (curious, trump has become more popular with his base since the election in spite o' a couple years worth o' relative impotence) but the trump voters hated hillary. well guess what? the republican voters hated most o' the other republican candidates near as much as they hated hillary. trump supporters at the time o' the election hated hillary and Congress and the establishment, and mainstream republican candidates were part o' the establishment. republican candidates weren't outmaneuvered so much as they were playing the wrong freaking game. trump hasn't had a plan... evar. describes self as a counter-puncher and am thinking such is accurate. trump responds as 'posed to plans. the thing is, the trump base is thorough invested. sure, fox news enables, but it is the trump base which reimagines every flaw and fumble as a success. hurl is seeing agency where there is none. trump is possible 'cause middle and lower middle-class white americans is seeing trump as their guy. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/01/12/trump-loyalists-rush-to-defend-the-indefensible-and-get-left-holding-the-bag/?utm_term=.06c1d78df5f7 if there is agency from the wh, then perhaps melania is behind it all, 'cause Prez trump does little save react, and that is good enough for his base. HA! Good Fun!
  25. So Trump is a defenseless young kid? Oh, well now I really feel bad for him. Poor guy. https://www.npr.org/2017/07/04/535429508/trump-s-weekend-gives-twist-to-meaning-of-bully-pulpit the present chief executive has helped change the definition o' a word while he attempts to simultaneous and incongruous appeal to his base by means o' his no-apology bluster (bullying) and at same time portrays self as the victim o' a media plot. is fascinating how a segment o' the US voting populace doesn't see the inherent inconsistency, but such is 2018. during the election, many defended trump's less-than-accurate bluster as campaign rhetoric. of course President trump wouldn't resort to such shenanigans once elected. started day one with trump calling the media liars in spite o' clear evidence undercutting his claims. unfortunate, trump's base is holding the media to a much higher standard than they hold their guy. admitted you got more than a few members o' the media jumping down into the mud with trump to sling dirt, but by doing so the press loses legitimacy in the eyes o' ordinary republicans while the president mudslinging is applauded as tough and real. so while Gromnir sees ugly, brutal and pointless trump supporters see the following: madness. HA! Good Fun! ps double-link removed
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