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Gromnir

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Everything posted by Gromnir

  1. as childish as it may appear, am wondering how much the mockery trump endured for his reflexive "two weeks" announcement led to him moving quickly to end diplomatic efforts and instead resort to an overt display of military force. first, netanyahu maneuvers trump into helping him with attacks on iran that israel couldn't manage itself; donald didn't wanna look weak by admitting that israel had not only successful attacked numerous iranian sites, but that israel purposeful kept the US in the dark about the attacks. and trump, like a child, were jealous of the positive attention israel was getting on fox? then we get the "two week" jokes, which reveal just how often trump goes limp after making a bold pronouncement. trump didn't like that very much. am suspecting what the US needs most is a competent kindergarten teacher, somebody with experience keeping little kids in line, to handle trump. HA! Good Fun!
  2. *eye roll* yeah, lexx who also imagined into existence a Gromnir position is an appropriate role model for you. is not as if he admitted his error neither. am not sure how you see lexx as having come out o' the situation looking anything but embarrassed, but am not surprised. so, birds of a feather? malc didn't exactly quietly ignore us either, but if this becomes a curious binary option, malc's approach were a far better way to handle. he initial defended what we see as mistakes, but he didn't fight and die on a pointless hill. am agreeing, you could learn from malc. unlikely. in any event, am still not seeing the point to all of this effort by israel if the goal were to neuter iran's capability to build a nuclear weapon. iran is facing more than a bit of political disarray, but it is hard to imagine they never considered the possibility of israeli or US attacks on their nuclear sites. for decades, the main thing holding iran back from building a weapon was the lack of political will to do so. bombing these sites surely didn't destroy all of iran's supplies of enriched uranium, and the knowledge o' how to build a weapon weren't vaporized by the fordow attack. iran is a big country with an enormous population and a whole lotta geography which is inhospitable and ideal for hiding some kinda stealth weapon development operation. iran could even secret a facility in the middle of a densely populated area. before the attack, it didn't look as if iran was actively pursuing the development of a nuclear weapon, even if they were enhancing their breakout capability. having been attacked, who here is confident that iran is less willing to build a bomb? regime change as the real goal looks far more likely, but am gonna see what happens from this point. (edit) am also not seeing any US or israeli solution for bushehr. even before the first attack, we woulda assumed israel would have devised a plan for dealing with busher if they were serious about at least temporarily halting iran breakout progress. am gonna admit to some cold sweat when israel announced that they finally had attacked bushehr. thankfully, that news were a mistake. HA! Good Fun!
  3. rhetorical? what rhetorical effect are you seeking to achieve seeing as how we already explicit answered? is a kinda sad sympathy for zor the effect you were aiming for? if so, congrats? and again, using ten year old data were kinda essential if am showing that the threat today is not in fact any more imminent than it has been the case for thirteen years, or more. etc. in spite o' your memento cosplay, we did over and over and over again make clear that the israeli excuse for starting a war with iran in 2025 appears unjustified. however, beyond all reason, your intransigence led to, "the past few pages o' the belligerent, misleading, strawmaning you has engaged in where you argue against positions Gromnir didn't make and selective quote to support your wholly baseless positions, all the while seeming oblivious to the fact that Gromnir, since the godfather baptism post, has been stating unequivocal our opinion that israel's accusations lack merit and surely do not rise to the level o' potential starting a war with a country of ninety million people, a country that had chosen not to construct a nuclear weapon since 2003." am genuine not concerned as to why you were so triggered that you would indulge in deceptive efforts to refute a position you couldn't recognize were largely aligned with yours. we know exactly why you would do such a thing even if we don't care about the motivation. however, am gonna admit that your reflexive self-immolation efforts is, up to a point, entertaining... even if they become exhausting and we eventual regret indulging your unhealthy needs. HA! Good Fun!
  4. ... for gawd's sake, what is wrong with you? honest? how many times do we need repeat that am having been arguing that israel's stated justification for attacking iran is contrived? have been saying for many posts and pages that israel's efforts don't match their excuse and that this operation looks far more like regime change than any kinda effort at neutering iran's nuclear breakout capability. more immediate relevant, am having been repeating, over and over and over again, 'cause somebody is so complete impervious to reason, that the nuclear threat iran poses today, based on assessments from iaea, US intelligence, rand, isis, etc. is little more significant today than it was thirteen years ago, or any day since then. we made kinda a deal about words... that israel's attack were most clear preventative as 'posed to preemptive, the difference being that preemptive can create legal legitimacy, while preventative, does not. based on iaea and recent US intelligence assessments, there was no imminent threat from iran, so calling the attack preemptive were inappropriate. again, am having been arguing that the data offered did not create a justification for attacking iran, so telling us that iaea agrees with us is nice and all, but may not quite have the relevance you believe it does. this is one o' the only accurate observations you has made over the past few pages o' the belligerent, misleading, strawmaning you has engaged in where you argue against positions Gromnir didn't make and selective quote to support your wholly baseless positions, all the while seeming oblivious to the fact that Gromnir, since the godfather baptism post, has been stating unequivocal our opinion that israel's accusations lack merit and surely do not rise to the level o' potential starting a war with a country of ninety million people, a country that had chosen not to construct a nuclear weapon since 2003. HA! Good Fun!
  5. exhausted, but am needing address the "liar" accusation as a point o' personal privilege... typical accusation from zor being manifest untrue and a kind disappointing projection. the full quote and context o' the partial quoting you call a lie. "aside, even though am arguing with our self, iran did not end it's weapons program 22 years ago. the ieae report am having linked were a wakeup call for the west, but the rand and isis links from a decade past we provided also argue, via considerable evidentiary support, that iran were maintaining a weapons program, but were not active developing a weapon. am not sure why that concept is so difficult for zor to grasp. the nuclear sites operated by iran were not sole for the purpose o' developing civilian electricity production and other iran excuses. iran did and still does have a weapons program, but they are not active pursuing the development of such weapons and they have not been doing so for over a decade. iran were close to breakout ten years ago. iran is negligible closer to breakout today. before, during and after the iran deal, no effort was made by iran to develop a weapon. as such, israel's justification for attacking at this time rings hollow." zor only quotes the bold part and calls it a lie? kinda like the three years quote, eh? left out the part where the conclusion were that a weapon could actual be completed in months, but that a delivery system would require up to three years. your selective and dishonest quoting is not accidental or limited. is your mo. we will further note that in previous posts to the one you called a lie, we stated unequivocal that we agreed with the assessment that iran had no nuclear weapon program, 'cause as counter-intuitive as it may be, us intelligence and iaea could simultaneous find that iran had no weapon program while also determining that iran were moving forward towards breakout capability. "again, duh. is the same silliness as we heard from zor in 2015 btw. the fact iran doesn't have a nuclear weapon in no way diminishes the possibility that they could achieve such in a realtive short period o' time. "yeah, since 2003, iran had not been active working on developing a nuclear weapon, but rand, iaea, isis (institute for science and international security as 'posed to the terror group... or the egyptian goddess) and others were in agreement iran had progressed very close to the threshold stage. iran had virtual all the ingredients and the infrastructure, and at one point estimates were that iran were within one month of breakout, IF iran put forth the effort to achieve such... which they did not and had not... although am gonna admit the one month estimate were kinda an outlier." we recognized as a fact that iran doesn't have a nuclear weapon program in a post made only a short time previous to the partial quote you highlight as a lie. also, "does anybody who knows zor personal wanna go over and make sure he is all right... ensure that he and elon ain't sharing a ketamine moment or something? he does get that Gromnir has been criticizing israel, right? we pointed out that israel went way too far in gaza and is now using a recycled excuse from 2011 to legitimize their attack which looks unconvincing unless you reimagine the motive as regime change. is not as if picking a side means anything to the strength o' the analysis, but the fact am using +ten year old documents is kinda essential to our claim that israel, who hadn't attacked iran for +ten years, sudden decided to do so in spite o' the relevant facts not having changed at all in those + ten years: iran is not current developing a weapon, but their current technical knowledge and resources mean they could create a weapon in six to nineteen months. if such facts weren't a legit excuse to attack +ten years ago, then why would iran continuing to not develop nuclear weapons sudden legitimize such an attack?" so we got multiple instances o' Gromnir making the observation that iran is not developing a nuclear weapon and that they don't have a weapon program from just previous to your your strategic partial quote lie accusation? liar, willful obtuse, or perhaps we were more right about ketamine/stroke than we believed. furthermore, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164291 Following Thursday’s resolution vote by the IAEA’s board of governors – which passed by a vote of 19 for, three against and 11 abstentions - Iran’s atomic energy body reportedly announced plans to open a new uranium enrichment plant and increase production of enriched fissile material. The draft for Thursday’s resolution highlights serious and growing concerns since at least 2019 that Iran had failed to cooperate fully with the UN agency’s inspectors. Tehran has “repeatedly” been unable to explain and demonstrate that its nuclear material was not being diverted for further enrichment for military use, the draft text maintains. Iran has also failed to provide the UN agency with “technically credible explanations for the presence of [man-made] uranium particles” at undeclared locations in Varamin, Marivan and Turquzabad, it continues. “Unfortunately, Iran has repeatedly either not answered, or not provided technically credible answers to, the agency’s questions,” IAEA chief Grossi said on Monday. “It has also sought to sanitize the locations, which has impeded Agency verification activities.” According to Mr. Grossi, Tehran has stockpiled 400 kilogrammes of highly enriched uranium. and https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-stock-near-bomb-grade-uranium-grows-sharply-iaea-report-shows-2025-02-26/ The stock of uranium refined to up to 60% in the form of uranium hexafluoride grew by 92.5 kg in the past quarter to 274.8 kg, one of two confidential IAEA reports said. That is enough in principle, if enriched further, for six nuclear bombs, according to an IAEA yardstick. There is enough for more weapons at lower enrichment levels. Where before its latest acceleration Iran was producing between 6 and 9 kilograms (13 and 20 pounds) of uranium enriched to up to 60% per month, now that figure is between 35 and 40 kg, a senior diplomat said. This is just short of the 42 kg that is enough in principle for one bomb, if refined further. ... uranium refined to 60% in those quantities don't have believable applications other than breakout capability or actual weapon manufacture. so, what exact is the position o' the iaea? what would any ordinary follower o' these issues, one unfamiliar with the narrow definitions used by iaea, us intelligence, isis and others, conclude that iran's efforts at increasing their stockpiles o' enriched uranium mean in terms o' efforts to construct a nuclear weapon? enhancing breakout capability v. a weapons program? again, am having stated multiple times that we agree with the observation that iaea, isis, rand, us intelligence and others have consistently assessed that iran has no weapons program and we agree that iran has not been making efforts to weaponize. that said, try and explain to any reasonable and ordinary person that iran, having abandoned their nuke program in 2003, is now closer to breakout capability than when they had a weapon program. and you continue to display your diminished capacity to understand logic by mocking yourself with mcveigh and nichols v. our neighbor phd. the logic fail is you mistaking noncompletion o' a working device as being proof of lack of capacity. we used an example where there would be no 'question as to know-how, infrastructure and materials to show that not completing a device fails as evidence o' a lack o' capacity. am finding it difficult to believe you honest don't get it, but... and so maybe you are just that obtuse. and final, hopeful final, the ten year old argument were intentional based on old data and conclusions; how can you possible still be missing that point? am criticizing israel's 2025 justification by pointing out that their conclusions is hardly more persuasive today than they were in 2011 and 2012 when us intelligence, isis, rand and iaea all agreed that iran was somewhere between six and nineteen months from reaching breakout capability. dude. serious. but what do we expect from the logic challenged guy who offers little in the way o' evidence to support his positions save to intentional misquote sources, a guy who has been arguing with a strawman mor a few pages and like so many redditt warriors, doesn't believe anybody will go through the effort to fact check him. and so here we are, once again, eh? turin horse HA! Good Fun! ps am having been warned by mods, years past, that calling posters "liar" is frowned 'pon. if such remains verboten, am recognizing we overstepped a line or broke custom. our excuse is that we were responding in kind, but perhaps such is insufficient or immaterial. regardless, if we posted in error, am apologizing in advance and bear no ill will if the thread is pruned.
  6. and second video is from 2017 btw. two weeks is parody. two weeks is a tell that trump hasn't even thought deep enough to come up with a lie. HA! Good Fun! ps (edit) for those not paying attention, it ain't just health care which didn't happen in two weeks. obviously the initial 24 hour and day 1 boasts for ukraine and bringing down inflation were anomalous, as two weeks is the reflexive rejoinder when trump is questioned. infrastructure never occurred during trumps first term in spite of perpetual two week estimates. wire tapping bombshell? nope.
  7. the cern facility is only a bit more excessive than our current setup... not to mention the vulgar oversized outdoor grill on our back patio, a weber charcoal grill, smoker, multiple air fryers (one toaster-style and two basket,) microwave oven, instapot, rice cooker, this and one of these... none o' which makes us near as good a cook as were our grandmother who cooked 99% on a circa 1957 basic 4-burner kenmore gas range. avocado color. HA! Good Fun! ps we got a bunch o' other additional cooking appliances, but they mostly sit in the pantry unused... as well as prep stuff like blenders, food processors and the stand mixer we almost never use 'cause we hardly ever bake.
  8. am thinking paperboy love prince has a better shot as the next nyc mayor. heck, paperboy love prince might have a better shot than pahlavi does o' bringing back monarchy to iran. paperboy is in favour o' ubi, so am suspecting there is at least one obsidian boardy who would support him. HA! Good Fun!
  9. am gonna admit that the part that made us open a search engine were the director credit? akeva schaffer? ... directed and wrote for snl from 2005-2011. whole lotta episodes worth o' directing credits and we had literal never heard o' him before today. ok then. admitted, is no shock his director movie credits were all flicks we never saw. he has an acting credit for the weird al parody biopic from 2022, and that is something am having meant to watch, but... ... am so outta touch. HA! Good Fun!
  10. does somebody wanna tell zor that am saying, ad nauseum, that israel did not have a legit imminent nuke threat for attacking iran? that fact doesn't seem to have sunk in yet. perplexing. kinda a lotta noise seeing he is arguing with the strawman he invented. can't serious wanna go down the list o' fact checks given your last few posts misrepresenting quotes and ignoring inconvenient facts. and is no surprise that you complete miss the point o' the tim mcveigh and phd chemist example as it is where you initial went off the rails.... and the iaea is thankful relevant, so am able to kill two birds with one fertilizer bomb. since 2011-12, iaea, rand, us military intelligence and isis has all been in agreement that iran has the know-how, infrastructure and, "very, very specific ingredients to build a nuke," within a period of six to nineteen months, and a bit less time in 2025. the fact our neighbor, in spite of having the know-how, infrastructure and access to ingredients necessary to build a bomb, but has not done so, hardly proves that she cannot build such a bomb. the recognition that tim mcveigh and nichols, not phd chemists, were able to build a bomb in no way diminishes the point that you have no better understanding o' basic logic today than at anytime in the past decade. iran and our neighbor not building a bomb o' any sort is unpersuasive proof that they is incapable o' doing so. our neighbor has chosen not to build a bomb. similarly, iran has chosen not to build a bomb. the length o' time which has expired since our neighbor has had the capacity to build a bomb and today in no way makes it more likely that she lacks capacity to do so. same goes for iran. am not sure how to simplify this further. reminder: our initial conflict with zor, from the start, were extreme limited, but presumably 'cause you got distracted by strawmen and phantoms o' what you imagined were our real arguments, you utter missed any chance at responding coherent or constructive. you made the logically faulty insinuation that the extreme amount o' time that had elapsed since israel and others first claimed that iran were working on a bomb, undermined the proposition that iran is, and has been only six to nineteen months away from creating a nuke. again, and hopeful final 'cause this is bordering on an insane level o' spam, iaea, us intelligence, rand and isis (and quite possible more,) all agreed that iran has had the capacity to reach breakout in somewhere betwixt six months and a couple years, and that assessment were true even back in 2011: a supported example unlike zor take on faith and selective half-quote nonsense, that iran had the "very, very specific ingredients" to reach breakout in a short span o' time furthermore, am not sure how many times we need repeat that am in full agreement that iran were not active pursuing the development of a nuke in spite of their efforts to shorten the breakout time by enhancing their technical and infrastructure resources, have now posted the following MULTIPLE times. "The reader is cautioned not to allow technical breakout estimates to become a distraction from the more important question of Iran’s political will. All breakout estimates assume that Iran has decided to produce a weapon. Yet this is likely not so." for chrissakes, the fact that pretty much every credible source agreed that in spite of having a short breakout timeline, iran had not been making any effort to actual develop a weapon is one o' the reasons Gromnir criticized israel (many times now) for attacking iran based on the pretext o' an imminent nuclear threat from iran. the reason iran weren't developing a weapon weren't lack o' capacity, but rather the absence o' political will. so what were different in 2025 than in the decades previous? seeing as how israel didn't provide any meaningful rationale or compelling evidence for a shift in will from iran, their justification for attacking iran looks fraudulent. but again, nobody is arguing with you that iran hasn't been working to develop a nuke for a long time. that has been a cornerstone o' our complaint that israel's excuse for attacking iran were bs. as such, complaining to us that iaea stated that iran had no weapons program since 2003 is kinda pointless. weapons program v. working towards breakout? you serious quibbling over nomenclature when am having already agreed more than a dozen times now that iran stopped working on developing a nuke way back in 2003 and instead focused on breakout capacity? ... look, am knowing the and blunders had to be embarrassing, but maybe you can take this as a learning opportunity? perhaps not. whatever. pushed us to exhaustion... again. HA! Good Fun!
  11. telling us that netanyahu's justification was less than convincing is kinda irrelevant, seeing as how that has been exact what Gromnir has been saying since our godfather baptism post... so again, duh. even so, there is an assumption that the delivery system in question is a ballistic missile warhead, which is why we quoted a pertinent portion from the rand report which describes the engineering hurdles o' accomplishing such a feat. however, as already stated, it takes little imagination to come up with alternative delivery methods for at least a single weapon. even then, zor can't help himself but misquote: "But US intelligence assessments had reached a different conclusion – not only was Iran not actively pursuing a nuclear weapon, it was also up to three years away from being able to produce and deliver one to a target of its choosing, according to four people familiar with the assessment." "up to" is carrying a bit of weight. funny you left that part out, eh? regardless, am admitted tickled by the realization zor has been busy arguing against an imaginary strawman. in any event, before israel's attack, not much had changed since 2011 when iaea and others recognized that iran were six to nineteen months away from breakout. before the most recent preventative attack by israel, there had been more than a decade o' time during which iran had the materials, infrastructure and technical know-how to achieve breakout in six to nineteen months. although breakout estimates had shrunk recent, the difference were a matter o' a few months. iran chose to not pursue the development o' a nuclear weapon. a decade o' restraint seems like a good thing in our estimation. unless somebody is hiding some sooper relevant info, there didn't look to be any more reason to attack iran in 2025 than were the case in 2024, 2023, 2022, 2021, etc. nevertheless, israel launched an attack which, particular based on their target selection, had zero chance o' seriously diminishing iran's breakout capability. is why am having repeated called bs on israel's justification for their attack. worse, if iran weren't developing a weapon before the attack as seems to be consensus, it would surprise us not at all if iran's calculus has changed. however, on the lighter side, 'cause am admitting this continued bloodbath is no doubt inspiring a bit o' nietzsche and turin horse sympathy for zor, ... is somehow equal parts amusing and grotesque that trump is effective quoting colonel strelnikov. if he had mentioned, "wolverines, small ferocious animals," we woulda' been absolute certain that trump had watched red dawn the night before. HA! Good Fun!
  12. never finished season two, but not 'cause it were bad... just weren't feeling it. dunno. a few o' the cameos is overt ridiculous, celebrities willing to poke fun at themselves, but am gonna admit the ridiculous-bordering-on-bad makes 'em fun. sting, as an example didn't lol, but we couldn't help grinning... a lot. HA! Good Fun!
  13. *chuckle* the three years is for a working delivery system. https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/17/politics/israel-iran-nuclear-bomb-us-intelligence-years-away "But US intelligence assessments had reached a different conclusion – not only was Iran not actively pursuing a nuclear weapon, it was also up to three years away from being able to produce and deliver one to a target of its choosing, according to four people familiar with the assessment." ... "The International Atomic Energy Agency, a top international watchdog, said last week that Iran had amassed enough uranium enriched at levels just below weapons-grade to potentially make nine nuclear bombs, which it termed “a matter of serious concern.” "The challenge, for Iran, is producing not merely a crude nuclear weapon – which experts say Iran could potentially do within the space of months if it decided to – but also producing a working delivery system, which could take much longer. "As US intelligence officials – and the IAEA – work to assess the damage Israel has caused to Iran’s nuclear architecture, there is some concern that the blitz might cause Iran to do what US officials believe it hasn’t up until now: pursue weaponization." but again, contrary to zor claims, iaea, us intelligence, rand, isis and others all agree that iran does in fact have the infrastructure, materials and know-how to breakout in an extreme short time frame... months. so keep repeating back to us what we has been saying from the start, that iran is not developing a weapon and has not been doing so for at least a decade. moving goalposts? serious? is Gromnir who from the start said it were iran's lack o' will that stopped 'em from moving forward with breakout, which is why israel's excuse for the attack now made little sense, but you didn't pay attention, presumably 'cause you were so distracted by your imagined strawman. literal our first post responding to your logic fail started... "logic failure. the fact iran hasn't developed nukes does not in anyway diminish the possibility that they have been one year away from developing a nuke for over a decade. iran no doubt made the calculation that they have more advantage being on the cusp o' producing a nuclear weapon than the costs o' actual possessing nuclear weapons would entail. iran has possessed the know how for a long time and they got most o' the infrastructure necessary to build a nuclear weapon. all they needed were time and will. iran has chosen nay as 'posed to yay... thus far." we said from the start that israel were disingenuous 'bout their motivation, so any kinda claim that netanyahu said something or other about iranian will is just noise and complete misses the point. one again, for the tenth(?) time, iaea, rand, isis and us intelligence assessments has consistently supported the position that supported that breakout time frames were six months to two years, and those initial estimates were more than ten freaking years past. the more recent isis and iaea predictions has trimmed the time frame a bit, but not much, which again, makes israel's excuse for their attack kinda tough to swallow. you were this guy-- "But you need very, very specific ingredients to build a nuke. Without those ingredients it simply won't work, as a matter of basic physical reality. "Dirty bomb, sure. That however would be extraordinarily disingenuous since New Zealand could build one of those, and we don't even have a reactor. So could Fiji." unfortunate for zor, iran had the "ingredients" in 2011. for cryin' out loud, 'cause o' you all we is doing is spam... In 2010, Iran began enriching to 20% in the PFEP using two centrifuge cascades.57 One cascade enriches 3.5% LEUF6 to roughly 20%. The other cascade is fed the tails assay from the first, which is around 2% U-235, and enriches it to 10%. The 10% product is then fed back into the first cascade at an intermediate point in order to enrich it to 20%. This procedure greatly improves overall efficiency. This is important from a cost perspective in producing fuel for the TNRR, Iran’s stated objective in enriching to 20%. However, it is also a useful way for Iran to improve its breakout capability should it ever choose to attempt a “batch recycling” process to quickly enrich 3.5% LEUF6 to 90% (this process is discussed in more detail in the section on breakout scenarios below). As of May 2012, Iran had produced 110.1 kg of 20% LEUF6 at the PFEP.58 footnote 58: 8 As of May 15, 2012, 43 kg of the 20% LEUF6 Iran has produced has been used to make fuel plates for the TNRR, thereby lowering Iran’s stocks of 20% LEUF6. IAEA, GOV/2012/23, para. 38. iaea, rand, isis, us intelligence is not talking about a dirty bomb. the breakout timeline is months, which comes as zero surprise to anybody 'cause that were the approximate assessment from iaea, rand, isis and us intelligence a decade ago. iran were not active working toward the development o' a weapon, but they already had the essential material and the know how. btw, for any who is genuine interested, as am having mentioned previous, the biggest remaining hurdle were likely an engineering problem as 'posed to a uranium enrichment issue. go to page 27 o' the lined rand report and check out figure 2.1. and "Once the appropriate fissile material is obtained in sufficient quantity, it must be crafted into a functioning warhead. It is assumed here that the Iranians would choose to produce a nuclear warhead with an implosion design, which requires less HEU and is easier to mate to a missile.112 Iran would need to overcome several technical challenges to construct a functioning implosion warhead that could be effectively mated to one of Iran’s ballistic missile designs. The HEUF6 produced in its centrifuges would have to be converted to uranium metal first, then machined into hemispheres for the warhead pit. Iran would need the high-explosive lenses necessary to implode the uranium core, which would have to be shaped into the right configuration so that the pit implodes uniformly. Iran also would need to have an appropriate neutron emitter to act as a trigger. While these are all challenging steps, there is evidence that Iran has already made progress with them, and may have already mastered many or all of them. Still, assembly of a warhead for the first time would be challenging and time consuming, even if the individual steps had been worked out in advance.113 Although the time required to make a weapon once sufficient fissile material has been produced is important, it is excluded from the breakout estimates provided in this section. This is because once sufficient HEUF6 has been produced, it can be removed to a secret location. Therefore, once Iran can produce enough HEU for a bomb, the chances for successful interdiction by the United States and its allies diminishes greatly. Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that it would still require time for Iran to build a weapon, and this time could be substantial." the engineering hurdles described is where the three year estimate comes into play and is not actual part o' traditional breakout analysis. and sadly, is an all too real possibility o' putting a crude weapon on a boat and having it dock in haifa. but go ahead and keep repeating that us intelligence says iran doesn't have a weapons program... in spite o' the fact that time and again we has pointed out that iran weren't pursuing the construction o' a weapon according to iaea, isis, rand and us intelligence. HA! Good Fun! ps almost as fun as watching zor try to extricate himself from his self made quagmire
  14. selective quoting and misreading. this is the quoted part from US intelligence: “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.” the first half is ap added. yes, as observed by many sources, iran has maintained and further developed their capacity to quickly achieve breakout. contrary to zor claims, iran has the necessary infrastructure. they got the necessary material. they got the know how. iran is not developing a nuclear weapon and they haven't been active developing a weapon for decades... which is our freaking point. what iran has done is maintained their capacity (infrastructure, material and know how) while working on breakout capacity. is not that iran has "yet to begin"... they began a long time ago and advanced such efforts aggressive until 2003, after which their goals changed to maintaining their program levels and advancing their capacity for breakout. is precisely why the estimated time for breakout has changed little relative little since 2015, but hasn't diminished neither and has in fact accelerated if not by a heck o' a lot. and as for the guy misreading iaea, Iran’s relations with the West entered a period of greater tension in November 2011 after the IAEA released a report providing an unprecedented level of detail about Iran’s past nuclear weapon-related activities. Although nearly all of these activities had previously been publicly known or suspected, the IAEA’s report gave them greater significance and credibility, and offered new evidence to support previous claims. The report came shortly after U.S. accusations of Iranian involvement in a plot to assassinate a top Saudi diplomat had already soured Iran’s relations with the United States and its allies. and In 2010, Iran began enriching to 20% in the PFEP using two centrifuge cascades.57 One cascade enriches 3.5% LEUF6 to roughly 20%. The other cascade is fed the tails assay from the first, which is around 2% U-235, and enriches it to 10%. The 10% product is then fed back into the first cascade at an intermediate point in order to enrich it to 20%. This procedure greatly improves overall efficiency. This is important from a cost perspective in producing fuel for the TNRR, Iran’s stated objective in enriching to 20%. However, it is also a useful way for Iran to improve its breakout capability should it ever choose to attempt a “batch recycling” process to quickly enrich 3.5% LEUF6 to 90% (this process is discussed in more detail in the section on breakout scenarios below). As of May 2012, Iran had produced 110.1 kg of 20% LEUF6 at the PFEP.58 footnote 58: 8 As of May 15, 2012, 43 kg of the 20% LEUF6 Iran has produced has been used to make fuel plates for the TNRR, thereby lowering Iran’s stocks of 20% LEUF6. IAEA, GOV/2012/23, para. 38. iaea reports made it possible to recognize just how short were the breakout timeline. again, nobody is contesting that iran weren't working to produce a nuclear weapon, so your quotes which reinforce that point reveal nothing. regardless, am unsurprised by the reditt approach to this issue. cherry pick a date, quote or a report and pretend as if the totality o' info disappears into the ether... but what should we expect from an individual who has not actual been arguing with Gromnir or addressing our posts, but clear trying to refute some imagined strawman. and again, unbeknownst to zor, for the past few pages we have been criticizing israel's stated justification for attacking iran as well as their continued war criming in gaza, but zor somehow missed? such efforts also ignore your intransigence, hoping we would forget? we will do you no favour bringing us back on point-- the fact iran has not active worked toward developing a weapon since 2003 in no way diminishes the possibility that iran is extreme close to breakout, same as were the case in 2011, 2012, 2015 and today. try and make this a nomenclature debate is ridiculous and pretends as if nobody is smart enough to go back and look at your posts from yesterday. "**First occurrence I could find of "Iran imminently going to have nuclear bomb" from Bibi is from... 1998. The first estimate I could find from US intelligence was that they could have one by 2000. "Iran nukes and cold fusion, perpetually just a little longer away." your ineffectual efforts to change the script notwithstanding, this were a discussion about breakout capacity and not whether iran were active pursuing the development of a weapon, 'cause again, we keep repeating, ad nauseum, that iran ain't been working to build a weapon. *chuckle* now that we are on the same page, we all agree, based on iaea, isis, rand and us intelligence, that the past decades o' iran not working to produce a nuke in no way reduce their capacity to breakout quickly, right? eye back on the ball? abandoning such development for decades don't in any way translate into proof that iran lacks the capacity to produce a weapon in a relative short period o' time, as is the conclusions o' iaea, us intelligence, rand and isis. you gonna once again try and convince us iran's breakout timeline ain't relative short? give it a shot, 'cause watching you struggle is amusing. but again, so as to be clear, the fact iran weren't working to develop a weapon for more than a decade makes israel's stated reason for attacking iran now less than convincing. breakout timeline in 2012 were six to nineteen months. now? is only a difference o' a few months less. so why now? am calling bs. looks like regime change, but that is an ugly label, so israel went for their own version o' wmd, but one much easier to prove 'cause it has been a relative uncontested conclusion since at least 2011 that in a matter o' months, iran could produce a weapon if they so chose. israel flips reasonable on its head... ignores the fact that iran has willing chosen not to develop a nuke in spite o' their relative brief breakout timeline, and sudden claims that iran's nuke program poses an existential threat. such a claim is only slight more coherent than zor's posts. HA! Good Fun!
  15. Appeals Court Seems Skeptical of California’s Case Against National Guard Deployment am not gonna even try and read tea leaves on this one, but am gonna observe it likely don't make too much difference as no matter what, ca or the fed is gonna appeal, and the appellate court(s) will likely maintain the current stay pending scotus resolution. well, en banc ca appellate might come before scotus. maybe. edit: politico's take HA! Good Fun!
  16. did reverse sear on a bone-in ny strip. *sigh* we don't typical do bone-in ny strip, but our preferred method for steak nowadays is that we bring the meat up to 120F in the oven which is set at 275F. we then quick hit the steak with our infrared broiler. let the steak rest for a bit less than ten minutes and by then the steak comes up to perfect med-rare internal. sometimes we do similar but after the oven, we finish in a pan with compound butter... or even just butter. this method works well in part 'cause we often let the meat rest before we do the pan finish. carbon steel pan is kinda ideal, but we also like to use a cast iron pan for this approach, and if we go cast iron, we put the pan in a 500F oven first so it is ripping hot before we place it on the stove. pretty much need less than 30 seconds per side to finish in the hot cast iron... though we highly recommend buy an elastic shower cap and covering your smoke detector while crustifying your steak as you will produce a fair amount o' smoke. we went smoky cast iron last night, but in part cause the steak was bone-in, it took a bit more than 30 seconds on one o' the sides to get the crust we demanded. "a bit more than 30 seconds" meant we overshot medium-rare and were firmly in medium territory. is not as if the steak were ruined, but am admitting we were disappointed for at least a few hours afterwards... and clearly we ain't managed to let go completely even today. perhaps we take food a bit too serious? also, we made frijoles charros the other day, which is kinda our alternative to making chili with beans. we always use mexican chorizo as one o' the meats, and while we ordinary use pinto beans, we had good mother stallard beans on hand and they have some nice coffee/chocolate undertones which we enjoy in charros. am kinda conflicted on using bacon, 'cause no mater how crispy you make your bacon, the meat becomes soft and less appetizing when cooked. we did have a bit o' very bacony ham, which we substituted for bacon... even if bacony is not a real word. also, this is one o' those recipes where am using cilantro stems as 'posed to leaves. the stems many people ordinary throw away have more cilantro flavor than does the leaves, but the stems is woody... but not woody once they has been frozen. am highly recommending to chop up frozen cilantro stems and throw 'em into a soup or stew if you has never done so before. the freezer burned cilantro will dissolve into your soup or stew. warning: cilantro flavor is concentrated in the stems, so you need less stem than leaves to get same flavour. ... am also willing to admit that we added more than a few dashes o' this into the soup/stew/whatever. rather than opening up a can/jar and chopping up a whole chipotle pepper, in a recipe which cooks for a considerable time, am finding the cholula sauce gives us the same, chipotle flavour we want as well as some heat without any additional work or mess. sue us. anyways, we serve the frijoles charros with queso fresco and lime... and maybe even some carne asada. we ordinary make a few quarts and then freeze half o' the batch, so am gonna have cowboy beans potential for a considerable period o' time as well as the accompanying gas and gas pains from the beans, meat... and the cheese we add with little restraint. worth it, but luckily we live alone and the dog doesn't mind our increased presence following the consumption o' a bowl o' beans. HA! Good Gun!
  17. we got no problem condemning israel, but (b) is an initial valid response even if you have framed it with a bit o' snark. how many time does folks need embarrass themselves by latching onto a preliminary narrative before there has been time to examine what actual happened. you sacrifice nothing by waiting a day or two to respond to these kinda events. observe that if true, it is yet more evidence o' israeli war crimes? sure. in our experience, am far less likely to unwitting play the fool when we adopt st. thomas as a role model. we let others adorn themselves in harlequin's motley as they race to be the first to condemn ___________, although am not sure what is the point o' winning that challenge. HA! Good Fun!
  18. am not sure if you get irony. tough to take serious from the guy who had multiple times not bothered to make a substantive argument in this thread, as well as doing the reflexive tell o' dismissing supported observations as word salad, or something similar, yes? as such, am finding your observation less than compelling... but thank you for continuing this silliness. honest. am not sure what you could possibly be getting out of this, but who are we to deny you what you seem to yearn for. making the same mistake and strawmaning non responsive arguments with an imaginary person rather than dealing with the individual responding to your posts. am having to do all the work 'cause you offer nothing meaningful or relevant. typical we would be exhausted by this point, but your responses is just so utter lacking am enjoying highlighting a compare and contrast difference in substance. aside, even though am arguing with our self, iran did not end it's weapons program 22 years ago. the ieae report am having linked were a wakeup call for the west, but the rand and isis links from a decade past we provided also argue, via considerable evidentiary support, that iran were maintaining a weapons program, but were not active developing a weapon. am not sure why that concept is so difficult for zor to grasp. the nuclear sites operated by iran were not sole for the purpose o' developing civilian electricity production and other iran excuses. iran did and still does have a weapons program, but they are not active pursuing the development of such weapons and they have not been doing so for over a decade. iran were close to breakout ten years ago. iran is negligible closer to breakout today. before, during and after the iran deal, no effort was made by iran to develop a weapon. as such, israel's justification for attacking at this time rings hollow. incoming wall o' text for those willing to read-- summary follows at after the spoiler window In any case, this evidence raises substantial concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities prior to 2004 and supports the 2007 NIE’s finding that Iran had a weapon program in place until that time. It also raises substantial concerns about Iran’s behavior and intentions after 2003, and undercuts Iran’s claims that its nuclear program is entirely peaceful in nature. The available evidence suggests that by 2003, Iran may not have had perfected its ability to produce a weapon, but had made significant progress with virtually every element of weaponization. It is unclear what, if any, progress Iran has been able to make in its weaponization efforts since its formal program was halted in 2003. Iran has thus far failed to satisfactorily address the above evidence to the IAEA, and has in fact refused to answer any weapons-related questions from the IAEA since August 2008, other than to claim that allegations of weapons-related work are “baseless” and that evidence of weapons work is “forged” and “fabricated.”105 again, israel has been war criming in gaza for a considerable period o' time now. returning hostages and some level o' retribution against hamas were deemed warranted post october 7 by much o' the world, but israel went way beyond that point a long time ago. we pointed out in the past that any kinda prolonged siege approach to gaza, cutting off food, water and electricity to the civilian population o' gaza more than incidental or briefly, would be a red line for us. unlike zor who stubborn chooses sides, am a bit more flexible, so it weren't difficult for us to condemn israel for their excesses in gaza... excesses which made little sense to us at the time as they accomplish almost nothing useful save guarantee that whosoever replaced hamas, assuming israel were successful in destroying that organization, would be more antagonistic than hamas, and potential more competent. even from a pure practical pov, we didn't see the value in the idf's ongoing gaza campaign. attacking hezbollah made sense o' the situation for us. add israeli support o' the US efforts to neuter the houthis as well as the most recent attacks on iran and only now does israeli efforts make sense... but not really. sure, regime change in iran likely means that at least short term there will be diminished iranian support for palestinian groups and others who wish to do violence to israel, but iran has a population o' something like 90 million and the only reason they ain't achieved breakout in two decades is 'cause they chose not to. after these attacks can israel be certain iran will not choose yay as 'posed to nay when considering whether to aim for breakout? what gives 'em such confidence the answer is nay? the israeli attacks thus far have no chance o' destroying the iranian nuclear program, so am questioning the wisdom o' the israeli attcks while observing that their announced rationale were bullsh!t. even so, am admitting we don't get much o' what is happening in the middle east. oil prices went up to $75 on the 13th and then dropped down to $68 the following day, but we are back up to $73.50 today. oil is not reacting the way it did post russia invasion o' ukraine, but so far it looks like even the illuminati is uncertain what will happen 'tween israel and iran, particular with trump's tweets, which are as nonsensical as zor posts, fanning the chaos flames. jk about the illuminati, but the rest is serious. HA! Good Fun! ps (edit) given that zor is logic challenged, as has been evidenced many times past and recent, am unsurprised he recognizes the ad hominem fallacy. if an insult replaces the argument, it is fallacious. however, please note it is only when you abandoned any effort at meaningful argument that we responded in kind. "word salad." bruce. then your strawman 'bout what we wanted. you didn't offer any argument, having functional surrendered, so ad hominem as a fallacy weren't relevant.
  19. ... this is the predictable zor response when he has absolute nothing. Gromnir presents analysis, and zor, unable to rely on his typical reddit drivel that almost nobody else bothers to fact check, does... whatever this is. but... does anybody who knows zor personal wanna go over and make sure he is all right... ensure that he and elon ain't sharing a ketamine moment or something? he does get that Gromnir has been criticizing israel, right? we pointed out that israel went way too far in gaza and is now using a recycled excuse from 2011 to legitimize their attack which looks unconvincing unless you reimagine the motive as regime change. is not as if picking a side means anything to the strength o' the analysis, but the fact am using +ten year old documents is kinda essential to our claim that israel, who hadn't attacked iran for +ten years, sudden decided to do so in spite o' the relevant facts not having changed at all in those + ten years: iran is not current developing a weapon, but their current technical knowledge and resources mean they could create a weapon in six to nineteen months. if such facts weren't a legit excuse to attack +ten years ago, then why would iran continuing to not develop nuclear weapons sudden legitimize such an attack? whatever. somebody should check zor for signs o' debilitating drug use or at least make sure he hasn't had a stroke, 'cause while his typical brand o' obdurate lack o' self awareness when somebody actual fact checks him surprise us not at all, am a tiny bit concerned for his safety and well being, particular if he has not yet figured out that Gromnir has been criticizing israel's stated rationale for their current attack on iran. am knowing that some o' you clowns can't understand how Gromnir could claim israel were justified in responding to hamas rocket attacks and the october 7 mass murders while simultaneous recognizing that, "am genuine surprised israel calculations proved accurate, given the ugly humanitarian crisis israel indulged in beyond any seeming reasonable efforts to remove/punish hamas and get hostages returned." given how zor and those o' similar mindset will die on a hill once they choose a side, regardless o' facts, it makes it difficult for them to recognize that not everybody is as limited. have said multiple times now am shocked that the US and arab states were willing to just look away as gaza burned... and we keep stressing that, ""Again," the whole point is that iran has been six to nineteen months away from breakout for at least 10 years and likely since 2003. nothing has fundamental changed in that time. is Gromnir who pointed out that the recent israeli attacks were preventative as opposed to preemptive, precisely 'cause there were nothing imminent about an iranian attack, especial with nukes. we observed earlier how if israel were most concerned about nukes, then their choice o' initial targets were perplexing... but less a mystery when viewed through the lens o' regime change. etc. in any event, what kinda l00n continues to fight with somebody, trying to prove a point their perceived adversary agrees with 'em 'bout?" zor pov: Gromnir-- israel = good guys that kinda oversimplified stoopid is why you once again fail. aside, the only reason we don't add zor to our ignore list is 'cause every few months (well a few months + a year and a half this last time given our absence,) he provides us with uniquely embarrassing entertainment, but am admitting that this time am moderate concerned he is suffering from a stroke or something similar. am not sure how many times we need says the israeli excuse for attacking iran don't past muster, but zor twists himself into a knot fighting with air 'cause his brain won't register that the use o' +ten year old documents is precise the point. duh. HA! Good Fun!
  20. on the lighter side: warning: the following scene is very tarantino HA! Good Fun!
  21. our only quibble is with the following: "The challenge, for Iran, is producing not merely a crude nuclear weapon – which experts say Iran could potentially do within the space of months if it decided to – but also producing a working delivery system, which could take much longer." post 9/11, this kinda thinking strikes us as painful short o' imagination. once you got a working implosion device, then is any number o' creative if crude ways to deliver to a target, particular a port city such as tel aviv for example. beyond 9/11, consider the following: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/wartech/nature.html ukranian spiderweb just happened for chrissakes. the inability o' too many in our military and intelligence communities to consider new possibilities and unconventional solutions is a persistent problem. h.r. mcmaster observed more than once that you can fight the US asymmetrical or you can lose. most other nations is aware o' that problem, so 'course they is planning asymmetrical and unconventional. why the US continues to assume that every other nation is incapable o' ingenuity is perplexing. to pretend as if iran is too stoopid to be creative strikes us as a serious mistake... and october 7 should make it abundant clear that the israeli intelligence is anything but omniscient. HA! Good Fun! ps (edit) not directed @Malcador, but 'cause this point keeps getting missed, am feeling the need to repeat: since at least 2011, iran has had the capacity to build at least one nuclear weapon and the time frame anticipated by the big brains has been anywhere between a few months to a couple of years. as such, the excuse israel is providing for their current preventative attacks has been equal valid/invalid every day for fourteen years... or more. iran coulda' built a nuke at least as far back as 2011, and probable closer to 2003. they haven't. for israel to attack now, and to not target at least a few o' the most important facilities in iran's potential weapons development infrastructure, serious undermines the excuse being provided.
  22. you wouldn't recognize word salad any better than logic. same old fails. again, from the linked rand report... highly recommended. In 2010, Iran began enriching to 20% in the PFEP using two centrifuge cascades. One cascade enriches 3.5% LEUF6 to roughly 20%. The other cascade is fed the tails assay from the first, which is around 2% U-235, and enriches it to 10%. The 10% product is then fed back into the first cascade at an intermediate point in order to enrich it to 20%. This procedure greatly improves overall efficiency. This is important from a cost perspective in producing fuel for the TNRR, Iran’s stated objective in enriching to 20%. However, it is also a useful way for Iran to improve its breakout capability should it ever choose to attempt a “batch recycling” process to quickly enrich 3.5% LEUF6 to 90% (this process is discussed in more detail in the section on breakout scenarios below). As of May 2012, Iran had produced 110.1 kg of 20% LEUF6 at the PFEP. iran had the know how and the resources at least as far back as 2012. but... It is unlikely that Iran will produce nuclear weapons within the next year, and it could be years—if ever—before it does so. At present, although Iran likely possesses the technical ability to make at least one deliverable nuclear weapon, it would be very difficult for it to do so without accepting serious risk. If Iran were to use its declared facilities for a breakout dash, it would likely require at least one year, and potentially more than two years, to build a bomb. Iran would find it extremely difficult to carry out a breakout dash using these facilities without alerting the United States and its allies, providing them with several months to consider a response. A potentially more attractive option for Iran would be to use a covert facility for HEU enrichment. However, this route would require the clandestine construction and operation of a facility, which would also carry significant risks. It is likely that Iran instead intends to focus its efforts over the near term on improving its breakout options, and to do so in ways that are unlikely to trigger a serious response, such as air strikes. Such a goal would be consistent with what has thus far been observed in Iran. ... Negative Security Consequences of Weaponization for Iran If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, the strategic results would not be all positive. In fact, Iran faces a complex and uncertain strategic calculus over the question of weaponization. The way that this calculus is approached, moreover, very likely varies across domestic political actors in Iran, with many elites more willing to accept the risks and costs of weaponization than others. The development of nuclear weapons could invite a preventive attack, and would likely trigger efforts on the part of other states to balance against Iran’s nuclear capabilities through arms buildups and possibly through the pursuit of nuclear weapons of their own. Iran would not be able to count on a benign response from Israel, and could find itself in a confrontation with a state that possesses far greater conventional and nuclear military capabilities. Weaponization could lead to a greater and permanent U.S. military presence or, in the worst case, military conflict with the United States. It could also increase Iran’s diplomatic and economic isolation, particularly with the West. Although some in Iran might believe that, eventually, they could go down the path of India and achieve a level of international acceptance as a nuclear power, they would not be able to count on such an outcome. For Iran, the security implications of weaponization are uncertain. Not all Iranian elites will recognize these potential trade-offs, however. The way in which Iran’s decisionmakers interpret the costs and benefits of nuclear policy choices will have at least as much to do with their particular views and assumptions as any objective calculation of rational regime interests. in 2012, rand and others observed how there were compelling reasons why iran was not likely to further pursue breakout, but were rather focuse on improving breakout capacity. regardless, the ability to do a thing is in no way disproven by a failure to do the thing in question. if zor reflected for even five minutes he could identify dozens o' examples which disprove his utter ridiculous claim, but in classic and predictable fashion he doubles down... and when confronted by sources, such as rand, iaea and isis, he bleats something irrelevant and repetitive. how many times has we replayed this same tired song? but, "Again," the whole point is that iran has been six to nineteen months away from breakout for at least 10 years and likely since 2003. nothing has fundamental changed in that time. is Gromnir who pointed out that the recent israeli attacks were preventative as opposed to preemptive, precisely 'cause there were nothing imminent about an iranian attack, especial with nukes. we observed earlier how if israel were most concerned about nukes, then their choice o' initial targets were perplexing... but less a mystery when viewed through the lens o' regime change. etc. in any event, what kinda l00n continues to fight with somebody, trying to prove a point their perceived adversary agrees with 'em 'bout? seriously dude. nevertheless, you keep making an observation which is utter irrelevant-- the fact iran didn't create a nuclear weapon since 2003, 2011 or whatever date you wanna choose as the one where folks who know a heck of a lot more than zor all seem to agree that iran was potentially months to, at worst, a couple years away from creating a nuclear weapon, in no way disproves the premise that they lack capacity to do so. what stopped iran from developing a weapon weren't a lack of capacity but rather their recognition o' the very real consequences o' genuine pursuing the development of nuclear weapons. the fact iran had the good sense not to antagonize, israel, the US and the world by crossing a red line since 2003 is strong if not conclusive evidence that they woulda' continued to forgo developing a nuke. converse, israel's calculus seems to be that they can claim self defense or some other kinda silliness and the other arab states as well as the US and the global community will at worst proclaim their indignation, but nobody will do anything meaningful to stop 'em. sheesh. honest, am feeling dirty for pointing out that we made zor's point before he did. somebody is too myopic or reflexive indignant to recognize they is arguing pointless. whatever. not new. HA! Good Fun! ps for those genuine interested in iran's breakout capacity circa 2012
  23. well yes, which is why for over a decade iran has been deemed capable of developing nuclear weapons within a year. they got the know how and near all the required resources. again, duh. is the same silliness as we heard from zor in 2015 btw. the fact iran doesn't have a nuclear weapon in no way diminishes the possibility that they could achieve such in a realtive short period o' time. yeah, since 2003, iran had not been active working on developing a nuclear weapon, but rand, iaea, isis (institute for science and international security as 'posed to the terror group... or the egyptian goddess) and others were in agreement iran had progressed very close to the threshold stage. iran had virtual all the ingredients and the infrastructure, and at one point estimates were that iran were within one month of breakout, IF iran put forth the effort to achieve such... which they did not and had not... although am gonna admit the one month estimate were kinda an outlier. converse, from rand "In any case, this evidence raises substantial concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities prior to 2004 and supports the 2007 NIE’s finding that Iran had a weapon program in place until that time. It also raises substantial concerns about Iran’s behavior and intentions after 2003, and undercuts Iran’s claims that its nuclear program is entirely peaceful in nature. The available evidence suggests that by 2003, Iran may not have had perfected its ability to produce a weapon, but had made significant progress with virtually every element of weaponization. It is unclear what, if any, progress Iran has been able to make in its weaponization efforts since its formal program was halted in 2003." "Even though Iran may already have developed the necessary technical components to produce a bomb, as of January 2012, Iran would likely need over a year to do so. This correlates well with the conclusions of the U.S. Intelligence Community, which has estimated that it would require Iran at least a year to produce a single nuclear weapon even if all available resources were swiftly dedicated to the task.107 Other credible sources, however, arrive at estimates as short as 6 months, or as long as 19 months.108 These estimates vary according to the assumptions they make about a number of uncertain variables. They also vary according to whether the intent is to identify likely or merely plausible—but unlikely—outcomes. Both worst-case and likely estimates will be provided in this section where appropriate." feel free to once again read or ignore the relevant sources, but back in 2011 and 2012, iran were estimated to be six to nineteen months away from developing a weapon, if they chose to do so. they had the infrastructure and resources to at minimum enrich enough U-235 to a purity o' 90% back in 2012, which were always the only real hurdle other than time and will. once enough fissionable material were produced, it could be removed to more secure locations safe from israeli bombing for instance, and then the iranians conversion o' heuf6 to metal, and machining of implosion devices could go through the predictable trial and error stages. back in 2011 and 2012 there were little disagreement that iran had the capacity and the basic materials to achieve breakout in a relative short timeline IF they chose to make the effort. the fact they didn't actual go through with such efforts is not proof that iran lacked capacity as 'posed to will. again, iran not developing nukes as proof they couldn't breakout within six to nineteen months is bad logic, and ignores the observations and conclusions o' reputable sources far more reliable than zor and al jazeera. HOWEVER, that is kinda our point. iran coulda moved forward at anytime since 2003, but they had made only incremental efforts in that direction and virtual no progress since 2015. hadn't done before the iran deal. hadn't done so after the iran deal... and hadn't appeared to make any efforts to do so even when the iran deal were ended. so israel pretending as if there were some kinda need for preemption ignores the past +ten years o' iran sitting on their hands. HA! Good Fun! ps (edit) in the spirit o' full disclosure, am admitting we were wrong about the original iran deal, and have pointed out our error multiple times. we believed the iran deal were foolish naive as it lacked any real enforcement and relied on iran to voluntarily comply with inspections and performance. and yeah, is not as if iran sudden became a good faith actor on thew world stage as evidenced by october 7, but by all accounts, iran were sticking to their commitments to not develop their nuclear weapons program even after the US broke the deal. yes, 2025 iran were likely even closer to breakout than were the case in 2015, if only 'cause iran were technical more advanced. so less than six to nineteen months? even so, israel's excuse for attacking iran appears little more valid today than at any other point in the past decade... or more.
  24. logic failure. the fact iran hasn't developed nukes does not in anyway diminish the possibility that they have been one year away from developing a nuke for over a decade. iran no doubt made the calculation that they have more advantage being on the cusp o' producing a nuclear weapon than the costs o' actual possessing nuclear weapons would entail. iran has possessed the know how for a long time and they got most o' the infrastructure necessary to build a nuclear weapon. all they needed were time and will. iran has chosen nay as 'posed to yay... thus far. our neighbor has a phd in chemistry from brown. perhaps we once gave her sh!t about going to brown, in spite o' our joking, she has a legit degree and +30 years of experience working both at jpl and then teaching at major universities. she knows chemistry. if our neighbor wanted to, could she build a device similar (considerable more efficacious) than the one used by timothy mcveigh? of course she could. the fact she hasn't gone ahead and built such a monstrosity is hardly proof she is incapable of doing so. duh. curiously, our neighbor is a middling cook, though we suspect she could do baking w/o much difficulty. is not as if she is a terrible cook like in bad anime, but am having seen her make omelets, roast chicken and have watched her attempt to grill foods and am feeling a bit embarrassed for her even if we pretend to enjoy what she serves. honest, we don't know why it would be so hard for a world class chemist to follow a recipe, but... in any event, october 7 and hamas keeping hostages, some o' whom were abused and/or sexually assaulted, gave israel's initial retributive efforts legitimacy in many corners o' the globe that other chronic war crimers don't have. israel, in spite o' their october 7 blunder, correctly predicted that the outrage over palasteninas suffering in gaza would amount to sound and fury. am genuine surprised israel calculations proved accurate, given the ugly humanitarian crisis israel indulged in beyond any seeming reasonable efforts to remove/punish hamas and get hostages returned. we woulda' thought there were a limit to how much palestinian suffering arab nations and the US would accept before making serious efforts to intervene, but am admitting we were wrong. the thing is, am suspecting too many arab nations is even less sympathetic about iranian suffering than they were 'bout palestinian. but again, the potential downsides o' a conflict 'tween israel and iran is so not similar to the worst-case scenarios for israel v. hamas. we woulda' expected a bit more pushback after the initial israeli preventative attacks. shows we don't know enough to provide meaningful analysis, but we don't pretend to neither. HA! Good Fun! ps (edit) am not sure about everybody else, but pete hegseth taking time to go on jessie waters to reassure the world that a US attack on tehran was not imminent was very comforting. (<--sarcasm)
  25. dunno, but after israel went after hezbollah, this were the increasing likely outcome... but am still not sure what israel sees in the fog of war for this new front to make sense. for decades, israel were doing the mow the grass approach in gaza, kneecapping hamas but recognizing that genuine weeding 'em out were too much effort and pointless as whichever group came after hamas would likely be ideological as bad. worse, hamas 2.0 might be more capable; hamas were incompetent at providing basic government services and israel seemed to think they were a limited threat insofar as their terrorist ambitions. hamas popularity were always low, save for immediate after terrorist or mass rocket attacks. get rid o' hamas seemed pointless when any alternative were likely to be worse. personally we couldn't figure out the gaza campaign beyond the initial retributive stages... until israel attacked hezbollah. the carnage in gaza made little sense to us as the idf were going so far to gain so little. the next hamas would be just as bad, and there would be legit reason for the palestinians to be more supportive o' river to the sea goals. the post october 7 gaza campaign were creating a generational wound. again, hamas were only ever popular with the people of gaza after they killed israelis. whenever hamas popularity got dangerous low, they committed some kinda "atrocity" against israel, and that seemed to mollify the people of gaza for a time. the vulgar levels o' violence done by israel in gaza were only gonna make hamas, or the next hamas, more sympathetic when that group carried out bloodshed against israelis. however, going after hezbollah made sense o' gaza 'cause it revealed israel were not interested in just getting rid of hamas; israel had larger goals. again, destroying hamas were gonna be bloody and pointless, 'cause whoever came next would be just as bad if not worse. the real danger was that the next hamas would be more competent. the thing is, israel recognized that october 7 happened 'cause o' iranian support o' hamas. once israel attacked hezbollah, it looked to us like their ambitions for a post october 7 were much more comprehensive than regime change in gaza. iran were likely always the ultimate ideal goal after october 7. is doubtful the israeli plan has gone exact according to the post oct 7 script, but am suspecting they always wanted to level gaza, decapitate hezbollah and the US were s'posed to neuter the houthis-- can't trust the americans to do anything right these days, eh? iran were always the ultimate goal, but could israel pull that off w/o facing the initial hamas quandary? what does regime change in iran really get israel... 'cause is obvious to us this ain't really about the iranian nuke program. israel intelligence shocking blundered in a big way regarding october 7 and am thinking that since that time, israel has been incremental building up to the iran attacks we see today, but am admitted not fully comprehending what is the final goal. even if regime change were somehow successful, how would that make the situation for israel better? the next iran is gonna be more huggable and less competent? serious? am giving israel credit for accurate predicting that the rest o' the arab world would sit idle and watch gaza burn. so far, israel also appears to have guessed right about the level o' outrage from the arab states following attacks on lebanon and iran. the US joining in to take down iran? if there is one thing which might encourage other arab states to come to iran's aid, the great satan aiding israel more direct might do it... but we got no real insights about what the arabs would or wouldn't do save to observe that israel has been more prescient than we gave 'em credit. still, none o' this actually makes sense to us save as a way to temporarily save netanyahu's political bacon, no pun intended. bloody regime change in iran poses similar issues as does regime change in gaza-- is worse 'cause the scale is so much larger in iran, and iran does have the know-how and basic resources to construct nukes. israel avoided regime change in gaza for many years and following innumerable rocket attacks precise 'cause the outcomes didn't justify the costs. why would israel believe the situation with iran is better? am admitted baffled by the reason and logic, but this might not be about reason and logic. HA! Good Fun!
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