Afghanistan,

[Orogun01]

I approve of your gutfelt indignation, believe me. But a thought occcurs to me: can any one soldier be sure any one incident is pederasty? Men east of Suez are just generally touchier feelier than we are to one another. I remember spending a full month in Thailand thinking EVERYONE was gay. It would suck to haul off and arrest someone who was actually being 'normal' with their nephew or whatever.

 

You must also keep in mind that something like this would need to be handled by Afghan law. No matter what you hear in the Guardian we're not the Cylons.

 

All the same, I agree that I'd find it hard to walk on by.

I'm not saying the we run rampant arresting everyone walking with a child but this is a little known fact about Afghanistan. Attention should be brought to the problem so that solutions can be explored. Plus Afghans have no law regarding the subject since there is no age of consent.

[Walsingham]

This story may also be relevant to the discussion. Although I fear it is another example of U.N.involved in Africa.

 

My tendency is to assert that there are some things which are just plain wrong. Exploitation of a presexual human for sexual purposes simply because they have no one else to care for them, is wrong. My hat's in the ring.

 

And my view on this case is that we should encourage a debate in Afghanistan so they themselves can move on the problem. Lord knows the Taliban should be behind the same objective. For while they are quite happy to explode small boys, they (according to legend) were first inspired to act by rapes of juveniles.

[Orogun01]

This story may also be relevant to the discussion. Although I fear it is another example of U.N.involved in Africa.

 

My tendency is to assert that there are some things which are just plain wrong. Exploitation of a presexual human for sexual purposes simply because they have no one else to care for them, is wrong. My hat's in the ring.

 

And my view on this case is that we should encourage a debate in Afghanistan so they themselves can move on the problem. Lord knows the Taliban should be behind the same objective. For while they are quite happy to explode small boys, they (according to legend) were first inspired to act by rapes of juveniles.

Sadly that's common in that area, one only has to look back to Sierra Leone.

 

It seems to me that the Taliban initial purpose was to gather enough support and like many rebel groups they make friends with the populace. I may be being a cynic but since I don't know the history of the Taliban that's how it seems to me at first view.

It really it's a ****ed up world these kids live in, either being molested or recruited to fight.

[Walsingham]

It certainly is messed up. Poor little sods.

[Gorgon]

I found out something shocking in that link.

 

 

 

Apparently Machete is bad. So depressing

 

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?.../DDNL1F71JV.DTL

[Gorgon]

By the way it's been suggested that we can't win, and that therefore we should negotiate with the Taliban. The notion seems to be gaining ground in our little Danish political weather system, and I actually found myself defending the war. Must be a first.

 

Yes you can win against an irregular opponent, it just takes a long time, in the case of Afghanistan probably a very long time. The important question is : 'what's the alternative.'

[Orogun01]

Pragmatically speaking it is an "unwinnable" war mainly because we have no solid objective. Is like the war against drugs in the remark that no matter how many victories you have it only brings new enemies. Today is the Taliban, tomorrow it will be another radical group; the only difference is that if we stay in the country there is a chance of it becoming self-sufficient enough to combat this threats whilst they are in the bud and that of them becoming more integrated to the world and it's general ideas.

[Gorgon]

Defeating the Taliban is not an abstract, it's not a hopeless endeavour , it's just difficult.

[Orogun01]

Defeating the Taliban is not an abstract, it's not a hopeless endeavour , it's just difficult.

We are not fighting the Taliban, we are in a war against terrorism. The problem with that is that there are no solid objectives, there is no ground to take or pieces. It's Vietnam allover again; we think that we are taking more pieces but they are controlling the area with less manpower.

[Gorgon]

But we are fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan, not an abstract noun. We don't pretend that winning means defeating the whole of militant Islamism.

[Orogun01]

But we are fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan, not an abstract noun. We don't pretend that winning means defeating the whole of militant Islamism.

We are fighting but there is nothing to win, we are fighting against a guerrilla force. As someone whose national history is a series of guerrilla wars and was forced to learn it I can tell you the best course of action here is to do nothing. The classic Fabian strategy, the Taliban simply can't exist without support.

[Gorgon]

That's where you are wrong, the Taliban can run the country with an iron fist regardless of popular support levels. They did once remember.

[Walsingham]

I agree that we need a far stronger and clearer commitment to a specific goal in Afghan. Without such a strategic clarity we cannot possibly hope to conduct our campaigns correctly, except by accident.

 

As for defeating the Taliban I think it must be true that they are like an iceberg. Only one tenth obtrudes into the physical world. They are an idea, or perhaps a lack of ideas. Yet history is littered with dead ideas and dead movements.

[Orogun01]

That's where you are wrong, the Taliban can run the country with an iron fist regardless of popular support levels. They did once remember.

They ran it through fear, the Taliban operates in the backyards of remote villages and through agents in the urban. They kill cooperators and try to discourage any future events, yet there are still those brave enough to risk themselves for the good of their country. Despite this there is still a wedge between the population and the US troops, our best resources to bring peace to the are is to train Afghans troops to fight the Taliban and spread them around known Taliban operation areas.

 

The other problem is civilian support of the Taliban, our troops can't move without the Taliban knowing because any bystander could be reporting to them. Whilst we have no eyes inside the Taliban, the use of intelligence and espionage tactics in this war could had afforded us a clearer view of objectives and fewer losses on our part.

It's my belief that if we are to win this war any support to the Taliban must be cut off. I would say that we employ the same strategy Valeriano Weyler used against the Cuban rebellion; in a more humane manner of course, as we need to control the movements of the population without encouraging support for the Taliban.

[Walsingham]

Tell us more about Weyler's strategy.

 

I was also appalled to hear today how (according to the Gen. Dannat) Brown left SIX MONTHS between meetings with him, in addition to refusing levels of funding agreed in the 1997-1998 defence review. Which leaves me wondering whether the man was properly incompetent, or positively hostile to our own troops. Which you must keep in mind happened over a perid when spending on non governmental organsiations such as arts funding councils and impotent industry watchdogs rose to more than that of the whole Ministry of Defence!

 

****ing shocking.

 

But on the bright side, perhaps it merely underscores the point that if we have managed to hang on with a total absence of funds or direction, then what will be able to do if we receive some bloody funds and direction!

[Orogun01]

Or he was trying to score points by supporting the international underdog: the arts. Quite frankly I doubt that excess funding will factor into the war since I believe that it will just be spent on frivolities. Proper use of funding is to keep the war going, a surplus will be wasted on experiments that should had been done before the war.

 

On to Weyler strategy; the Cuban revolutions followed the same pattern, from east to west in a series of guerilla operations to minimize the military hold over the area. At the point which Valeriano Weyler was assigned to the task of quelling the rebellion they already had won a considerable amount of ground. Weyler cut supplies and information from the rebels by isolating their main resource; civilians. What went on to be known as the first official concentration camps. It was a horrible thing and in the end counterintuitive to the cause, that's why I said in a "humane manner".

The point of the matter here is that traditional tactics don't work against guerilla groups, one needs to limit their access to the population. For Weyler it made military activities easier but in the long run it fell apart, but it did bring the rebellion to a stand.

[Walsingham]

It's an interesting example, Orogun, but one I feel is deeply flawed.

 

The Afghan population isn't the sea in which the fish swim. They're the damn fish. They need to be secured, enabled, and inspired. Not jailed, disabled, and enfuriated.

[Orogun01]

It's an interesting example, Orogun, but one I feel is deeply flawed.

 

The Afghan population isn't the sea in which the fish swim. They're the damn fish. They need to be secured, enabled, and inspired. Not jailed, disabled, and enfuriated.

I repeat, that's why I said in a more humane manner. We don't need to jail them, we just need to control access, keep out the Taliban, and make moving within the urban areas harder for the insurgents.

[Walsingham]

It's an interesting example, Orogun, but one I feel is deeply flawed.

 

The Afghan population isn't the sea in which the fish swim. They're the damn fish. They need to be secured, enabled, and inspired. Not jailed, disabled, and enfuriated.

I repeat, that's why I said in a more humane manner. We don't need to jail them, we just need to control access, keep out the Taliban, and make moving within the urban areas harder for the insurgents.

 

It's my fault for being thick, but would you mind restating your plan?

[Orogun01]

It's an interesting example, Orogun, but one I feel is deeply flawed.

 

The Afghan population isn't the sea in which the fish swim. They're the damn fish. They need to be secured, enabled, and inspired. Not jailed, disabled, and enfuriated.

I repeat, that's why I said in a more humane manner. We don't need to jail them, we just need to control access, keep out the Taliban, and make moving within the urban areas harder for the insurgents.

 

It's my fault for being thick, but would you mind restating your plan?

No, It's my fault for not being concise The major problems that troops face when on the ground is that; they don't know where the enemy will come from or who is it, I.E.D.s, and that the Taliban is able to move freely. Basically instead of being out there looking for the Taliban we should focus on separating the Taliban from the population. We have some railroads checkpoints but insurgents still move between them and once inside urban areas they are able to operate freely. Any area that is not choke full of troops is free ground for them.

 

Is the same mistake from Vietnam, we are playing chess they are playing Go. We should focus on gaining ground and limiting the enemies movement inside populated areas which should alleviate some of the problems I previously mentioned. It should also hinder the Taliban's intelligence on troops movements and should make recruitment harder for them.

[Walsingham]

I am not sure it's really valid to describe this conflict in terms of Vietnam. If it were then our casualty figures by now would be ten times what they are. The enemy just aren't present in the same sort of numbers and nor do they have the same architecture behind them.

 

I need to think about this some more though. I think the key is the concentration of force. The Talibs are running around in small forces. They hoof up in a given area and the locals support them out of fear as much as anything. What alternative do the poor buggers have? ... more thought needed.

[Gorgon]

Not to mention that the Viet Cong had considerable popular support. I don't know that there exists an inexhaustible will to continue fighting until the western powers give up and go home among the population.

[Nepenthe]

Not to mention that the Viet Cong had considerable popular support. I don't know that there exists an inexhaustible will to continue fighting until the western powers give up and go home among the population.

 

As long as they keep getting recruits and funding from outside the area...

[Orogun01]

I am not sure it's really valid to describe this conflict in terms of Vietnam. If it were then our casualty figures by now would be ten times what they are. The enemy just aren't present in the same sort of numbers and nor do they have the same architecture behind them.

 

I need to think about this some more though. I think the key is the concentration of force. The Talibs are running around in small forces. They hoof up in a given area and the locals support them out of fear as much as anything. What alternative do the poor buggers have? ... more thought needed.

Its not the same situation but its the same problem and it's one of the situation in which we have fought against guerrilla groups. Concentration of force seems to be the best recourse here.

[Walsingham]

No, erm, what I mean is that the Talibs are masters of concentration of force - at least so far as the locals are concerned. I shouldn't need to point out that in terms of actual firefights the Talibs still get knocked about by our troops. So it's the ability to concentrate force on a village which is interesting me.

 

Thinking logically I can see two options: increase the force presented by the village a la Malaya, or increase the force available from outside the village. Except that might be really trciky on such a large and disparate scale. Perhaps the thing to do would be to look at this as analagous to the u-boat threat?