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Qwerty the Sir

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Everything posted by Qwerty the Sir

  1. Crosby is tied with Zetterberg now for the league lead (Zetterberg has one game in hand). That game Detroit-Chicago was simply huge for the Blackhawks and a good game to boot. I think it was the first televised Hawks game in the Chicago area for years plus the Hawks gained ground on the Red Wings and stopped them from reaching a franchise record for a win streak, kinda rekindling the rivalry. In fact they also broke Osgood's attempt to tie the streak of games without losing in regulation (21, by Osgood in 1996). The only streak they didn't break was Zetterberg's point streak, which is now 17 games from the start of the season (club record). Now he only has 12 games and 38 points to tie the franchise point streak at any time.
  2. Purgatorio should be out soon.
  3. Hahaha! :D This is why I'm a fan of the players on my fantasy team rather than the fan a team (and I drop the struggling ones on waivers).
  4. I should really take out more time to watch more Leafs' games. One night they play like a dominant team, the next night, they play like a bunch of floaters and the other team looks so good. Always keeping it fresh! :D
  5. I still can't understand how a hockey stick got through a goalie mask cage. Of all the luck... DiPietro could be out a while, Khabibulin is playing badly, and Hasek will be back soon, so Osgood won't play much.
  6. Russian reversal YOU!
  7. I'm looking into getting a Wii because of The Simpsons Game. Now to pick up the funds (still haven't got Mask of the Betrayer)...
  8. Oh, man, I forgot about how good Sundin and Alfie are playing (Alfie is the MVP of my fantasy team so far). The Swedes are ripping up the NHL so far.
  9. Yup, two goals again tonight. He just tied a club record for point streak from the beginning of a season. When will this guy slow down?
  10. Yes. "Scientific sufficiency" has no bearing on epistemic merit. I'm beginning to think it was a mistake to bring up that selected quote of Hume earlier, as this has become the focus of the topic of the nature of inference between correlation and causation when it shouldn't be. Let's just ignore what Hume meant or didn't mean. The critique of causality is older than Hume and put forward in more direct, "better" cases than Hume. I have referenced a few of those above. I have put forth the critique in my own words as well. Yes, so much for them. To say smoking causes lung cancer or that nuclear weapons cause nuclear explosions is a conclusion based on some correlation between two events, and an invalid inference is made to attribute a causal link. People may accept this inference for psychological or pragmatic reasons, but there is no logical or empirical justification present for those conclusions. I suppose if one does not mind accepting conclusions that are logically invalid and have no empirical justification, then they do not have to do away with their world view. First of all, let's get this straight, I'm not here to convince you about anything, and your beliefs aren't my business, so believe what you want. If you find the model I gave "less attractive", fine. I took your request for a "better" model to be a model with logical consistency, but maybe that wasn't what you meant by "better". The occasionalist model does make assumptions (like everything), but it has a logical consistency that inferring a causal nexus from correlated events does not. In the occasionalist model once a prime mover entity and its attributes are proved or assumed, deductive inferences can take you I make a couple of assumptions sure, though the assumptions are related to deductive reasoning, so it is incorrect to say 'rather'. I assume at the basic level the principle of the excluded middle and the truth values of the basic logical operators to derive the deductive inferences and rules of validity, which I then apply to the inference from correlation to causation to show that it is invalid. It is wrong to attribute this argument to me. I merely point out that causality is problematic. I have no desire to solve it. You asked for a "better model" (given your context, I took this to mean explanation). I provided one. The occasionalist model holds that a prime mover entity (who's proof of existence is given by a deductively valid argument relying on assuming the principle of the excluded middle [a basic foundation of logic] and the principle of sufficient reason [very crudely, everything must have an explanation]) is the one who by nature of its attributes, is the cause of all things, and that while there is no necessary causation, there is a contingent causation based on the prime mover entity itself, which explains why certain events are correlated. The inference from correlation to causation also provides an explanation which is (at least what I consider to be) just as strong in its explanatory power. We observe two things/events to be regularly correlated so we say that this is so because there is some sort of causation going on. Both provide meanings and explanations for why things are as they are. The difference is that the former relies on a valid inference while the latter relies on an invalid inference. Salmon in his Foundations of Scientific Inference on the other hand, does not provide another model. He simply is content to show the epistemic problems with causality and the challenges it poses to scientific knowledge, and at the end (he is a scientist sympathetic to his discipline), remain hopeful that it will be solved. The former actually gives you a logically consistent model and explantion of why things are regularly correlated. It does rely on some ontological baggage of the existence of God (which remains indirect to the occasionalist model at hand and so does not affect its logical consistency), which, though also logically consistent itself, relies on the extra assumption of the principle of sufficient reason. The latter does not attempt to give a model or an explanation for events. In doing such, it avoids that extra baggage of assumptions that the former brings along. Also, if this is your impression of Ghazali and Malebranche, it is incorrect. First, they actually both give proofs for God (though you are right in a way that both, also do hold that a proof (in the logical sense) is patently unnecessary for them to believe in God, it seems to be more for those who don't believe and to show that rational tenability and cogency of such a belief). I won't get into why they argued for an occasionalist model (there are many articles which speculate on the motivations of occasionalist metaphyiscs), but it's safe to say that they really didn't seem concerned that causality was problematic, and solving it wasn't their motivation. If you begin with assuming that causality is real, good enough. You would have to already hold the conclusion that smoking causes cancer BEFORE observing any sort of correlation though. I think this is the point that is problematic for those who want to use observed correlations. Let's make this clear again, if someone to begin with, assumes that causal links exist between specific events, it still does not change the fact that there exists no deductively valid inference to show us that. Assuming to start with, say, a casual link between smoking and cancer is present, means that observing a correlation between the two events is irrelevant. If you look closely, you will see that never has causality itself been called FALSE or non-existent. Simply the avenues of proving it have been called into question due to their invalidity. Not my solution, and the solution is not a search for meaning. Solve these misinterpretations, otherwise we cant go further. Aside from again attributing the argument to me, are you equivocating me pointing out that the occasionalist explanation of causality has logical consistency while inference from correlation to causation is logically invalid to me saying that it is more meaningful to say that God moves everything rather than discern causes for outcomes. I'm not interested in saving face on an internet message board.
  11. When will Zetterberg cool down? Every day I expect this guy to stop scoring at his torrid pace but he still does so day-in day-out.
  12. A very nice goal by Toews; reminds me of very similar ones by Lecavalier and St. Louis (and those were among their career best). Of course, having the Colorado announcer call makes everything so much better. I'm upset that Chicago blew a 3 goal lead, but Robert Lang will probably win the game with a harmless looking play like he always does.
  13. Yeah, I know what you mean, I was just watching this game on-off as a neutral observer, and Chicago, which is kinda the team I'm pulling for this season, won basically every game with these come from behind/last minute goals, but it always sucks having it happen to your team. I'm now sad that Koivu didn't score.
  14. Oh boy, these last minute goals are great! Hopefully Koivu gets the gamewinner in OT, helps the fantasy team.
  15. Haha! :D That's great, I can't wait to play this game!
  16. I don't think it was claimed by anybody that causation must be proved to be used. Certainly, it is used everyday by most people. What was claimed is that causation must be justified to use rationally to form conclusions that are rational. For prediction, see problem of induction (certainly a greater epistemic threat to science then the problem of causation). Ignore Hume's expose (not doing the strength of the argument justice), go to Salmon's work in The Foundations of Scientific Inference for a more cogent discussion related to science itself (he takes a sympathetic view towards science, but ultimately concludes that there is no satisfactory resolution to the problem, though he is optimistic). Karl Popper also agreed that Hume was correct on the issue and tried to formulate a "deductivist approach" that ran into the same problems he wanted to avoid. For "a better model", Ghazali and Malebranche invoke that God is the cause of all things. The model is certainly much more logically consistent than attempting to use an invalid inference to jump from correlation to causation. Pragmatic considerations for science (and other things) are nice, and may convince people as to their usefulness, but I'm afraid they provide no epistemic value to the discussion.
  17. I remember right before the Leads lost 7-1 to the Canes, there was a article on TSN on how Toskala quieted all doubts. Then of course, after that game, Toronto won 8-1. :D
  18. taks, on the OSIM, the Wikipedia neutrality issue has to do with the way the article is written (and it is written in a polemical, one-sided way unbecoming of an encyclopedia). All of the issues of that OSIM survey are cited, however. The fact that the survey is nearly 10 years old, had problems with its text, some fake signatures. Also bring into account that since the survey was nearly 10 years old (a time when less of an agreement was reached on the issue), opinions have changed:
  19. Heh, to be fair, Toronto played pretty well that game, Buffalo just decided to act like Chicago (now there's a team that steals wins :D).
  20. uh, that's not the point i was trying to make. what i meant is that since it is an opinion piece, its estimation of "consensus" is at the very least biased. they choose not to point out all the significant numbers of people that disagree, or have made significant counter claims. i.e., saying that article is truly representative of "the vast majority of scientific organizations" is disingenuous at best (i'm not accusing you here of being disingenuous, rather, the article is). 19,000 signed the OPIM petition. your first link is to a report on the IPCC SPM, which is NOT any indicator of any consensus. it was written by only a few people and many of the "consensus" scientists that are included in the group are slowly coming forward voicing their disagreement with many of the SPM conclusions. your second link is more of the same but for the the 3rd IPCC report. indeed, the 3AR was where the hockey stick got promoted heavily, which has now been shown to be the result of spurious correlations as a result of overfitting (among other problems. no, both links demonstrate that the same authors still hold the same views they did in 2001 as they do in 2007. the consensus view of the IPCC is manufactured. the IPCC, in general, does not conduct its own studies, btw. it is a political body, not a scientific body. taks I cannot find any mention of the OPIM, did you mean the OISM petition? On the OISM survey, you do know that there is quite a bit of problems with it? Some of them are discussed in this Wikipedia article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oregon_Petition I know of some more detailed critiques by some specific organizations, if you want the links, just ask. As for dismissing the IPCC and it's findings, you do know that a multitude of scientific organizations endorse it right? All of these following organizations endorse the IPCC and it's findings and/or make their own statements that human activities play a significant/main role in global warming (some even advise policy changes): *note: I know some societies have been listed more than once; this is because they made different statements* http://www.nationalacademies.org/includes/...ergy_07_May.pdf 1. Academia Brasileira de Ci
  21. When I watched a friend light a cigarette last night, I saw the event of of the flame from the lighter touch the cigarette, and then I saw the cigarette light on fire. I could say that these two events are closely correlated, I saw one happen right after the other. However, at no point did I actually perceive any sort of causation. If one thinks about it, this makes sense; how the hell does one actually perceive causation? The only thing I saw was that the lighting of the cigarette occurring together (or right after) with the contact of the flame. I never saw the lighting of a cigarette If you really assert that we can perceive causation empirically (and not just construct it mentally), please provide an example where a cause effect link is perceived between two things (better yet, provide a video showing it). When someone makes a claim about a truth, some sort of rational justification usually needs to be provided to make acceptance of that truth rational. OK, although if they are going to disagree with the skepticism against causality, you would think they could provide some justification to make their opinions more solid... Nobody is saying that Hume is the end-all. I didn't even want to bring him up by name in the thread, however, his quote about providing justification was a very precise way of summing up the problem posed and bringing up the question of justification. Add to that the fact that it is hard for me to find online texts of Ghazali and Malebranche (both who put forth less ambiguous and more cogent criticisms against causality earlier than Hume), who also bring in God into the equations (occasionalism) further complicating the situation. That empirical test would have only given a correlation between things. The known physical relationship was once again (invalidly) inferred from that correlation.
  22. Hume says that causality is invented in the mind precisely because nobody has ever shown how it could be anything else but a figment of the imagination. It is not his premise that is flawed, it is the premise he critiques that is flawed. If cause-effect relationships exist, why can we not perceive them empirically. You say we can only test it empirically, but in fact, the only thing we get out of our testing is empirical data of a correlation. We never empirically perceive a casual link. Again you restate that cause effect relationships exist, but without any satisfactory justification for the assertion. Your second sentence is in the ballpark of correctness though. The conclusion that Hume would make is that we can never have rational justification for our knowledge about "matters of fact" (the "world around us" is included in its domain), as that knowledge is gained through an irrational method. To take the fire burning cotton example, Hume would say that it is wrong to say that the fire causes burning of the cotton, because we can never perceive any casual relationships, only correlations, and there is no valid inference from correlations to casual links. The known physical relationship was inferred from the correlation in the first place. To use it as if it existed before empirical data of the correlation between two things was known is definitely problematic in the matter of justification. Now, if you are looking at the issue already presupposing causality, then it is not much of a problem, but if you were to try and convince someone of who didn't presuppose it, then you must offer a justification for the principle. Until you do so, it is quite reasonable for them to reject any scientific conclusions or theories based on cause-effect relationships as irrational. Like Hume says: As for the second part of your statement, you are right that all of science (and much more) suffers from the same problem, and that nothing (that is "matter of fact" knowledge) can be known at all, and that scientific theories and laws would become decidedly invalid and irrational to hold. I don't see what is preposterous about it at all however, except for the fact that it is an unpalatable conclusion for some. Like I said before, this is one of the epistemic problems with science, its methods, and its inferences. Ok, and you are looking at it with the eyes of a scientist (or statistician). This is why I said there is an impasse. First let me correct you on attributing to me that I don't think empirical evidence exists. I am not propounding a skepticism of the external world here. Indeed, how can I be accused of holding that position when I affirm that there is indeed empirical evidence for correlations between two things. What I am propounding is that there is no empirical evidence for casual links and causality, as we do not perceive causality. Add to that the fact that there is no valid inference from data of correlation to causal links, and you get the basic gist of my argument: there is no reason to believe cause and effect relations exist. Yes, it is an opinion piece, as is your opinion piece that human don't play a significant part, and natural causes play the most significant part. Now, I don't know about the inclinations of others, but disregarding my skepticism towards science (due again, to epistemic problems with some questionable assumptions it makes), if I were to hold a strong position on the issue, it would be in line with the vast majority of the scientific organizations. Also, I would say that there is quite a bit of empirical evidence against your assertion given how many scientists let those organizations speak for them (I'll try to bring up a count of signatures of all the scientists who have latched on to the manifesto that global warming has a significant or main cause in human activities, and we'll compare it to the scientists who disagree). Frankly though, 15 major scientific organizations propounding the view that human activities play a significant role or play the main role in the current trend of global warming says quite a lot, and at least for me, it more than demonstrates your assertion as incorrect. If you want more evidence, that is more in line with statistical methods, try some of these polls of scientists on the issue: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...7020400953.html http://www.csm.ornl.gov/PR/NS-10-25-03.html Both links show that there is wide agreement among scientists that human activities play a significant factor in global warming (on the severity of the problem, there is disagreement).
  23. taks, if you are going to dismiss my arguments against casual relationships by saying that "this is science, not philosophy" (this is actually an exploration of the epistemic nature and value of a scientific and statistical maxim), then I'm afraid we'll be at an impasse. You are basically presupposing that correlation implies or suggests causation in each one of your examples. The "known physical relationships" you speak of are nothing more than correlations that have been observed, which you already presuppose are casual relationships... You are saying (to take one example) that we already know that there is a relationship between the heat of fire and the burning of cotton, and that is the reason why there is a correlation between them. This does nothing to actually justify the claim of "To say a "Correlation does not suggest causation" is false: A demonstrably consistent correlation often suggests or increases the probability of some causal relationship (or implies it, in the casual sense of the word)", as it is already presupposed. So when you say: ... you are saying that the "known physical relationship" is what established the casual link, correct? So how was the physical relationship known? Well, it was by the observed correlation between the oceanic temperature and the rate of carbon dioxide release. Now, you are arguing in a circle (which is valid, and fine [for you] if you are already presupposing your premise, however, I am not). You have really not offered any justification for the statement "To say a "Correlation does not suggest causation" is false: A demonstrably consistent correlation often suggests or increases the probability of some causal relationship (or implies it, in the casual sense of the word)", which is what I was asking for from the beginning. You are looking into the issue of correlation and causation from inside it. I am looking into the issue from outside of it. You are already assuming that correlation implies causation; I am not. The impasse lies here. -- Just a quick note on the carbon dioxide-global warming examples, I think I have been a bit ambivalent on my dealing with global warming with my previous statements (due to other issues that distracted me). I do indeed think that Gore's film [and not the scientific community's view] had overinflated claims and was sensationalist to say the least, and I do believe that public policy should remain as far away from the influence of science as possible, and I am really not interested in the nitty bitty details of scientific data and research (what I'm interested in is the relationship of science and society). With that, you can probably guess I am quite apathetic towards the issue of global warming (aside from how it relates to society and policy). That being said, I do know that you are kinda on shaky ground on a couple of your statements concerning the issue. Firstly, on your statement that "most scientists believe only one thing about GW: the planet has warmed" (it was in reply to a quote that scientists [and hippies] believe humans are a significant factor in the warming trend), it is also the case that most scientists and scientific organizations endorse the view that humans play a significant role or the main role in the warming trend. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_op..._climate_change (a wiki link for convienence) Secondly, on the fact that temperature's rise before carbon dioxide levels, the majority of scientists who endorse the above view explain that in terms of feedback argument. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attribution_o...s_CO2_increases (another wiki link for convenience).
  24. It is not completely false taks it is completely true, and in the rest of my statement which was not quoted, I go on to show that. Now, here is that part again: Again, the reason why correlation can never imply any sort of causation or casual link is because the casual link is not a logical necessity and it is not empirically perceived. Hume and before him medieval occasionalists pointed this out. After understanding this, some people will then go to the claim that correlation never implies a causation, but suggests one, and they use probability. They say, like you that "the higher the correlation, the more likely the cause-effect relationship becomes". However, there really is no justification for that statement. Why is it the case that the higher the correlation, the more likely a cause-effect relationship exists? Since we still do not perceive any sort of causation. The same problem we have when saying that correlation implies causation occurs when saying that correlation makes it more likely that causation exists. To any purporter of the statement "correlation implies causation" or "correlation likely suggests causation" must show why this is true. Let's take an example of two events which seem to be 100% correlated and which everyone assumes a casual link occurs. Fire burning cotton (this is an example that Hume and Ghazali both used when dealing with causation). In everyday speak, we say that cotton, when placed into fire, is burned by it (the fire causes the burning of cotton). We say this because 100% of the time in the past (at least to my knowledge) when cotton is placed into a fire, the cotton is burned. But we actually are only seeing two events coming one after the other in succession, the cotton is placed into a fire, and the cotton is burned. We never actually perceive any kind of casual link between the two. What inference, then allows us to make the conclusion that the fire caused the burning of the cotton. Certainly, we cannot purport any logical necessity between the two (it involves no contradiction to say that fire does not burn cotton), and we have no empirical basis to form a link... It's just one of those pesky epistemic problems of science and scientific inference that still needs to be resolved... Someone really needs to change that Wikipedia entry then; they have made an assertion, and yet not shown it. Again, the same question posed to you above can be posed to the Wikipedia article. How exactly does a demonstratively consistent correlation suggest increased probability of a casual relationship? Going on the case with Gore's film, you were quite correct to show that Gore had the relationship mixed up. It makes more sense to point to a graph and say that higher temperature is correlated with higher carbon dioxide levels as the former usually precedes the latter (according to the best data gathered). So Gore would not really even be able to make the jump from the correlation to a cause-effect relationship because he is misreading the data in the first place. However, neither is it correct for you to say that "second, correlation does indeed imply at least some causation, like it or not. that the correlation exists over six hundred and fifty thousand freaking years is clear evidence that there is a cause-effect relationship. unfortunately for the activist world, since temperature precedes CO2 rise, that means temperature is the cause, not the effect. oops."
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