The ability of governments to make mind-numbingly stupid decisions constantly surprises me

[Humodour]

A front-line scientific squad which has responded to major outbreaks of disease such as SARS, Hendra and the swine flu is to be disbanded.

 

Funding has run out for the program which provided the "investigative backbone" for Australia's infectious disease response for 20 years, raising concerns among public health experts.

 

Emeritus Professor Robert Douglas, from the National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health at the Australian National University (ANU), along with fellow academics, is calling for an alternate source of funding to be found.

 

He said Australia did not have an equivalent of the US' Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and so many of its vital functions fell to the Master of Applied Epidemiology (MAE) program operating at ANU.

 

Every young scientist involved in the program spends two years "immersed in disease surveillance and outbreak investigations" around the country.

 

"They serve as a flying squad to respond at short notice to unusual infectious disease events that present potential treats to the population's health," Prof Douglas said.

 

"The ongoing human resource represented by the MAE trainees is a highly cost-effective insurance policy that we cannot risk losing in the challenging times ahead."

 

Prof Douglas said, over 20 years, about 160 MAE trainees had played central roles in stemming the spread of about 200 epidemics, including severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Hendra virus, the swine flu and food-borne infections.

 

The MAE was recently rolled into the same funding allocation as the broader Public Health Education and Research Program, which had reached its expected end and was not to be renewed."

 

"Although Australia is now one of the few industrialised nations that has no national centre for disease control, the MAE program at least represented one of the essential elements that such a national organisation would provide," Prof Douglas said.

 

Its loss would "leave Australia vulnerable at a time when increasing population movements, changing climate and other pressures increase the likelihood that we will face new pandemics and the re-emergence of old ones".

 

Prof Douglas raised the concerns in an article published in the latest edition of the Medical Journal of Australia.

 

http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-natio...1114-17sey.html

 

How could a government be so obviously stupid? Honestly - this isn't even a partisan issue. It's not even an expensive programme - a few million dollars. Pocket change for a government flush with cash in an economy booming along at an insane pace with a projected public budget surplus by 2014-15.

 

It just baffles me. They didn't even replace it with an alternative, just brushed it under the carpet hoping nobody would notice the funding lapse. Moronic Labour government.

[Aram]

Good. Keep the government out of my infectious diseases!

Edited November 15, 2010 by Aram

[Walsingham]

You don't mention if its role is being subsumed by another body. Is this the case? If so, how great a decrement in capability will occur?

 

Which specific capabilities do you think the previous system delivered that would significantly impact the outbreak of a pandemic?

[Humodour]

Your first question is covered by my statement "They didn't even replace it with an alternative" - the government certainly hasn't announced anything and if it does have a new disease centre up its sleeve this is a PR disaster.

 

Your second question was covered by the article, where the contributions of the current system were highlighted - especially things like Hendra, SARS and Swine flu (the first main Swine flu wave hit the southern hemisphere first, particularly Aus, before the northern hemisphere due to our opposite seasons, for example). Maybe something like this isn't strictly 'necessary'. Maybe we could borrow research from other countries. But if we did that we'd be giving up part of our heritage as a bastion of scientific output. And if we did that, who would study things like the Dengue fever, Hendra, SARS, and Swine flu outbreaks? Australia has its own very unique set of environmental conditions which other countries and research centres overseas are unlikely to study in a manner that considers this. It does not sit well with me at all.

 

I wouldn't mind if this function was simply transferred to the CSIRO, but has that happened? No.

 

I think this bit is especially poignant:

 

Its loss would "leave Australia vulnerable at a time when increasing population movements, changing climate and other pressures increase the likelihood that we will face new pandemics and the re-emergence of old ones".

 

So if anything we should be increasing the centre's funding!

[Walsingham]

Forgive me digging my heels in for a moment, but:

 

1. I assume that the centre was responsible for three roles:

- Pre-emptive outbreak modelling

- Analysis of possible outbreaks

- Command coordination in the event of outbreak

 

2. Even if we assume the centre was doing its job well then these roles will be subsumed

- The broader academic community and (among others) UK and US government bodies will continue modelling outbreaks

- Spotting outbreaks will, ultimately occur eventually, when local hospitals spot the development

- Command coordination requires different elements working together depending on the scale of the outbreak. In the event of a really serious pandemic you'd want coordination at the Oz equivalent of COBRA, or the Army. Because you would need to enforce quarantine and control supplies, maintain public order etc

 

3. In my experience when a govt. initiative folds 90% of the time it's because the people in charge were either crap or ****ing off everyone around them. Either eventuality precludes them doing an effective command and liaison role. Pop may or may not agree.

[Calax]

Although with something like the CDC you have a central group to deal with the public, and a specific chain of command that's easily in place, where as I'd guess that Aussies are gonna have a bit of a power struggle at the start of an epidemic as several groups try to horn in and get more funding by leading.

[Walsingham]

Although with something like the CDC you have a central group to deal with the public, and a specific chain of command that's easily in place, where as I'd guess that Aussies are gonna have a bit of a power struggle at the start of an epidemic as several groups try to horn in and get more funding by leading.

 

You speak wise words indeed. I can easily see this happening.