Azarkon

I don't think that's quite what Gorgon meant, but with regards to your argument - well, I really hope you're a vegetarian, because that's what your position demands, ultimately. We don't have to eat animals, or wear their skin, or use medicine made from their organs - therefore, if you want to make the argument that we shouldn't kill anything we don't have to, then we shouldn't kill any animals. Period. If you're okay with that, great. At least you're consistent. So basically you're saying that I read more into your post than I should have? That when you said "weak and defenseless" you only had people in mind, or was speaking in such abstract terms that "it means what it means what it means?" Fine. That's why I asked for clarification. To begin with, I don't see why someone who's fine with hunting would oppose using poison to cull dogs, anyhow. A gunshot to the head is faster, perhaps, but you can also miss.

True for nearly anything in the animal kingdom and certainly for everything under class mammalia, so that's definitely not all there is to say.

It's only a matter of conscience if you make the "like me" connection between animals and people. In the vast majority of cases where animal cruelty is actually involved, that connection is never made. Not to mention, where the connection should be drawn is subjective even within the animal rights community - people in the US like to throw dogs and cats into the equation, but purposefully exclude cows and pigs. People in Japan like to talk about animals on land, but ignore their own fishing practices in the sea. Some extremists want to go as far as insects, while others are content with primates and dolphins. This sort of thing annoys me to no ends. *shrug* I don't agree with the general "weak and defenseless" argument. At face value, it's the sort of moral equivalence that equates stepping on ants to slaughtering people. That can't be what you meant, but it's not like you were just talking about people, posting in an animal rights thread. That's why I asked for clarification, but if you're unwilling to give it, fine, I'm not going to press the point. I can agree that if someone held an empathic view towards animals and actually believe that they can feel pain in the same manner people can, then their cruely towards animals (or lack thereof) is a good indication of their character. But I won't extend that argument to people who refuse such a view in the first place, because I feel that the degree to which you can make the connection depends, ultimately, on your personal and social conditions. A starving Indian beggar used to fighting scraps from feral dogs won't likely feel the same way an upper class Beverly Hills dog owner would, and I refuse to believe that you can say anything about the former's character versus the latter's based on that.

Let me ask it in a different way, then - what, exactly, does an animal rights militant's treatment of animals and other beings that he sees as "weak and defenseless" say about him as a person? Is he humane and compassionate? Is he malicious and hypocritical? Is he a freedom fighter? Is he a terrorist? Is he good? Is he bad? Does the society he represent constitute a better, more civilized version than the one in which the rest of us dwell? Does it constitute a worse one, with all its priorities reversed? You said that we can tell alot about a person/people by his/their treatment of animals. I'm wondering what you meant by that. That is the clarification I seek.

Not at all. In fact, you might want to look into this book: Lea, Suzanne Goodney (2007). Delinquency and Animal Cruelty: Myths and Realities about Social Pathology, hardcover, 168 pages, ISBN 978-1-59332- 197-0. Lea challenges the assertion made by animal rights activists that animal cruelty enacted during childhood is a precursor to human-directed violence. The activists argue that our most violent criminals started off their bloody sprees with animal torture. Many parents, teachers, school administrators, and policy makers have thus accepted this claim on face value. In contrast, Lea finds that, in fact, many American youngsters-- and boys, especially-- engage in acts of animal cruelty but that few of these children go on to enact human-directed violence. The truth is, the link between animal cruelty and predisposition toward human cruelty rests on the application of zoosadism - ie whether you derive pleasure out of animal suffering, which 1) has nothing to do with actual practice or treatment (therefore, it is invalid to say that culling animals by one method versus another is indicative of zoosadism, because the choice has nothing to do with pleasure) and 2) is flimsical in and of itself as a predictor for human violence, even if fully established, as more recent research has shown.

Not a sole discriminator, but a pretty good reflection - at least, that's the interpretation I got out of "says a great deal 'bout us as people/People." Gromnir can clarify, if he'd like. For me, the very notion that you can make a leap from attitude towards animals to attitude towards weak/retarded people is a bit of a stretch. In order to consider one's treatment of animals in the context of the humane, one must, foremost, establish an anthropomorphic understanding of animals, without which any appeal to human ethics or human feelings is utterly meaningless. A person or people's treatment of animals is therefore not at all reflective of that person or people's basic humanity if, for that person or people, such a connection is never made. To mistake this missing link as an indication that something is wrong in the membrane ignores the social, cultural, and personal constructs inherent in the debate. Gromnir's argument is something akin to the one made by Richard Posner (as opposed to Peter Singer, who adopts a more rights-based approach fundamentally founded on an objectivist view towards cognitive capacity): "The "soft" utilitarian position on animal rights is a moral intuition of many, probably most, Americans. We realize that animals feel pain, and we think that to inflict pain without a reason is bad. Nothing of practical value is added by dressing up this intuition in the language of philosophy; much is lost when the intuition is made a stage in a logical argument. When kindness toward animals is levered into a duty of weighting the pains of animals and of people equally, bizarre vistas of social engineering are opened up." That, there, is the central point. The whole concept of kindness towards animals is predicated on the realization and anthropomorphization of the pain felt by animals, and that particular awareness is very much dependent on something that humans are not, by all indications, born with: an equivalence between their own sensual faculties and that of other creatures. In fact, children are often the greatest violators of "other creatures' rights" because they simply do not register the connection, which must be taught. For the longest time - and truly, until the animal rights movement of the 1970s - this teaching was not part of any secular society (though it was a component of Buddhism and Hinduism). That's not to say the notion didn't exist in any individual capacity, only that it was not a doctrine that was widely accepted. Why not? Because the environmental factors were not present - back when animals were little more than sport, pest, and feral threat - to draw the connection. Only when real contact with animals became largely domesticized did culture begin to swing the other way. And that's perfectly fine - it's logical that a society habituated on the image of animals as cute, cuddly pets and Disney protagonists would draw the equivalence. But that's a statement about society, not basic humanity, and it is fundamentally irresponsible to assign such a cultural norm to the moral and psychological judgment of other persons/peoples. In short, yes, a person's treatment of animals says alot about that person's moral and psychological character if they think of animals in the same terms as people. But for a great majority of those actually accused of animal abuse, that is basically untrue, and the argument becomes moot: you cannot (or at least, it would be irresponsible to) infer from a person's treatment of animals how that person is, deep inside, unless you know where that person stands on the "animals are just like me"--"animals are just mindless automatons" spectrum. For many cultures outside of the West, particularly those that have not experienced an animal rights movement that completely changed their perceptions of the human-animal relationship, it is basically ridiculous to argue that attitudes towards animals reflect basic humanity. As much as I'd like to say that those who value animal rights are essentially better, kinder persons whose sympathies towards those who are different put the rest of humanity to shame, I am reminded of how delusional that is each time I see an animal rights activist put the welfare of animals above that of other humans. It is then that I understand the more primal drive at work: it's not so much that these people are hypocrites (because I'm sure they care a great deal about animals), but that the ability to humanize animals says nothing about the inability to dehumanize humans. In fact, one might say that animal rights militants are differentiated from the rest of society simply by their swapped sympathies: to them, animals being like us means that those who kill animals must essentially be murderers. And of course, murderers deserve to be killed - because they're not human.

The analogy is correct, but the insight is lacking: a comparison is not an explanation. Still, why did you feel compelled to answer my question to Gromnir? Let him defend his own suggestion that people's attitudes towards weaker beings reflect their general humanity, particularly in relation to the existence of pro-life militants and animal rights militants.

The point is to obtain clarification, dear Gromnir, for what you left unsaid: that there is "inhumane," and then there is inhumane. Culling disease-ridden animals with what tools you have available to you isn't inhumane. It's pragmatism. The idea that anyone takes pleasure from such a cull, or should be judged thus of their humanity, is, frankly, pretty absurd.

So how do animal rights militants play into all this? You know, the guys who put bombs under people's cars in order to get them to stop the "inhumane" treatment of animals?

It's looking dangerous for the Democrats. A McCain victory seems very likely now that Obama and Hillary is tearing each other apart.

But in what way is democracy more suited for the normalization of extremes, and how does that deter war? The last time I checked, Bush pushed through the War in Iraq without universal consent, and maintained it for more than four years despite a majority opposition. Russia fought both Chechen Wars as a democracy. By contrast, China, an authoritarian regime by every notion of the word, hasn't gone to war in the last thirty years. The argument that proclivity for war is tied to government structure therefore seems flimsy, at best. I would be more convinced if you can show that the protection of human rights within a country have anything to do with its foreign policy. In my view, it is more likely that a nation with a strong sense of ideological human rights would engage in interventionary wars than would a more practical authoritarian regime trying to keep its population under control. There is no reason to believe that democracies would shun war - though there reason to believe that democracies are less likely to engage in total war (because of the difficulty of instituting a draft when your legitimacy depends on those you're drafting). In my view, while there is some correlation between democracy and belligerence, they are not the most important factors and therefore not safeguards. A country's economic system, resource security, position within the ideological-practical spectrum, and regional balance are far better places to start than the government. Fundamentally, countries go to war largely to protect their self-interests, and this is as true of democracies as it is of dictatorships. The system of interdependent compartments is designed to tie every country's self-interests with every other country's. That's the reason it's likely to work - at least while the interdependence holds.

But that is easy. Remember, some of the worst dictators of the world were either voted into power, or might as well have been. Historically, people are known to willingly give away their freedoms and their rights in order to attain security and prosperity. Democracy is insufficient. A free press and a strong anti-war tradition is more important.

I think we both agree that in the lack of social conditioning, there remains a basic set of comforts and discomforts that are wired directly into our biology. The question is how deep this wiring goes. I make no claim to possessing the real answer to the "nature vs. nurture" question, but I do want to point out that the tendency for people to act in their own self-interests (or, at least, in the self-interests of "those like them") is nigh universal and thus justifies a view of morality-as-personal-comfort-zone. There may, in fact, be some people in the world who would elect to act against their own self-interests on the basis of some moral code (or, perhaps, it is more accurate to say that they view following those principles as the highest fulfillment of their self-interests), but they are few and far in-between. By and large, people will choose according to basic wants and fears, which in this case corresponds to their own survival. What arguments they conjure to justify themselves is mere psychological trickery - because fundamentally, one cannot choose rationally between the deaths of billions of innocent people. The consequences cannot be predicted, and all conventional notions of morality falter. As Gandalf would say, "even the wise cannot know all ends." In the end, I am rather disappointed that no one has pointed out what I think is true: that with regards to this question, rational morality fails. In the absence of rationality, there is only one "moral" way to decide between two fundamentally "immoral" decisions: flip a coin, and let nature decide. The alternative is too dreadful to consider.

I'm not sure about that. It seems to me that there are fundamental comforts and discomforts produced by evolution, and which require substantial conditioning and desensitization to the contrary in order to even begin to overcome. The stigma against murder, for example - even though it's possible to condition a soldier to shoot to kill, there are hosts of psychological problems associated with soldiers who are trained to practice such actions against unarmed civilians (against enemy soldiers, "murder" can be justified as "self-defense"). I see morality as a consequence of these intrinsic factors as much as I see it as the outgrowth of society and culture.

Alot more comfortable than if they were dead, don't you think? The fundamental reason you don't want to submit to a foreign system is that said system will always be twisted to favor its original masters. As terrible as the Chinese leadership may be (and personally, I don't think they're doing that badly, given the circumstances), they're still better than an America that would, when push comes to shove, throw China to the wolves to save itself.

If it helps you, you might want to think of this dilemma a little differently than how the OP presented it. Imagine, instead, that there was an asteroid headed for the earth. There is no way to deflect the asteroid, and no time to evacuate. The only thing the world can do to choose where it hits: China, or the US. If it hits China, all ~1.3 billion people there are doomed. If it hits the US, all ~0.3 billion people here are dead. What do you choose? It comes down to the same moral argument, which is fundamentally a value judgment, and therefore inherently relative. Btw, I disagree with every single opinion that's been expressed here so far. Take from that what you will.

Generally, under a utilitarian point of view, the happiness of the many indeed outweigh the happiness of the few. In practice, most people practice utilitarianism - but only when it benefits them, so the point becomes moot. In the end, it's just one more nail in the coffin of utilitarian objectivism. In this case, if you were Chinese, you'd certainly argue that the US should just roll over and die. Vice versa with Americans and China. For people not in either country, the choice comes down to which country they like more (on this board, I'd expect the US to be the popular answer). What's the point of debate? No one will accept a moral system that does not place their comfort zone at its center. In the case of something as vital as survival, that almost always means people will accept the moral system that will allow them to survive (those who did not, well, died - and were thus taken out of the evolutionary chain). Personally, if I were to throw my lot with moral objectivism, I'd go with deontology. At least then you can argue that the situation presented by the OP is fundamentally immoral and would never happen if people were deontological (in this case, an argument could be made for whether to prefer the US or China, depending on who attacked who, whose actions are justified, etc.). Utilitarianism is far more practical, but it's fundamentally relative. On a side-note, I hope everyone understands now why I made the argument in the other thread regarding why the world will continue to militarize. The US simply cannot expect that the rest of the world will submit to its military supremacy - because when push comes to shove, people will always choose themselves.

In some sense, this sort of thing is why the children of important politicians should not serve on the frontlines. If they are discovered, it is almost certain that they will become major military targets & threaten the lives of their fellow soldiers. Imagine if the Taliban had used Bush's daughters (yes, I'm aware that Bush is a bad example) as a bargaining chip. If he did not negotiate, he shall certainly be responsible for the deaths of his own children. If he did, he would've sold out his country. Not a decision anyone should be forced to make, even Bush. I understand Harry's display of courage, and people's (at least, Britons') desire to take pride in his actions, but I'm reluctant to cheer on such potentially disastrous acts, in general. No doubt the fact that the British royalty has limited political power helps Harry's case, but even so, he is important enough that he would've been a target if the insurgents knew who he was, and there is no reason to believe why the insurgents couldn't find out, in today's information-heavy world, when US reporters did. There are better ways to use a prince's status, talent, and influence than fight on the frontlines. No doubt Harry was concerned with the reputation of his family and wanted to show that the British royalty isn't a coven of spineless faux-celebrities. Still, one wonders why he had to take up the mantle of soldiership in order to prove that, despite the very real political vulnerabilities he brings. Is there no other way to display one's courage and will to do good? If so, what does that say about civilization's need for war?

Not entirely. A resurgence of dysgenic fears is taking place, currently, especially in relation to immigration and the changing demographics of previously "homogeneous" countries. This time, it's backed by a combination of pseudo-science and anti-PC "rationalism," which in effect is a reactionary throwback to the days when "race" mattered. The implications of this movement are hard to predict, as the situation has not yet reached a point when a politician could actually build a legitimate platform on being "anti-PC" with respect to race. I'm sure our resident "racialists" can tell you more. Ultimately, I think the more interesting question is not whether dysgenic fears are irrational, but whether morality falls apart in the face of the "greater good." It's one thing to say that our societies are built on the assumption that "all men are created equal," another altogether to say that those are the principles by which we choose to live, regardless of whether they're true. As technology progresses and we attain greater understanding of the human species, I can only imagine that the question of eugenics vs. dysgenics will become all the more urgent. I do not think that liberal-humanism has yet recognized the fundamental threat science poses to its ideological basis, and that opponents are already chipping away at the pillars that support its doctrines. We shall have to see whether liberal-humanism can reinvent itself in the face of factual contradictions with its most basic assumptions - and what will happen if it does not. These are interesting and worrisome times. On closing, just to make my point a little more concrete, let me pose this question: if it were discovered that, indeed, certain groups are vastly superior to other groups in terms of, say, quantitative intelligence (math, science, engineering, etc.), and that the skills possessed by such groups are necessary for the running of a technological society, what should be done with regards to our social policy? Should it change at all? What if said groups are "threatened" by other, competing groups of "lesser" intelligence, and are hence in danger of becoming marginalized by virtue of their numbers ala Idiocracy? Should the government intervene and, in effect, engage in coercive eugenics? Or should it remain passive, and risk the "degeneration" of society? Idiocracy is not as innocuous as you might think. Like all satire, it conceals an element of truth.

Nature and nurture are often indistinguishable, when it comes to humanity. What you describe is a particular interpretation of eugenics; it is not, by any means, the only interpretation. For example, I'd consider commercial genetic engineering (ie designer babies), even without any government intervention, intrinsically eugenicist. In this respect, the sole difference I identify between eugenics and "natural evolution" is conscious self-direction - evolution is passive, eugenics intentional. I think you will find, if you look it up, that there is definitely controversy in the usage of the term. I happen to fall on the inclusive side of the debate.

That's one way to define eugenics. Another is to recognize that eugenics is the inevitable outcome of self-directed social forces that favor one group of people (in terms of reproduction) over another. Human societies have, in this respect, always engaged in eugenic practices - you yourself do it by choosing to reproduce with a certain type of people (ie physically attractive individuals) over another, social groups do it by forbidding or encouraging marriages to certain other social groups (ie people of one ethnicity preferring to marry people of the same ethnicity), and the government does it by favoring certain groups over others (ie monetary incentives, sterilization options for people with genetic diseases, screening & abortion, etc). It is the extreme, coercive tactics that certain eugenics supporters promote that are evil, not the concept itself.

*shrug* Most people don't think for themselves.

For a true believer, faith is reason. Why do you think there is such a huge controversy in nominally "secular" states over things like homosexuality and abortion? These are not arguments that can be solved solely by reason, not for the religious, at least.

You're ignoring the fact that religion and the state are often fundamentally conflicted in the laws they prescribe, and therefore cannot coexist without one or the other giving in. This is why the process that ultimately enabled Christians to coexist with the secular state is precisely a reformation of the religion itself. Otherwise, the only possible coexistence is a state of heresy, in which the practitioners of the religion merely pay lip service to its doctrines; for the true believers, this can never be an acceptable compromise. This is why traditional Islam cannot coexist with a modern secular state - because in order to follow its doctrines, as they are currently interpreted, traditional-minded Muslims must place Shariah laws above state laws. Only a reformation of the religion can bridge the differences between the scriptural tenets and modern secularism. This is a good move on the part of Turkey, which has always existed in a precarious balance between its dedication to secularism and its traditionally Islamic population. I can only hope the process is a success, though it could easily fail and result in the revisionists being branded heretics.

So, with the recent turn of events, who are the likely contenders?